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To members of the Australian Institute for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 
thank you for the opportunity to edit this collection of essays, the sixth in the 
Genocide Perspectives Series. We would like to thank UTS ePRESS for enabling 
academic works such as Genocide Perspectives to reach a wide audience, and 
particularly to Scott Abbott and Matthew Noble. 
Finally, a very heartfelt thanks to Vernon Ah Kee for allowing his artwork 
to appear on the cover of GPVI (and to Jacob G. Warren for facilitating that 
opportunity). Ah Kee’s art represents themes of genocide and atrocity, both of 
which are explored in the Genocide Perspectives Series, and we are honoured 
that such a high calibre and moving artwork accompanies this book.

The Process and the Personal Cost 
of Genocide
Nikki Marczak and Kirril Shields
It is with a mixture of sadness and appreciation that we include, in this  edition 
of Genocide Perspectives, the final published text of Professor Colin Tatz. The 
father of Australian genocide studies, and Founding Director of the Australian 
Institute for Holocaust and Genocide Studies (AIHGS), Professor Tatz passed 
away on 19 November 2019. In the wake of his death he has been honoured by 
individuals he inspired, organisations he worked with, and communities whose 
experiences he shed light on and for whom he advocated tirelessly throughout 
his life. He has been hailed as a ‘doyen of genocide studies academics’,1 celebrated 
on ABC and SBS radio, by Armenian and Jewish communal  representatives, 
and the universities at which he taught.2 His dedication to challenging rac-
ism has been at the forefront of tributes, and his courage and rebellious streak 
 1 ‘Colin Tatz Has Passed Away at 85’, J-Wire, November 19, 2019, https://
www.jwire.com.au/colin-tatz-has-passed-away-at-85/. 
 2 Phillip Adams, ‘Remembering Colin Tatz’, Late Night Live, ABC Radio, 
November 20, 2019, https://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs 
/late nightlive/remembering-professor-colin-tatz/11722570; ‘Vale Emeritus 
 Professor Colin Tatz’, November 22, 2019, https://politicsir.cass.anu.edu.au 
/vale-emeritus-professor-colin-tatz.
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admired by all those who knew him.3 To us and the other members of AIHGS, 
he was Colin—our mentor and friend, and we will always remember him.
Colin adapted some of his 2019 book, The Sealed Box of Suicide: The Contexts 
of Self-Death, for an essay in this collection, and it is perhaps fitting that his last 
topic of writing relates to existential questions around life and death, personal 
choices, and the legacy of trauma, grief, and mourning. 
Professor Tatz was never one to shy away from unorthodox and original 
theses, but his views were always informed by decades of practical, collabora-
tive work with Indigenous communities. In his paper ‘Genocide and Suicide’, 
Tatz draws connections between the two. Sometimes they are co-existent, 
as noted through the Holocaust and Armenian cases, but in the main he focuses 
on Aboriginal communities in Australia, arguing that the high rates of suicides 
are not the result of mental illness, nor a phenomenon that can be medicalised 
or treated within a ‘mental health’ framework. Rather, he positions suicide as 
arising from centuries of colonisation, theft of land, and destruction of identity, 
families ripped apart under government policy, institutional sexual abuse, the 
Western legacy of drug and alcohol abuse, and from a cycle of socio-economic 
disadvantage. It is the consequence of decades of trauma and exacerbated by 
a sequence of paternalistic government policy, Tatz argues, that denies Abo-
riginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ self-determination. But Tatz goes 
 further, asserting that in this context, suicide may be a rational choice, to escape 
one’s existence in the absence of hope. Low life expectancy in Aboriginal com-
munities means that funerals are constantly being held; children are exposed 
to death regularly and from an early age. Sadness and grief are not the same as 
mental illness, but they are so intrinsic to many Aboriginal lives that suicide 
must be understood as a response and a valid choice. 
Tatz’s contribution sets the tone of Genocide Perspectives VI as a volume that 
offers new insight into the past, reinvigorating debate and providing scholarly 
contemplation on the ‘crime of crimes’, genocide. In this edition, among other 
topics, contributors explore the causal factors in the emergence of genocide, 
and reveal the impact of the Holocaust on individuals and families. Aspects of 
Indigenous Australian experiences are discussed, so too the persecution of par-
ticular groups by the Nazis. The legacy of the Armenian Genocide is explored 
through the ‘long shadows’ of the Ottoman era that are currently influencing 
atrocities in the Middle East, while the role of global governments in halting or 
fuelling the process of genocide is a key focus. 
Once again, in the spirit of AIHGS, we have chosen to emphasise Australian 
scholarship, providing a platform for both established scholars and emerging 
ones. Australian scholars are at the forefront of genocide studies and have their 
own historical perspective living in a post-colonial, post-genocidal nation. 
 3 Nikki Marczak and Meher Grigorian, ‘A Rebel with a Cause and a Teacher 
with Heart’, Plus61J, November 25, 2019, https://plus61j.net.au/plus61j 
-voices/rebel-cause-teacher-heart/.
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Authors represented here, we believe, portray the diverse areas of study and 
research undertaken in the country, and their contributions are valuable to the 
expanding literature on genocide.
Genocide Perspectives VI begins with a densely analytical, evidence-based 
thesis on how political leadership can either fuel the fires that lead to mass 
atrocity or, alternatively, divert a nation away from conflict and violence. Alex J 
Bellamy and Stephen McLoughlin are respected experts on the United Nations 
endorsed concept of the Responsibility to Protect, which holds that states have 
a responsibility to protect peoples within their borders from atrocity crimes, 
and that where a state manifestly fails to do so, the international commu-
nity has a responsibility to intervene. In this essay, Bellamy and McLoughlin 
explore the role of political leaders in driving the course of a country either 
towards violence, or diffusing the conditions that could lead to it. Although 
much research has been undertaken on the influence of leaders such as Adolf 
Hitler and Josef Stalin in pushing countries, indeed continents towards geno-
cide, little is understood about the strategies leaders can effectively use to pull 
back from the brink. Providing a plethora of examples, from Kenya to post- 
Apartheid South Africa, Tunisia to Macedonia, Bellamy and McLoughlin show 
how decision making by leaders, even in nations that have the preconditions for 
atrocity crimes, can prevent mass violence. The stark comparison with recent 
examples of protracted conflict marred by attacks against civilians, such as the 
case of Syria, is extremely impactful. Their argument that leadership plays an 
important role in atrocity prevention must prove to be a cornerstone of atrocity 
prevention scholarship. 
Similarly, Melanie O’Brien looks at genocide as a process rather than a one-
off event, showing how violation of the right to freedom of religion manifested 
in a range of case studies. O’Brien examines the tactic of genocidal regimes of 
breaching the human right of freedom of religion in order to destroy the victim 
group, through the lens of the Holocaust, the Cambodian Genocide and the 
Armenian Genocide. Even when the target group is not defined purely as a 
religious group, O’Brien argues, the violation of freedom of religion contributes 
to the genocide. With a strong foundation in human rights law, this essay shows 
the journey of a gradual violation of rights towards mass atrocity crimes. 
In the third essay, Katharine Gelber gives us a highly personal view of the 
sorts of rights violations O’Brien describes. As a child of a Holocaust survi-
vor who never spoke of his experiences, Gelber grew up with minimal insight 
into her father’s past, and it was only after he died in 2017 that she ‘discovered 
a trove of objects, artefacts of a life I knew almost nothing about but which 
he had had in his possession for decades’. Gelber spoke at The University of 
Queensland’s Yom HaShoah, or Holocaust Memorial Day event in 2019, and 
presented her findings from a two year research journey that has culminated 
in her donating her father’s belongings to the Sydney Jewish Museum as The 
Gelber/ Altschul Collection. Just as important, her journey has shed light 
on aspects of her family history that have left both visible and hidden scars 
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— intergenerational effects that are common to many children of survivors, 
even (perhaps especially) when they were told nothing of their parents’ trauma. 
The impact of Nazi persecution is told from a very distinct but equally per-
sonal perspective by Amanda Tink, who frames her essay with the continual 
consciousness that as a person with a disability, she would have suffered a ter-
rible fate had she been born in the Nazi era. Tink writes, ‘As with all geno-
cides, its roots are in our language, and language around disability remains 
resolutely dehumanising’. Tink explores the Nazi genocide of people with men-
tal and physical disabilities through Australian author Les Murray’s text, Fredy 
Neptune. Murray was mildly autistic and he draws on his own experiences as 
well as those of his autistic son to convey prejudice and violence against people 
with disabilities. These are told through the eyes of two characters—Fredy, also 
autistic, who develops a physical and emotional reaction (superhuman strength 
and loss of pain) after witnessing a brutal act of murder during the Armenian 
Genocide, and Hans, an intellectually impaired young man whom Fredy res-
cues from Germany in 1933. Once again, the nature of genocide as an evolv-
ing and escalating process of prejudice, discrimination, language, violation of 
rights, and finally violence, is emphasised in Tink’s paper, first with the ideol-
ogy of eugenics permeating language around those with disabilities, deeming 
them as inferior and unworthy of life, and then, with their rights gradually 
taken away over time, eventually even their right to life. 
The role of perpetrators in the Nazi ‘euthanasia’ programme discussed in 
Tink’s paper is explored in detail in Linda Shields and Susan Benedict’s essay 
on the role of nurses in Nazi Germany. Despite being one of the ‘caring profes-
sions’, nurses participated, with varying degrees of willingness, in the murder 
of disabled people—a category that the Nazis did not hesitate to expand to take 
in more and more victims. Shields and Benedict provide background about 
the propaganda of eugenics that was designed to convince those working in the 
Nazi system that their actions were not only legally required but morally right, 
and outline the processes undertaken in hospitals to determine which individ-
uals were no longer ‘worthy of life’. The question of how medical professionals 
could starve children, force feed people lethal doses of drugs, or leave victims 
outside in the cold to die remains unanswered, but Shields and Benedict’s essay 
provides insight into the often banal and sometimes ideologically driven moti-
vations for perpetrators of genocide. 
Complementing Tatz’s piece by exploring the exploitation and trauma of 
Indigenous Australian communities from a different point of view, is Jacob G. 
Warren’s essay on Maralinga and nuclear colonialism. Warren describes the 
pain and ‘violent realities’ of seeing Maralinga, this ‘invisibly scarred and toxic 
region only two hours north of the much-used Eyre Highway’. Just as Tink 
analysed genocide through literature, so too does Warren examine Indigenous 
genocide (the destruction of the peoples, identity, and land) via visual art. War-
ren describes the sand-covered painting Maralinga by Jonathan Kumintjara 
Brown and the five-metre tall installation Thunder Raining Poison by  Yhonnie 
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Scarce, drawing connections with the image of the desert as ‘void’, terra  nullius, 
the notion that the land was uninhabited, and environmental injustice a form 
of slow violence. Like many of the other essays in this collection, Warren grap-
ples with the understanding of genocide as a slow gradual process but still evi-
dent today in the artworks depicting the nuclear destruction of Maralinga. 
Another site of historical violence against Indigenous Australians is Myall 
Creek, where a massacre took place in 1838 of 28 men, women and children 
of the Kamilaroi nation. Each year that event is commemorated, and it is well 
known because it was one of the only massacres of Aboriginal people that 
resulted in prosecution against the perpetrators. Mark Tedeschi QC, who wrote 
a book on the event titled Murder at Myall Creek, gave a speech at the 2017 
commemoration that he has generously allowed us to publish here. Tedeschi 
contemplates the significance of the unique prosecution of convicts for the 
murder of Aboriginal people and highlights the role of those individuals who 
refused to remain silent in the face of this horrendous crime. He points out 
the similarities between the case and modern war crimes trials, although war 
crimes as a concept had not been invented. Indeed, Tedeschi asserts that the 
‘actions of the Myall Creek murderers were war crimes and part of a deliberate, 
state-sanctioned genocide of the Aboriginal people that today would be pun-
ishable by the rules of international criminal law’.
Australian history, and the legacy of genocide, are two topics explored by 
Caroline Schneider and Hans-Lukas Kieser in their essay based on the 2018 
exhibition in Canberra, ‘Long Shadows—The Great War, Australia and the 
Middle East’. The exhibition and the essay look at the connections between 
the ANZAC experience and the Armenian Genocide, drawing on experiences 
of Australian soldiers who witnessed genocidal crimes as well as humanitar-
ian efforts by Australian organisations to assist Armenian victims, all the while 
asking why the Armenian Genocide does not have a more prominent place 
in Australian and ANZAC history. The authors draw yet another important 
 connection, between the persecution of the Ottoman era against ethnic and 
religious minorities, and the echoes, or ‘long shadows’, in the Middle East 
today, most clearly seen in the 2014 genocide of the Yazidis in Northern Iraq. 
The parallels between the two cases must compel us to ask why we still have 
not learnt from history, taking us back to Bellamy and McLoughlin’s analysis of 
leadership and atrocity prevention. 
Schneider and Kieser mention the transgenerational impact of the Arme-
nian Genocide on the Armenian community and this issue is analysed in 
depth in the final essay of the collection, ‘“It’s Happening Again”: Genocide, 
Denial, Exile and Trauma’, by Armen Gakavian. First examining how survivors 
and their descendants have responded to the ongoing trauma of the genocide 
over the past three decades, Gakavian goes on to identify two newer responses. 
The first—engagement with Turkish government, civil society and individu-
als has an ‘outward, positive focus’ whereby diasporan Armenians are will-
ing to engage with Turkish peers in the more neutral environments of North 
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 America, Europe, and Australia. Likewise, there has been a shift among some 
segments of the Turkish community that have proven willing to honestly 
 confront their nation’s history. The second more recent response, Gakavian 
argues, is one of fear among Armenian communities that the genocide ‘is hap-
pening again’. Gakavian looks at responses to the 1988 earthquake, the conflict 
in Nagorno-Karabakh, and the recent conflicts in the Middle East especially in 
Syria,  analysing how Armenians view such events through the lens of their 
unresolved trauma and Turkish denial.
We are very privileged to have co-edited this timely and original contribu-
tion to the Genocide Perspectives Series and to genocide studies literature more 




Political Leadership and the Paths  
to and from Mass Atrocities
Alex J. Bellamy and Stephen McLoughlin
Syria’s President, Bashar al-Assad, had an important decision to make on 30 
March 2011. His country had been engulfed by protests for the past two weeks, 
triggered by the security force’s overreaction to anti-regime graffiti scrawled 
on a school wall by a group of teenagers and fuelled by the tumults of the 
‘Arab Spring’. Now, the President was to deliver his first televised address to the 
nation since the protests began. Assad had a real choice to make; his counsel-
lors were divided. Indeed, there is some suggestion that there were even two—
very  different—draft speeches.4 Some, like Manaf Tlass, a close confidant to 
Bashar and his father Hafez al-Assad before him, and Brigadier General in Syr-
ia’s elite Republican Guard, advised restraint. The President should align him-
self with the protesters, sack corrupt officials and offer political and  economic 
reform, Tlass argued. Above all, he should rein in the security forces, end 
the use of force against peaceful protesters and prosecute those  responsible. 
 4 David Lesch views the speech as a pivotal turning point and documents the 
background and debates in impressive detail. See David W Lesch, Syria: The 
Fall of the House of Assad (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 75–82.
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The people still believed in him, Tlass told his President. Moderation and 
accommodation would dampen the protests and secure the regime—just as it 
had in  neighbouring Jordan.5 Others disagreed. Hesitation and restraint would 
be taken as signs of weakness, they argued, just as in Egypt, where the army’s 
refusal to fire on protesters had sealed President Mubarak’s fate six weeks 
 earlier. Assad would have no such problem persuading the feared security ser-
vices, the Mukhabarat, and elite military units loyal to the government to attack 
the protesters. The President should denounce the protesters and step up the 
crackdown, they argued.
It was a close-run thing. On the day itself, moderates inside Assad’s inner cir-
cle believed the President would offer a hand of conciliation to the protesters. 
Millions of Syrians tuned in to watch, most hoping that their President would 
offer words to unite the country and stem the escalation of violence. They were 
to be bitterly disappointed. Assad chose instead to pour fuel on the fire; to send 
Syria on a path towards civil war, mass atrocities and utter destruction, all in 
order to protect his family’s hold on power. The President denounced the pro-
testers as part of a great foreign-backed conspiracy that was using sedition to 
weaken and destroy Syria itself. All part of a masterplan supposedly orches-
trated by Israel. The government, he argued, must take a firm hand. The touch-
paper was lit and many Syrians left bitterly disappointed. But beneath all that 
lay the hard realisation that the state was positioning itself against the people, 
that the government would not reform and that violence was inevitable.
It is true that genocides and other mass atrocities do not emerge out of 
nowhere, that they are processes often long in the making.6 All too often, how-
ever, a focus on the structural causes and pathways of escalation that lead to 
mass violence obscures the role of human agency, the fact that along the way 
leaders make decisions that push their countries towards, or away from, mass 
violence. Syria’s recent history might have been very different had Assad cho-
sen a different path. Likewise, Slobodan Milošević might have led Serbia in a 
 different direction, Salva Kiir and Riek Machar might have pursued a more 
peaceful way of resolving their differences in South Sudan and Aung San Suu 
Kyi’s government of Myanmar might have dished out citizenship rights not 
atrocity crimes in Rakhine state. Decisions made by leaders line the path to 
mass atrocities, yet they can also forge a path away from mass atrocities.
There are uncomfortable truths here for those invested in atrocity preven-
tion, too. In May 1998, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan gave a speech in 
Kigali, Rwanda, in which he underscored an undeniable—if uncomfortable—
 5 Tlass later defected. For an account based on his testimony see Sam Dagher, 
Assad or We Burn the Country: How One Family’s Lust for Power Destroyed 
Syria (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 2019). 
 6 Except where specifically noted, we use the terms ‘mass atrocities’ and ‘mass 
violence’ as shorthands for the atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes, 
 ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. 
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truth about the genocide there four years earlier. For all that the international 
community could be condemned for failing to confront the mass slaughter, the 
genocide itself ‘was a horror that came from within’.7 Atrocity crimes do not 
emerge from nowhere but arise out of deep-seated fear and practices of dis-
crimination, marginalisation and conflict. On most occasions both the forces 
that push societies towards the abyss, and those that inhabit such moves, are 
propelled not by international actors but by national governments, civil socie-
ties and private sectors animated by decidedly local concerns.8 As Scott Straus 
recently argued, international actors can play a ‘supporting role’ but ‘it is very 
difficult, if not impossible, for international actors to impose new political nar-
ratives or to impose peace on ruling elites who do not want to compromise’.9 
The hard truth is that more often than not, the actors primarily responsible for 
determining whether or not a country will experience the horror of atrocity 
crimes are those within the country itself.10 
In this essay, we explore the role of national leaders in committing, stopping 
and preventing mass atrocities. We argue that leaders play crucial but poorly 
understood roles in determining whether or not mass atrocities occur, as well 
as the degree to which they do and how they are terminated. To begin to better 
understand the role of leadership in causing and preventing mass atrocities, 
this essay unfolds in two main parts. First, we build a case for the importance 
of understanding the influence that leaders have had. We do this by pointing 
out the tendency on the one hand to accept as a given that such leaders as Josef 
Stalin, Pol Pot and Adolf Hitler were central to perpetration of genocide and 
mass violence, yet on the other there is very little interest in investigating what 
leaders have done to navigate things in a different direction. We then draw 
on examples to explore the role and impact of leaders in three ways: in creat-
ing or inhibiting risk; in pulling societies back ‘from the brink’—or pushing 
them over it—in times of crisis; and in halting—or prolonging—atrocities that 
have already started. In better understanding the decisions that leaders have 
 7 Stanley Meisler, Kofi Annan: A Man of Peace in a World of War (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, 1997), 172.
 8 The importance of the local in driving atrocities is emphasised by Scott 
Straus, The Order of Genocide: Race, Power and War in Rwanda (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press 2008) and, more generally, Stathis N Kalyvas, 
The Logic of Violence in Civil Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006). 
 9 Scott Straus, Making and Unmaking Nations: War, Leadership, and Genocide 
in Modern Africa (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015).
 10 For an account of the different types of roles played by individuals with 
respect to atrocity crimes, see Edward C Luck and Dana Zaret Luck, ‘The 
Individual Responsibility to Protect’, in Reconstructing Atrocity Preven-
tion, eds. Sheri P Rosenberg, Tibi Galis, and Alex Zucker (Cambridge: 
 Cambridge University Press, 2015), 214–32.
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made historically, which have led to both the perpetration and avoidance of 
mass atrocities, and why they have made such decisions, what becomes clearer 
are the circumstances within which leaders make such decisions, the reasons 
behind their decisions and how preventive strategies can be better calibrated to 
deal with different types of leaders. 
Leadership and mass atrocities
Historians have written dozens, if not hundreds, of volumes about the central 
role that leaders such as Hitler, Stalin and Pol Pot played in planning, authoris-
ing and orchestrating mass violence.11 But we lack a broader understanding of 
the role of leadership, the choices that leaders make and the factors that influ-
ence those choices. In particular, because we tend to focus only on the most 
notorious of genocidal leaders, we tend not to see the other paths that were 
open to them and the impact other leaders have had on halting atrocities that 
have started. And almost completely ignored are those leaders who succeeded 
in steering countries away from violence entirely during times of upheaval and 
dangerous risk escalation.12 We know much about Bashar al-Assad’s fateful deci-
sion, much less about how Jordan’s King Abdullah II or Tunisia’s Ben Ali and 
then Hamadi Jebali navigated more peacefully the same winds that destroyed 
Syria (though not entirely peacefully in Ben Ali’s case). When it comes to lead-
ership and mass atrocities, the dogs that do not bark are never heard. As a result, 
we have only a partial understanding of the role that leaders play—one that 
provides relatively little advice for the prevention of mass atrocities.
There is broad consensus that mass atrocities are processes that are 
 deliberately planned, rather than spontaneous outbursts of violence.13 There 
is also good evidence that authoritarian political regimes are more prone to 
perpetrate such violence than others, and that those regimes that promoted 
exclusionary ideologies are especially prone.14 But these contextual factors, and 
 11 See, for example, Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives (New York: 
Knopf, 1992); Ben Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide 
in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge 1975–1979 (New Haven, Connecticut: 
Yale University Press, 2008).
 12 See, for example, Helen Fein, Accounting for Genocide: National Responses 
and Jewish Victimization during the Holocaust (New York: Free Press, 1980); 
Leo Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1983); Jacques Semelin, Purify and Destroy: The 
 Political Uses of Genocide and Massacre (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2007).
 13 For example, see Adama Dieng, ‘Seeing Atrocity Crimes as Processes, 
Not Single Events’, interview by YJIA, Yale Journal of International Affairs 9, 
iss. 1 (2014): 85–90.
 14 Straus, Making and Unmaking, 326.
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the impact they have on the course of events, are mediated by human agency, 
meaning that similar sets of factors create different effects in different settings 
because the people who are taking decisions and acting upon them are differ-
ent. As the historian Margaret Macmillan points out, no two settings are ever 
the same precisely because the people involved are different. These regimes are 
more often than not headed by a prominent, sometimes ‘charismatic’, leader. 
What matters—when we are looking for evidence of processes or risk factors—
is the collective impact these have on the choices that leaders make across time 
and space. The way we understand mass atrocities and their prevention there-
fore needs to be ‘saturated with agency’ to a much greater extent than it is.15 
On the one hand, structural or contextual factors associated with heightened 
risk of mass atrocities matter only inasmuch as they influence the decision 
making of individuals and groups, and little is more consequential than the 
decision making of political leaders. On the other, it is important to recognise 
that contextual factors are often themselves produced by the conscious deci-
sions of national elites. Forms of government, patterns of discrimination, the 
quality of the rule of law, the character of national ideologies—all of these fac-
tors associated with heightened risk are human artifices usually constructed by 
national elites. In relation to each one, national leaders could have chosen to 
follow more propitious paths, as indeed they tended to do in those countries 
that successfully navigated their way through moments of potential crisis.16
For example, in explaining why Côte d’Ivoire ‘retreated from the brink’ in 
early 2011 while Rwanda spiralled into genocide 16 years earlier, Scott Straus 
points to the distinct approaches each country’s inaugural post-colonial leader 
took. Rwanda’s Grégoire Kayibanda repeatedly emphasised the threat that 
 ethnic Tutsis represented, while Côte d’Ivoire’s Houphoet Boughny ‘preached 
the values of inter-ethnic cooperation, dialogue and tolerance’.17 Another study 
investigated the domestic factors that were instrumental in three countries—
Botswana, Zambia and Tanzania—navigating long-term risk associated with 
mass atrocities following independence in the 1960s. It found that effective 
long-term risk mitigation was in large part the product of the inclusiveness 
of vision, and corresponding inclusive policies implemented by these states’ 
founding leaders: ‘This in itself highlights the importance of individual agency 
in the long-term prevention of mass atrocities’.18 Evidently, not only do leaders 
 15 To borrow a phrase used by Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How 
Europe Went to War in 1914 (London: Penguin, 2012), xxvii. 
 16 This way of thinking about the relationship between human agency and 
social structures in the context of mass violence draws from Alex J Bellamy, 
East Asia’s Other Miracle: Explaining the Decline of Mass Atrocities (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2017), 11. 
 17 Scott Straus, ‘Retreating from the Brink: Theorizing Mass Violence and the 
Dynamics of Restraint’, Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 2 (2012): 353–55.
 18 Stephen McLoughlin, The Structural Prevention of Mass Atrocities (London: 
Routledge, 2014), 159.
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matter in the  prevention of mass atrocities, but often their agency plays a cen-
tral role in shaping and limiting scenarios of risk.
That mass atrocities tend to be deliberative and well planned is well estab-
lished. This suggests the importance of leadership, and historical experience 
seems to bear this out. Scholars have long argued that leaders are of central 
importance in making purposeful decisions that lead to such violence. They 
argue that the leader is often the key agent responsible for instrumentalising 
pre-existing divisions and prejudices that escalates tensions and mobilises 
populations to either take part in violence, or turn a blind eye to the violence 
directed against collective groups.19
But as experience in Côte d’Ivoire, Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia shows, 
the influence of leadership goes both ways. In some cases where atrocities 
begin but are ended relatively early—as in the post-election violence in Kenya 
in 2007–8, or in the communal violence experienced in Kyrgyzstan’s city of 
Osh in 2008—it is often political leadership that has been effective in changing 
course away from violence. As the next section demonstrates, there are numer-
ous examples where leaders have helped curb mass violence and de-escalate 
risk. Knowing how these different scenarios unfold is crucial in developing our 
understanding as we continue to seek greater clarity on why, as Ban Ki-moon 
observed during his time as the UN’s Secretary-General, ‘some states have 
taken one path and other states a different path’.20 
What does this mean for how we ought to think about the prevention of 
mass atrocities? Surprisingly, perhaps, given the voluminous historical litera-
ture on the role of individual leaders, emerging practices, policies and theories 
for atrocity prevention pay scant regard to understanding the role of leaders 
and leadership, the importance of their decision-making, or the manner in 
which influence might be effectively wielded. Indeed, thus far deliberations 
have tended to focus on the importance of ensuring the legal accountability of 
leaders in the event of mass violence, without much in the way of longitudinal 
or case specific evidence that accountability factors into the decisions leaders 
make. Thus, for example, the landmark International Commission on Inter-
vention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report on the Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P) acknowledged that the systematic targeting of victims was the product of 
a failure of both ‘leadership and institutions’ and observed that in cases where 
such targeting was occurring, sanctions that targeted leadership groups were 
 19 Neil J Kressel, Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide and Terror  (Cambridge, 
MA: Westview Press, 2002), 171; David Hamburg, Preventing Genocide: 
Practical Steps Toward Early Detection and Effective Action  (Boulder: 
 Paradigm, 2008), 34; Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Worse than War: Genocide, 
Eliminationism, and the Ongoing Assault on Humanity (New York: Public 
Affairs, 2009), 76.
 20 Ban Ki-moon, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the 
 Secretary-General, A/63/677 (2009), 20.
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more effective than general sanctions.21 Of course, mass atrocities are not ‘fail-
ures’ of leadership but the product of wilful choices made by leadership, the 
means by which leaders try to get what they want. Echoing the scholarly litera-
ture on the causes of genocide and other mass atrocities, the report identified 
‘leadership’ as a key causal factor but this did not translate into guidance about 
how this might be addressed. The report’s discussion of strategies of prevention 
focussed heavily on institutions such as human rights reform, improving the 
rule of law and the promotion of dialogue and reconciliation, but said nothing 
about leadership.22 In effect, then, leaders disappear from the equation when it 
comes to preventive policies and strategies, as if institutional reform is driven 
by invisible hands rather than existing political leaders.
The wider roles of leadership received more oxygen in Ban Ki-moon’s first 
report on the R2P principle in 2009. In it, the Secretary-General observed that 
atrocity crimes are the results of the actions of political leaders who make delib-
erate political decisions aimed at manipulating pre-existing social divisions and 
weak institutions.23 Ban Ki-moon went on to point out that often weak leader-
ship lies at the heart of mass atrocity crimes, in response to which he recom-
mends international programmes that seek to ‘build leadership capacity’, such 
as work done by the UNDP and the Woodrow Wilson Centre.24 The Secretary-
General broke new ground by observing that ‘farsighted leadership’ can play 
critical roles in preventing ethnic violence, pointing explicitly to the example of 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the early 1990s, which avoided 
mass violence as its neighbours Kosovo, Bosnia and Croatia burned. The Sec-
retary-General also highlighted the importance that successive generations of 
leaders (in at-risk societies) have in preventing the kinds of ‘fissures and frus-
trations’ that lead to mass atrocity crimes.25
Clearly, therefore, the UN’s inaugural report on R2P laid out the importance 
of understanding the crucial role of leadership, both in the path to the perpe-
tration of mass atrocities and in managing risk of such violence. Yet the precise 
role of leadership, in terms of mass atrocity prevention, is not clear. Indeed, the 
report acknowledged that: ‘ … more research and analysis is needed on why 
one society plunges into mass violence while its neighbours remain relatively 
stable … ’26 Little was known about why many at-risk societies do not experi-
ence mass atrocities, let alone the role that individual leaders might have played 
in risk de-escalation.
 21 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The 
Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: International Development Research 
Centre, 2001), 2.
 22 The Responsibility, 19.
 23 Ki-moon, Implementing R2P, 12.
 24 Ibid., 16.
 25 Ibid., 21.
 26 Ibid., 10–11.
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The Secretary-General began to fill this void in a 2013 report that explored 
the domestic-level actors and strategies that made countries more (and less) 
resilient to mass atrocity risk—the first formal report on atrocity prevention to 
project a focus on the role that domestic actors play in avoiding mass violence. 
Ki-moon identified six key national sources of resilience that inhibited escala-
tion towards mass atrocities—including constitutional protections, systems of 
democracy and accountability, measures addressing inequality and the crimi-
nalisation of atrocity crimes—but again opted to focus on institutional capaci-
ties and factors rather than individual agency. Indeed, none of the six sources 
of resilience identified individual agency and leadership as being important 
inhibiting factors in risk de-escalation and atrocity prevention.27 
Subsequent United Nations reports on atrocity prevention and R2P have 
 continued to gloss over the role of leadership. While there are passing  references 
to the importance of leaders as prevention actors, they tend to articulate the 
importance of leadership in four ways: the preventive role of local leaders;28 
the importance of international leadership in responding to impending or 
unfolding atrocities around the world;29 military leadership;30 and the need 
for strong leadership at all levels (local, national and international).31 The 
role of religious leaders has also emerged as a key focus thanks to the efforts 
of the  Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, 
Adama Dieng. Nonetheless, though the idea of national leadership playing an 
important role in steering countries towards or away from upheaval and mass 
 atrocities was acknowledged in the 2009 report on R2P, thinking about this 
important question has not advanced since.
In what remains of this essay, we want to suggest a more systematic way of 
thinking about this question that focuses on three critical contexts:
1.  The role that leaders play in creating or inhibiting the risk of mass  atrocities 
within societies;
 27 Ban Ki-moon, Responsibility to Protect: State Responsibility and Prevention, 
A/67/929-S/2013/399 (2013), 8–11.
 28 Ban Ki-moon, A Vital and Enduring Commitment: Implementing the Respon-
sibility to Protect, A/69/981-S/2015/500 (2015), 8, 11, 20; Ban Ki-moon, 
Mobilizing Collective Action: The Next Decade of the Responsibility to Protect, 
A/70/999-S/2016/1620, 10, 14; António Guterres, Implementing the Respon-
sibility to Protect: Accountability for Protection, A/71/1016-S/2017/556, 15; 
António Guterres, Responsibility to Protect: From Early Warning to Early 
Action, A/72/884-S/2018/525, 3, 4, 11, 14.
 29 A/69/981-S/2015/500, 13; /70/999-S/2016/1620, 14.
 30 A/69/981-S/2015/500, 11.
 31 A/70/999-S/2016/1620, 10, 18; A/72/884-S/2018/525, 7.
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2.  The role that leaders play in driving societies ‘over the brink’ into mass 
atrocities and why some leaders are effective in steering countries away 
from mass atrocities during times of upheaval and heightened risk; and
3.  Why and how some leaders put a halt to mass atrocities early. 
The fateful decisions leaders make can either inhibit mass atrocities or push 
states and societies towards—and over—the brink, as shown in the table below. 
In what follows, we will examine these different roles in more detail.
Atrocity accelerator Atrocity inhibitor
Context Risk makers
•  Assads in Syria,  
Milošević in Serbia
Risk breakers
• East Asian governments
Crisis Drivers
• Suharto in Indonesia
Preventers
•  Gligorov in Macedonia, Mandela in 
South Africa
Resolution Prolongers
•  Government and  
opposition in Syria
Terminators
• Kibaki and Odinga in Kenya
The role and impact of leaders
Risk makers and risk breakers
Social contexts—the stuff of atrocity risk factors measured by early warning 
frameworks—do not appear out of nowhere. Sometimes, as in the case of 
Hitler and Stalin and Pol Pot too, they are driven by ideology, the murderous 
intent there from the start, and an end in itself. More often, though—and this 
is  something missed by our focus on the demagogic core—leaders create risk 
almost unknowingly, as a by-product of their efforts to simply cling to power 
in settings where most of their people would rather that they did not. A good 
recent example of this takes us back to where we started: Syria’s Assad family. 
The Assads, father Hafez and son Bashar, played a key role in creating the 
conditions for mass atrocities, building a corrupt minority-led state that 
 maintained order through the ruthless and arbitrary application of extreme 
violence, including killing, torture and detention. Internally divided and 
 externally threatened, it is unsurprising that post-independence Syrian domes-
tic politics were anything but stable. After a failed attempt at parliamentary 
democracy and a series of coups and counter-coups, the Ba’athists seized con-
trol of the government in 1963. Arab nationalist and determinedly socialist in 
 orientation, the Ba’ath Party appealed to Syrian society’s outsiders, such as the 
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religious  minorities and rural poor.32 The new government, led by Salah Jadid, 
embarked on a radical programme of socialist reform. Behind the scenes, Hafez 
al-Assad, an ambitious army officer from the minority Alawite sect, consoli-
dated his  control over the military. In November 1970, a dispute over policy on 
the  Palestinian issue came to a head. Jadid tried to dismiss Hafez, who then led 
a successful coup and claimed power.
Survival was the principal goal of Hafez’s new government. Hafez al-Assad 
proved to be a supremely gifted, if ruthless, political tactician. But he lacked a 
compelling strategic vision beyond survival itself.33 His ambition was to estab-
lish a strong Ba’athist state and mass party based on socialist principles that 
would marshal economic development, reform the social order and empower 
previously marginalised groups.34 The reality rarely matched the ambition and 
Syria lurched from crisis to crisis, the government almost permanently in cri-
sis mode. Hafez’s ‘was a government which grew out of seven years of bloody 
struggle, and its foundations were and would remain the army, the security 
services, and the party and government machinery’.35 Trusted loyalists, most 
of them Alawites, were placed in the key command positions. The security sec-
tor was purged of non-Ba’athists and of any whose loyalty to Hafez al-Assad 
was questioned. Thus, the new president came to rely heavily on a close net-
work of trusted personal followers, many of them kin, for leadership of the 
military and security forces.36 While his government’s legitimacy depended on 
a broader coalition of allies, those outside his almost exclusively Alawi inner 
circle were kept well away from positions that could be used to challenge the 
leader’s supremacy.37 According to one estimate, 90 per cent of the command-
ers of major military formations were Alawites.38 Economic benefits were given 
 32 John McHugo, Syria: A Recent History (London: Saqi Books, 2001), 118–22.
 33 Central argument made by Eyal Zisser, Assad’s Legacy: Syria in Transition 
(New York: New York University Press, 2001), 190–91.
 34 Raymond Hinnebusch, Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba’athist 
Syria: Army, Party and Peasant (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 2; also Pat-
rick Seale, Assad: The Struggle for the Middle East (Oakland: University of 
California Press, 1988).
 35 Seale, Assad, 178.
 36 Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria: Revolution from Above (London: Routledge, 
2002), 67.
 37 Compare Hinnebusch, Authoritarian Power with Steven Heydemann, 
Authoritarianism in Syria: Institutions and Social Conflict: 1946–1970 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), and Andrew Rathmell, ‘Syria’s Intel-
ligence Services: Origins and Development’, Journal of Conflict Studies 16, 
no. 2 (1996): 75–96. 
 38 Eyal Zisser, ‘Appearance and Reality: Syria’s Decision-Making Structure’, 
Middle East Review of International Affairs 2, no. 2 (1998): 29–41.
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to key allies, part of a highly corrupt patronage network designed to keep the 
Assads in power.
This was all part of the government’s attempt to ‘coup-proof ’ itself. To this, 
Hafez added a complex system of multiple overlapping security agencies, 
including the military, the secret police, six intelligence agencies (five of which 
focused primarily on ‘internal’ threats) and government militia—known col-
lectively as the mukhabarat.39 The feared mukhabarat enjoyed complete impu-
nity and autonomy, and were responsible for policing Syrian society as well as 
each other. Their activities were governed by an ‘emergency law’ first enacted 
in 1963 and still in force at the beginning of 2011, which allowed the secu-
rity forces to detain, try and sentence people—in secret—under the rubric of 
‘protecting the state’.40 Numbering between 50,000 and 70,000 officers, these 
agencies supported operations overseas and extensive activities at home. Each 
agency also operated its own prisons and interrogation centres that enjoyed 
almost complete independence and faced little in the way of oversight or scru-
tiny.41 Mukhabarat members enjoyed immunity from prosecution for any 
actions undertaken in the service of the state. Together, the security services 
maintained a dense network of surveillance and regularly used arrests, impris-
onment, torture and extra-judicial killings to intimidate or eliminate actual or 
suspected opponents. In 1982, the security forces brutally repressed an uprising 
in Hama, killing 30,000 in the process. A demonstration of what the security 
forces were willing to do to keep the Assads in power, and a portent of worse 
to come.
Bashar al-Assad’s ascendancy to the presidency in 2000 was greeted with 
optimism. The new leader promised reforms but the hope was short lived. 
The mukhabarat state prevailed. Indeed, if anything, the mukhabarat became 
a more visible part of daily life in Syria. According to a 2010 report by Human 
Rights Watch, ‘Syria’s security agencies … detain people without arrest war-
rants and torture with complete impunity’.42 In 2003 there were an estimated 
1,000 political prisoners.43 
Thus, on the eve of the ‘Arab Spring’, Syria was a society on the brink, put 
there largely by the policy choices of its own leaders. Resentments over past 
violence, the privations caused by the mukhabarat state and Bashar’s failure to 
deliver on reform ran deep. Economic hardships had grown, displacing whole 
communities, and the government had failed to offer any respite. Most Syrians 
 39 On the establishment of the security state in Syria see Heydemann, 
 Authoritarianism in.
 40 Lesch, Syria, 71.
 41 Alan George, Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom (London: Zed Press, 2003), 2.
 42 https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/07/16/syria-al-asads-decade-power 
-marked-repression.
 43 International Crisis Group, ‘Syria Under Bashar (II): Domestic Policy 
 Challenges’, Feb. 11, 2005, 11.
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were deeply dissatisfied with their government, many loathed it, and a large 
number wanted it overthrown.
But national leaders can choose different paths. It is instructive to compare 
the experience of different regions on this point. Etel Solingen did just that in 
a landmark study that compared post-colonial East Asia with the Middle East. 
Both had emerged from colonisation around the same time, both were plagued 
by territorial disputes and ideological fissures, and in the 1950s they had 
 similar types of highly centralised authoritarian states. They both had societies 
 dominated by conservative feudal lords and military elites. In some respects, 
the Middle East’s starting position was better than East Asia’s since it enjoyed a 
higher degree of cultural similarity and fewer sharp ideological divides. From 
that point on, however, the two regions took very different paths. Most East 
Asian states consciously prioritised economic development through industri-
alisation and trade. National resources and government energies were directed 
towards supporting industrialisation. Intra-regional trade grew strongly, cre-
ating its own demands for regional stability and establishing national elites 
with international interests. The region developed strong anti-war norms of 
non-interference that helped stabilise relations between states. Middle Eastern 
governments, on the other hand, preferred self-sufficiency over trade, state-
led rather than state-supported entrepreneurship and privileged the military, 
the military–industrial complex and militarised conceptions of security over the 
civilian economy.44 In the Middle East, war remained a persistent feature of 
political life. In East Asia, it declined dramatically. The incidence of armed con-
flict in the Middle East was some five times greater than in East Asia. The prin-
cipal cause of this marked difference, Solingen found, was the prioritisation 
of economics by East Asian governments and the outward-looking and trade-
focused path to development they embraced. The prioritisation of ‘economic 
development’ in East Asia, Rosemary Foot writes, ‘reflects a widely held belief 
among many of the elites in these states that there is a reciprocal relationship 
between economic growth and the promotion of regime and state security’.45
Our point here is that East Asian governments chose to prioritise economic 
development rather than military spending. Ironically, East Asia’s path away 
from mass atrocities was shaped by a country that had recently perpetrated 
massive atrocity crimes but that was now looking to turn its back on that 
past. The adoption of the developmental trading state model began in Japan 
 immediately after World War Two. It did not take long for others in the region 
 44 Etel Solingen, ‘Pax Asiatica versus Belli Levantina: The Foundations of War 
and Peace in East Asia and the Middle East’, American Political Science 
Review 101, no. 4 (2007): 758. 
 45 Rosemary Foot, ‘Social Boundaries in Flux: Secondary Regional Organi-
zations as a Reflection of Regional International Society’, in Contesting 
 International Society in East Asia, eds. Barry Buzan and Yongjin Zhang 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 196.
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to notice Japan’s remarkable post-war economic growth and try to emulate it. 
Another war-stricken country, Taiwan—an island state built on the remnants 
of China’s nationalist government—quickly adopted Japanese style priorities 
and policies, with similar results. Not every government intervention was 
effective, of course, but the cumulative prioritisation of economic develop-
ment, building of public-private partnerships and promotion of foreign trade 
yielded positive results overall. Taiwan was followed by Singapore, Hong Kong 
and South Korea—the growth of an educated middle class in the latter eventu-
ally propelling political reform, as well as elites realising the economic costs of 
trying to hang on to authoritarian government. Then Malaysia and Thailand 
followed, as authoritarian governments in Indonesia and The Philippines also 
tried, and failed, to mimic the model, prompting relatively peaceful transitions 
to democracy there too. And, as national leaders came to prioritise economic 
growth at the expense of military growth, ideological crusades and sectarian 
division, so the incidence of mass atrocities and the risks associated with them 
declined. As a result of that, one of the most violent and atrocity-risk prone 
parts of the world became progressively more peaceful as the social context of 
risk receded.46
Our point here is that just as the Assads played an instrumental role in  creating 
the risk of mass atrocities in Syria, and successive governments in Sudan and 
Rwanda did the same, a number of leaders in East Asia played pivotal roles in 
dampening risks and helping their countries navigate difficult challenges with-
out mass violence. The key lesson in all this is that, as Scott Straus has argued in 
the context of post-independence Africa, we need to pay much more attention 
to the states and societies that leaders build and shape, and think more carefully 
about how to engage earlier to inhibit the drift towards atrocities. As Straus 
explains, ‘the long-term best asset against the risk of genocide and mass cat-
egorical violence is to craft a political vision that incorporates a role for multi-
ple identities as fundamental to the project of the state’.47 The key to this, Straus 
argues, is for national leaders to ‘articulat[e] a nationalist narrative of pluralism 
and inclusion [which] provides the greatest source of restraint’.48 Whether or 
not they do matters a great deal.
Drivers and inhibitors
Even in situations of risk, political leaders have choices about the type of politi-
cal, institutional and economic paths they want to take. These choices are not 
pre-determined, but they are immensely consequential. We know this because 
societies with similar structural conditions can experience wildly different 
 46 The central argument of Bellamy, East Asia’s Other Miracle.
 47 Straus, Making and Unmaking, 323.
 48 Ibid.
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 trajectories owing to the decisions their leaders make. To give one example, 
Zimbabwe from the early 2000s contained all the elements necessary for inter-
nal conflict and mass atrocities. That it has not suffered the same fate as many 
of its neighbours owes much to the conscious decision of opposition leader 
Morgan Tsangirai to keep peace.49
It is not difficult to see evidence of leaders driving a politics of fear that push 
societies to the brink. For example, we can see it in the current  Hungarian 
 government’s rhetoric and policy of marginalisation and discrimination 
directed towards the country’s Roma population and refugees. We see it also 
in the sectarian preferences exhibited by states across the Middle Eastern 
region—practices that sowed the seeds of resentment, violent conflict and 
mass atrocities.50 
It is also clear to see leaders driving states and societies over the brink. In fact, 
as a wide range of studies have demonstrated, mass atrocities rarely  happen 
in the absence of humane leadership.51 Take for example the mass killing of 
alleged communists in Indonesia in 1965–66, long regarded as an example 
of organised frenzied violence. The famous anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, 
who was well aware of the killings, ascribed the violence to cultural factors, 
specifically ‘popular savagery’ driven by pent up frustrations.52 But it is now 
clear that the atrocities were planned, instigated and organised by the Indone-
sian army that was led by the country’s incoming president, Suharto.
In late September 1965, a small group of Indonesian military officers with 
putative ties to the Communist Party (PKI), kidnapped and killed six sen-
ior army officers in what is widely thought to have been an attempted coup 
in support of Indonesia’s increasingly leftward leaning President, General 
Sukarno. The army, led by General Suharto, quickly suppressed the coup and 
killed the ringleaders. The army then initiated the PKI’s violent destruction. 
Between October 1965 and March 1966, around 500,000–600,000 Indone-
sians were slaughtered by the army and allied militia, religious youth groups 
 49 On which, see Stephen Chan, Citizen of Zimbabwe: Conversations with 
 Morgan Tsangirai (Harare: Weaver Press, 2010).
 50 Daniel Byman, ‘Sectarianism Afflicts the New Middle East’, Survival 56, 
no. 1 (2014): 79–100 and Christopher Phillips, ‘Sectarianism and Conflict 
in Syria’, Third World Quarterly 36, no. 2 (2015): 357–76.
 51 The literature on this is extensive. For example, see Kuper, Genocide; Fein, 
Accounting for; Goldhagen, Worse than; and Jacques Semelin, Purify and 
Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide (London: Hurst and 
Co., 2014).
 52 Clifford Geertz, ‘Afterword: The Politics of Meaning’, in Culture and Politics 
in Indonesia, ed. Claire Holt (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), 282, 
and Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 
1973), 332. 
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and  zealous mobs.53 The killing was remarkable for its speed and intensity. 
Suharto employed units with strong anti-communist credentials KOSTRAD 
(reservists under Suharto’s command) and RPKAD (elite units, staunchly 
anti- communist) to spearhead the killings.54 The campaign began in Central 
Java and moved quickly to East Java and other provinces, Suharto claiming 
the purge was an ‘absolutely essential cleaning out’ of communists.55 The army 
encouraged the establishment of militias and offered them the political author-
ity, training, arms and logistical support they needed to conduct mass killings.56
Although much of the killing was not done by the military, in most cases 
militias, youth groups and mobs did not start committing atrocities until 
elite military units arrived to direct, encourage and enable violence by instruct-
ing and arming the groups. In October 1965, the army worked hard to whip 
up a ‘near hysterical anti-communist pogrom’.57 Killing was typically initiated 
by the military and then continued by others at the military’s urging.58 The 
 massacres were planned and orchestrated by the army with the intention of 
 53 An army fact-finding commission put the figure at 78,500, but this has 
widely been criticised as being too low. Some estimates put the death toll at 
2 million. Another official report, by KOPKAMTIB, estimated that 800,000 
had been killed in central and eastern Java, and another 100,000 in both 
Bali and Sumatra, putting the total at 1 million. See Robert Cribb, ‘Problems 
in the Historiography of the Killings in Indonesia’, in The Indonesian Killings 
1965–1966: Studies From Java and Bali, ed. Robert Cribb (Melbourne: Cen-
tre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash, 1990), 7, and Arnold C. Brackman, 
The Communist Collapse in Indonesia (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), 115. 
Today the figure of 400,000–500,000 is generally accepted by the Indone-
sian government.
 54 John Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval (New York: David McKay Co., 
1967), 132.
 55 Brackman, The Communist, 119; Robert Cribb and Colin Brown, Modern 
Indonesia: A History Since 1945 (The Postwar World) (New York: Longman, 
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eliminating the PKI.59 As Julie Southwood and Patrick Flanagan note: ‘The 
Indonesian massacre was essentially a project of systematically indiscriminate 
killing. A project connotes aims, means and responsibility. It was systematic 
in that the military leadership clearly defined the set of victims: the PKI and 
its sympathisers. It was indiscriminate in that within the category of victims 
specified, all members were to be killed regardless of age, sex, guilt or any other 
criteria’.60 By March 1966, the atrocities had achieved the army’s objective of 
eliminating the PKI and it moved to end the killing and restore order.61 The deal 
was sealed by the elevation of General Suharto to the presidency. 
There is abundant evidence that the military’s senior leadership wilfully 
drove their country over the edge into mass atrocities. General Nasution, one of 
the survivors of the coup, instructed that, ‘all of their [PKI] followers and sym-
pathisers should be eliminated, otherwise the incident will recur’. The PKI, he 
argued, should be exterminated ‘down to its very roots’.62 Nasution insisted that 
‘they must be immediately smashed’ because ‘they have committed treason’.63 
Army propagandists insisted that ‘the sword cannot be met by the Koran … but 
must be met by the sword. The Koran says that whoever opposes you should 
be opposed as they oppose you’.64 The army forced or simply fabricated con-
fessions from PKI leaders that intimated a deep plot to take over the coun-
try and impose communism.65 In addition, the army concocted lurid stories 
about the torture, humiliation and mutilation of the six general who were killed 
and claimed that naked female communists danced over the generals’ bodies. 
Images portraying these horrific scenes were frequently broadcast on televi-
sion.66 The communist assault on Indonesia’s way of life and their perverted 
brutality required a thorough ‘cleansing’ and the killing was often described 
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in this way by the army and its allies.67 The army made a point of portraying 
the communists as denigrating traditional Indonesian beliefs, be they Islamic, 
Buddhist, Hindu, Christian or nationalist.68
But leaders can also be proactive in introducing policies and strategies to 
confront escalating tensions even in the midst of crisis. In the early 1990s, as 
the Former Republic of Yugoslavia was fragmenting amid tension and con-
flict, the newly independent Republic of Macedonia stood at a crossroad. With 
minority Serbs and Albanians raising grievances, and Serbia threatening mili-
tary action against Macedonia’s recent secession, the country appeared to be on 
the brink of war. That Macedonia avoided the conflict and mass atrocities that 
unfolded in Croatia and then Bosnia, was largely due to its new president, Kiro 
Gligorov, but also other political and ethnic leaders. 
Gligorov succeeded in negotiating an agreement with Serbia that was 
 instrumental in defusing tensions between Skopje and Belgrade. Macedonia’s 
declaration of independence in September 1991, took place in a climate of 
high tension. Secessions in Slovenia and Croatia earlier in the year had trig-
gered violent clashes in both states with the Yugoslav National Army (JNA). 
JNA units were still stationed throughout Macedonia, making military reprisal 
a real possibility.69 Gligorov negotiated with the Serbian government on the 
removal of all JNA units, securing an agreement in early February 1992. The 
agreement guaranteed the total withdrawal of JNA troops, while leaving behind 
some military equipment. The departure of the JNA decreased the likelihood of 
Serbian military interference in the nascent state of Macedonia.
Yet this move did not affect the possibility of internal identity-based tensions 
from escalating. There were two chief fault lines along which problems could 
potentially arise—between ethnic Serbs and ethnic Macedonians; and between 
Albanians and ethnic Macedonians. Leaders in the Macedonian government 
chose a path of accommodation and dialogue with the leaders of the largest 
Serbian political party, the Democratic Party of Serbs in Macedonia (DPSM). 
This led to an agreement that leaders on both sides signed in mid-1993, the 
terms of which included constitutional recognition of Serbs, greater media 
access and greater resources for Serbian language education. In return, the 
DPSM agreed to put an end to their opposition to Macedonia’s statehood. As 
Ackerman points out, following the agreement, major confrontations between 
Serbs and Macedonian authorities ceased.70 
Accommodation and dialogue between leaders lay at the heart of manag-
ing tensions between ethnic Albanians and Slavic Macedonians. Prior to inde-
pendence, the Macedonian government allowed ethnic Albanian political 
parties to be established, facilitating a range of voices and demands from the 
 67 Cribb, ‘Problems’, 24, 30.
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Albanian community. While tensions remained high in the first couple of years 
of independence, the Macedonian government took political inclusion a step 
further by introducing power sharing measures. Five Albanians were elevated 
to ministers between 1990 and 1994, and following this, the number was four.71 
The government also agreed to include Albanian language programmes on the 
state-run television channels and radio stations and supported the daily pub-
lication of an Albanian language newspaper.72 While these measures were still 
not regarded as sufficient by many in the Albanian community, grievances—
particularly in the first few years of independence—were mostly aired in non-
violent ways. Most Albanian leaders did not advocate the use of violence in 
their push for greater recognition.73 Indeed, they themselves were measured in 
how far they would push their specific agendas for more autonomy within the 
newly independent state.74 In an effort to place limits on Macedonian national-
ism, Gligorov and other ministers were proactive in constructing a national 
identity that was broad based and inclusive. They did this by downplaying 
myths and avoiding extremist nationalist rhetoric in a variety of public forums 
and political debates.75
Finally, Gligorov was aware that the departure of the JNA left Macedonia 
vulnerable to potential outside military threats. In an effort to avoid the pos-
sibility of the descent into violence that occurred in other newly independ-
ent states from the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Gligorov made a personal 
appeal to the United Nations for military assistance. The UN Preventive 
Deployment Force (UNPREDEP)76 was authorised at the end of 1992. Gli-
gorov first flagged the idea for a preventive deployment in December 1991 in 
a meeting with Cyrus Vance, UN special envoy at the time. He then made an 
official appeal in November 1992, as the conflict in Bosnia was rapidly escalat-
ing, amidst  growing concerns that violence would spill over into Macedonia. 
In a letter to Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Gligorov proposed 
a ‘preventive mission’, which then led to the authorisation of UNPROFOR’s 
deployment along Macedonia’s borders. This then evolved into UNPREDEP in 
1995. UNPREDEP is broadly credited with playing a key role in preventing war 
from spilling over into Macedonia.77 Gligorov, along with other political lead-
ers in Macedonia, were instrumental in preventing identity-based violence in 
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the early years of the country’s independence. Their strategies anticipated and 
targeted multiple flashpoints, which meant that preventive strategies they insti-
gated included accommodation of and dialogue with the country’s minority 
groups; the effective negotiating of the JNA’s departure; and the facilitation of 
an international military presence, which helped to plug the gap in the nascent 
country’s security capacity during an extremely volatile period.
Mediation, compromise and public appeals based on inclusive ideas also lay 
at the heart of South Africa’s transformation from Apartheid state to universal 
enfranchisement, steered by Nelson Mandela and F. W. de Klerk. The avoid-
ance of mass atrocities during this transition in the early 1990s was a product 
of de Klerk’s commitment to dismantling Apartheid, Mandela’s willingness to 
shift away from some of the ANC’s more radical objectives, and the readiness 
of both to consult and compromise. These factors ensured that South Africa’s 
transformation had widespread support. They were also instrumental in pre-
venting extremist groups on both sides of the political divide from provoking 
widespread conflict. Yet, the transition away from Apartheid took place in a 
context of rising inter-group tension and violence, and widespread mistrust. 
The challenges, on de Klerk’s part, of managing rogue elements within the 
security establishment, and on Mandela’s part of dampening tensions between 
Inkatha Freedom Party supporters and ANC supporters, made the prospect 
of a peaceful transition insurmountable at times. However, both leaders were 
instrumental in navigating the country to peaceful elections in 1994.
Two moments stand out. The first was a speech made by de Klerk on 2 Febru-
ary 1990, when he announced the lifting of the ban on previously illegal oppo-
sition parties, the repeal of the 1953 Separate Amenities Act and the immediate 
and unconditional release of Mandela.78 This sudden and dramatic change her-
alded the instant end of the Apartheid system, and belied de Klerk’s record as a 
solid advocate of National Party policies to that point. However, upon becom-
ing president in 1989, he concluded that a continuation of the status quo would 
place the country on an irreversibly destructive path.79 In his opening speech 
to parliament, he prefaced the rescinding of Apartheid policies by stating that 
‘only a negotiated understanding among the representative leaders of the entire 
population is able to ensure lasting peace. The alternative is growing violence, 
tension and conflict’.80 With a single speech, de Klerk announced to the coun-
try a radical change of direction. Far from alienating the white population, the 
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speech won the support of most South Africans, including the white popula-
tion. According to one journalist, people ‘were propelled by the sheer excite-
ment of a journey undertaken at last’.81 A referendum conducted two years later 
confirmed that two thirds of the white population were indeed in favour of 
these reforms.82 It was de Klerk’s decisive public announcement that marked 
the end of Apartheid, and won widespread support, both among the minority 
white and broader South African population. 
The second moment was Mandela’s commitment to diffusing inter-ethnic 
tensions in the year leading up to the election in 1994. Between 1990 and 1994, 
inter-group tensions grew increasingly violent and threatened to derail the 
transition to democracy. This provoked tensions on two fronts—between sup-
porters of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the ANC, but also between 
Mandela and de Klerk.83 In this four-year period, the IFP perpetrated thousands 
of human rights violations, including the Boipatong massacre, which resulted 
in forty-five deaths, prompting the ANC to temporarily halt transition talks 
with the South African government and other groups.84 In the wake of this, 
Mandela faced calls from his own supporters to abandon peaceful strategies 
and resume an armed struggle. His public response to such calls was emphatic 
and uncompromising, using his own position to drive home a path of peace: 
‘If you have no discipline, you are not a freedom fighter. If you are going to kill 
innocent people, you don’t belong to the ANC. Your task is reconciliation’.85 
Violence escalated again in 1993, with the assassination of Chris Hani, leader 
of the South African Communist Party and head of the ANC’s armed wing, 
Umkhontu we Sizwe, by a white nationalist. This triggered widespread riots that 
threatened to escalate to full blown war. Again, Mandela publicly diffused ten-
sions and steered public rhetoric away from calls for retribution.86 Mandela’s 
determination to transition away from Apartheid through negotiation and not 
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violence, and his calls for supporters to refrain from responding violently to 
inter-group violence provoked by both the IFP and security forces, were instru-
mental in navigating the country back from the brink of conflict in 1993 and 
the final months leading up to the elections in April 1994.
Thus, Gligorov and Mandela chose a path different to Suharto, Nasution and 
their allies, and managed political transitions without mass bloodshed. And 
while Indonesia pressed on into a bloody war of aggression in Timor Leste 
and civil war in Aceh that were resolved only decades later with Suharto’s 
forced removal from office, both Macedonia and South Africa emerged from 
their transitions into a period free from mass killing, both avoiding the very 
real potential for civil war. Understanding why Gligorov and Mandela chose 
this path, setting out precisely how both they and their countries benefitted 
immensely from their actions, and figuring out how others might be encour-
aged to follow suit, ought to become central avenues of research for those con-
cerned with preventing future violence.
Prolongers and terminators
Once mass killing erupts, leaders make choices about whether to prolong the 
violence in the hope of getting themselves a better outcome or to prioritise 
the lives of their people by looking for ways out of the violence. Of course, the 
choices leaders make are influenced and constrained by their context, ideology 
and the situation around them, but nevertheless there is ample evidence to sug-
gest that national leaders often do have the room to change their mind if they 
so choose. Even leaders who for a time drive their societies over the brink are 
capable of walking them back. In 1995, for example, Slobodan Milošević, the 
architect and chief prolonger of war, mass atrocities and genocide in former 
Yugoslavia, decided to abandon the Bosnian Serbs in order to protect his own 
domestic position.
We can return to the Syrian tragedy for an example of leaders choosing to 
prolong rather than terminate atrocities, calculating that they could get a bet-
ter deal by killing more people. In 2012, a plan put forward by former UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan seemed to offer a chance for peace. Yet by all 
indications, despite enjoying the UN Security Council’s formal support, the 
plan seemed doomed to failure from the beginning. Why? 
Most commentators acknowledge that the Annan plan’s failure was caused 
by forces beyond Annan’s control, principally that neither the government nor 
the opposition was wholly committed to it and that the major powers were 
deeply divided about it.87 Annan explained that ‘without serious, purposeful 
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and united international pressure, including from the powers in the region, 
it is impossible for me, or anyone, to compel the Syrian government in the 
first place, and also the opposition, to take the steps necessary to begin a 
 political process’.88 
First, the Syrian government was never committed to the peace process and 
likely never intended to entertain a political process that would result in it hav-
ing to share power or lose power altogether. Russian support for the April 12 
ceasefire persuaded Damascus to accept the plan and even to restrain its use 
of heavy weapons, but, Annan argues, ‘sustained international support did not 
follow’. As the ceasefire unravelled, ‘the government, realizing that there would 
be no consequences if it returned to an overt military campaign, reverted to 
using heavy weapons in towns’. Then, having tried to reinvigorate the process 
by securing an agreement in Geneva on the need for a political transition, no 
pressure was brought to bear to force Assad to accept it.89 Likewise, the armed 
opposition—emboldened by international support and convinced that Assad’s 
days were numbered—viewed the initiative as a means to the end of remov-
ing Assad. Annan’s deputies, al-Qudwa and Martin Griffiths, engaged with the 
opposition but found them uncompromising. One UN official, for example, 
visited the Free Syrian Army and found that the Army believed that NATO was 
poised to intervene as it had in Libya and this this was only a matter of time.90 
That belief, combined with the influx of weapons from outside, made the oppo-
sition think that victory was inevitable. As such, they had few incentives to 
compromise, and instead looked only to use the process for their advantage. 
What is more, even had the SNC, for example, been more fully committed, the 
opposition lacked sufficient unity and coherence to hold the ceasefire together.
Second, Annan could only paper over the deep international fissures for so 
long. It was immediately clear that the Geneva Communiqué had done little to 
alleviate the problem. Governments offered wildly different interpretations of 
what had been agreed. Ultimately, international support for Annan was luke-
warm at best, and in some quarters actively hostile. No state was prepared to 
prioritise the peace plan above their own positions on Syria’s future. Ultimately, 
while the Kremlin was prepared to urge Damascus to accept Annan’s six-point 
plan, it had no intention of allowing material pressure to be brought against it. 
When Moscow reached the limits of its influence, it chose to protect the regime. 
Russia was adamant that the armed opposition was as much to blame as the 
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government for the breakdown of the ceasefire, arguing that the opposition 
had tried to exploit the ceasefire in order to gain territory. On the other side, 
Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia voiced disquiet about the process before it had 
even begun, Saudi Arabia for example criticising Annan for even engaging with 
Assad.91 All three continued to supply or facilitate the supply of arms to the 
opposition during (albeit not at the levels seen after the process collapsed), and 
none used their influence over the opposition to encourage it to comply with 
the ceasefire. All gave the impression that the process was but a stepping stone 
towards more robust military support for the opposition. The opposition, then, 
saw little reason to compromise. 
Third, there was a pronounced gap between the glacial pace of political nego-
tiations and the deteriorating situation on the ground. The Syrian leadership 
negotiated while simultaneously stepping up its military actions. As violence 
escalated, it was clear that the non-coercive approach was not working. Indeed, 
many in the West worried that the process itself was providing cover for the 
continuation of violence and that the Russians were stalling in order to buy 
time for Damascus. There was little point persisting with a failing strategy, they 
argued, but there was little idea of what could replace it. The peace process 
collapsed and Syria’s war entered a new, even deadlier, phase. At the time of 
writing, more than 500,000 Syrians had been killed and 6.5 million forced out 
of the country.
But it does not have to be like this. The ethnic violence that erupted in the 
aftermath of the disputed 30 December 2007 elections in Kenya was quickly 
stemmed by both sides of the political divide who agreed to negotiate a com-
promise that left neither with everything they wanted, but which saved their 
country from the fate that befell Syria.92 While up to 1,500 people were killed 
and 300,000 displaced, a coordinated diplomatic effort by a troika of eminent 
persons mandated by the African Union (AU), spearheaded by Kofi Annan and 
supported by the UN Secretary-General, persuaded the country’s president, 
Mwai Kibaki and main opponent, Raila Odinga, to conclude a power-sharing 
agreement and rein in the violent mobs. This prevented what many feared 
could have been the beginning of a much worse campaign of mass atrocities.
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When genocide and mass atrocities erupt, the degree to which global actors 
can make a difference depends on whether local and national leaders are will-
ing to reach compromises and pull their followers back from violence. Do 
they believe, for instance, that their reputations and futures could be adversely 
affected by escalating violence? When they do not care what others think, have 
very different value systems, see their choices in existential terms and/or are 
highly resentful of external interference, the range of options for international 
action narrows markedly. Very often, decisions about whether to prolong or 
terminate atrocities are driven by domestic politics and personal ambitions. In 
practice, political leaders tend to be swayed more by what their political allies 
and financial backers are telling them than by the protests of outsiders. If major 
trading, economic, political or security partners are capable of making—and 
are prepared to make—perpetrators pay a significant price for bad behaviour, 
they will weigh their options differently. Such partners can, of course, act as 
spoilers instead. Whatever focus we take, more attention needs to be paid to 
how and why leaders choose to prolong or terminate mass atrocities. 
Conclusion
When it comes to understanding mass atrocities and their prevention, lead-
ership and individual responsibility are crucial. The intent and receptiveness 
of national leaders is of uttermost importance. Intransigent leaders can incite 
and perpetuate violence, block international action, refuse to implement agree-
ments, stir up distrust and animosity towards the United Nations. Consensual 
preventive measures tend to have limited effect when leaders are intransigent. 
Receptive leaders, however, can negotiate and peacefully resolve crises, are 
open to persuasion, and are more likely to implement agreements. 
In this essay we have begun to sketch out a typology of the roles that leaders 
can play as a first step towards a more detailed understanding of leadership 
and, critically, of how leadership can be used to support the prevention of mass 
atrocities. Our central argument is that the emerging field of atrocity preven-
tion must pay far greater attention to questions of human agency than it hith-
erto has. As this avenue of enquiry develops, three critical sets of questions will 
need to be addressed.
First, we will need to develop more comprehensive accounts of the  relationship 
between leaders’ agency and the social, historical, institutional and normative 
structures they inhabit. We have proposed here that leaders typically have suf-
ficient agency to make fateful choices but clearly the degree of agency they have 
is bounded by context. To better understand the extent of agency that lead-
ers enjoy, we will need a more differentiated account of how different contexts 
impact and shape agency. We have also suggested that leaders are not passive 
recipients of social context, but often play a determining role in shaping that 
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context. Once again though, greater specificity is needed to understand the dif-
ferent roles that different sorts of leaders play. 
Second, and following on from this, we will need to develop frameworks for 
better understanding different leadership types, drivers and causal influences 
to afford us sharper analytical and predictive tools.93 
Third, we might also look for leadership in different places. For example, in 
2013–14, the Nobel Prize-winning Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet com-
prising civil society organisations representing organised labour, the private 
sector, the legal profession and human rights advocates, navigated the coun-
try peacefully through a political transition that contained all the portents of 
violence and atrocities. Similarly, in 2013, KEPSA—a Kenyan Private Sector 
Alliance—played a pivotal role in supporting atrocity prevention activities that 
helped the country avoid a repeat of the violence resulting from elections from 
2007 to 2008.
When it comes to understanding and preventing mass atrocities, leadership 
matters. In this essay we have explored some of the different ways in which 
it matters, but this is a field of exploration that has a long way yet to go. 
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CHAPTER 2
Freedom of Religion in the  Genocidal 
Process and Group Destruction 
in the Holocaust and Armenian 
and Cambodian Genocides
Melanie O’Brien
Human rights are freedoms that are inherent to all persons, which states are 
obligated to protect. The atrocities of World War Two, in particular the annihi-
lation of Jews in the Holocaust, shocked the global community into the  creation 
of today’s human rights legal system. Traditionally, international law was 
 concerned with the rights and regulations of states. Following the Holocaust 
however, other actors (including individuals) were included in international 
law, based on the idea that states should not be free to treat persons within 
their territory as they wish and, in particular, should not be free to persecute 
and kill. The sentiment was that people should be respected and accorded 
rights to be able to live with dignity and liberty, within a broader desire for 
democratic rule of law.94 Dignity and freedom are the essence of human rights, 
and are to be enjoyed by all without discrimination as to race, gender, religion, 
 94 J.S. Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991).
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 ethnicity, sexuality, nationality, language, political or other opinion, disability, 
or any other reason. This is the universality and inalienability of human rights: 
everyone, everywhere is entitled to human rights. Protection of human 
rights is fundamental.
Genocide is a process,95 throughout which many human rights violations 
occur, usually on a mass scale. The process begins with violations such as 
restrictions on freedom of expression and freedom of movement, escalating 
to violations of rights to family and health, before intensifying to violations of 
right to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, 
and right to life.96 This chapter will consider one particular human rights viola-
tion in genocide: violation of the right to freedom of religion. 
Genocide consists of multiple crimes, including non-physical-extermination 
crimes: causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of national, ethni-
cal, racial, or religious groups; and forcibly transferring children of the group 
to another group. Such crimes are essential in determining genocide and must 
not be suppressed from deliberations over the definition of genocide or the 
prosecution of perpetrators. While genocidal crimes may manifest in many 
forms, this essay focuses on violations of freedom of religion, which amount 
to criminal conduct as they cause serious bodily or mental harm, and include 
forcible transfer of children (for religious conversion) and killing members of a 
group (religious leaders).
Some groups are targeted for genocide because of religion, and are subject to 
substantial violations of their right to freedom of religion. Nonetheless, as will 
 95 On genocide as a process, see for example, Martin Shaw, What is  Genocide? 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015), 101–3; Sheri P Rosenberg, ‘Genocide Is 
a Process, Not an Event’, Genocide Studies and Prevention 7, no. 1 (2012): 
17–23; Scott Straus, ‘Contested Meanings and Conflicting Imperatives: A 
Conceptual Analysis of Genocide’, Journal of Genocide Research 3, no. 3 
(2001): 349–75; Sheri P Rosenberg and Everita Silina, ‘Genocide by  Attrition: 
Silent and Efficient’, in Genocide Matters: Ongoing Issues and Emerging 
Perspectives, eds. Joyce Apsel and Ernesto Verdeja (Abingdon: Routledge, 
1999), 106–26; Helen Fein, ‘Genocide by Attrition 1939–1993: The Warsaw 
Ghetto, Cambodia, and Sudan: Links Between Human Rights, Health, and 
Mass Death’, Health and Human Rights 2, no. 2 (1997): 14; Leo Kuper, Geno-
cide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century (New Haven: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1982); Helen Fein, Accounting for Genocide: National Responses 
and Jewish Victimization During the Holocaust (New York: Free Press, 
1979), 60; ‘The 8 Stages of Genocide’, Genocide Watch, 1998, http://www 
.genocidewatch.org/aboutgenocide/8stagesofgenocide.html; ‘The Ten Stages 
of Genocide’, Genocide Watch, 2016, http://genocidewatch.net/genocide 
-2/8-stages-of-genocide/. 
 96 These violations are somewhat linear, but there are also many overlapping 
stages.
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be demonstrated by the case studies in this chapter, even if a group is targeted 
for their nationality, race, or ethnicity, genocidal regimes have a tendency to 
fixate on destruction of religion as they execute genocide. This chapter exam-
ines the specific targeting of religion itself; how genocidal regimes breach the 
human right of freedom of religion as part of the destruction of that group as 
a social structure. Analysis will be offered of violations of freedom of religion 
as carried out by the Nazis, Committee of Union and Progress (CUP or Young 
Turks), and Khmer Rouge respectively in the Holocaust, and the Armenian 
and Cambodian genocides. The chapter will demonstrate how this particu-
lar human rights violation contributes to genocide, regardless of whether the 
group targeted for destruction is categorised as a religious group. This essay will 
conclude with what can be appropriated from these case studies for prevention 
and punishment of genocide.
Right to freedom of religion
The right to freedom of religion is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (article 18) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (article 18). It is considered a ‘far-reaching and profound’ human right, 
as it is part of the sweeping human right to thought, conscience and  religion.97 
It protects theistic, non-theistic, and atheistic beliefs, and religions of any age 
or group size. Also included is the right not to profess any religion or belief.98 
The right protects freedom to manifest religion or belief in worship, obser-
vance, practice, and teaching. This is an inclusive freedom covering: ritual 
and ceremonial acts; building of places of worship; use of ritual formulae and 
objects; display of symbols; observance of holidays and days of rest; dietary 
requirements; wearing of distinctive clothing or head coverings; participation 
in rituals associated with certain stages of life; use of a particular language cus-
tomarily spoken by a group; choice of religious leaders, priests, and teachers; 
establishment of seminaries or religious schools; and preparation and distri-
bution of religious texts or publications.99 It is prohibited to coerce or impair 
the right to have or adopt a religion or belief, or to restrict access to services 
 (medical, education, and etcetera) based on religion.100
 97 Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 22, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/
Rev.1/Add.4, 27 Sept. 1993, para. 1.
 98 Ibid., para. 2.
 99 Ibid., para. 4.
 100 Ibid., para. 5; Heiner Bielefeldt, Nazila Ghanea, and Michael Wiener, 
 Freedom of Religion or Belief: An International Law Commentary, Oxford 
Scholarly Authorities on International Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016), 56.
36 Genocide Perspectives VI
Limitations on the right to freedom of religion are permitted. However, as 
with the general rule on limitations on human rights, such limitations are only 
permissible when prescribed by law and when necessary to protect public 
safety, order, health, or morals. No limitation is authorised with regards to the 
prohibition on coercion of religion and on religious education. This equates 
the prohibition on coercion and education with the prohibitions on slavery 
and torture, from which derogations are also not authorised, in order to ensure 
human dignity (an underlying principle of human rights). Even more specifi-
cally, ‘[r]estrictions may not be imposed for discriminatory purposes or applied 
in a discriminatory manner’.101
Minority religions are not to be discriminated against. The terminology used 
by the United Nations Human Rights Committee indicates that violation of 
freedom of religion is inherently linked to discrimination, persecution, and 
even violence:
In particular, certain measures discriminating against [adherents of 
minority religions or non-believers], such as measures restricting eligi-
bility for government service to members of the predominant religion 
or giving economic privileges to them or imposing special restrictions 
on the practice of other faiths, are not in accordance with the prohibi-
tion of discrimination based on religion or belief and the guarantee of 
equal protection under article 26.102
Freedom of religion is a human right that, while granted to the individual, has 
inherent communal and social aspects. Bielefeld et al. suggest that ‘[h]uman 
rights have a strong positive bearing on communities, since they are always 
exercised in a social context’.103 Religion is an individual choice, but is often 
practiced communally and seen as very significant socially. It exists in many 
cultures as a defining element of that culture, of that group, even if that group 
is considered national, ethnical, or racial. Therefore, violation of the right to 
freedom of religion can lead to communal and social disintegration. 
Writing of his experience in the Holocaust, Jean Améry described the viola-
tion of human rights during the genocide process as a destruction of his society 
and community: ‘The functionary of an authoritarian system who beats me 
arbitrarily, does not merely violate my body; he rips apart … the social contract 
within whose limits any human conduct, across all societal roles and situa-
tions, must always remain’.104 Améry noted that ‘dignity can be bestowed only 
 101 HRC GC No. 22, para. 8.
 102 HRC GC No. 22, para. 9.
 103 Bielefeldt, Ghanea, and Wiener, Freedom of Religion, 69.
 104 Améry speaks specifically of this struggle: Jean Améry, Jenseits von 
Schuld und Sühne: Bewältigungsversuche eines Überwältigten (Stuttgart: 
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by society’, and that dignity is connected to trust in the world and the social 
contract.105 Freedom of religion is part of the fundamental right to human dig-
nity, and part of the social contract. Destruction of dignity and social binds is 
a substantial element of the destruction of a group in genocide; one that survi-
vors struggle to reclaim and to deal with.106 
Violations during the Armenian Genocide 
The Ottoman Empire was a fairly tolerant pluralistic empire. A variety of groups 
of different ethnicities and religions co-existed without being persecuted. How-
ever, this did not mean that all groups—particularly minority groups—had 
equality. Armenians were a distinct minority group in the Ottoman Empire: 
they were Christian in a Muslim majority.107 Moreover, Armenians were a 
distinctive group, with their own religion, language, and culture. They were 
a millet, a religious community within the Empire, with well-defined statuses, 
duties, and obligations, and a great deal of autonomy, including the right to 
practice their religion.108 Yet this status also resulted in legalised discrimina-
tion in certain areas of life, such as multiple taxes and exclusion from military 
service.109 As Melson explains, ‘This was the explicit agreement that dhimmis 
[people of the scripture] were never to consider themselves the equals of Mus-
lims. The Ottoman state considered Muslim superiority to be both just and 
natural, and the necessary if not merely sufficient condition for its continued 
tolerance of inferior minorities’.110 Christians were second-class citizens due to 
their religion. Muslims referred to them as Gavur (or Kafir)—unbeliever or 
‘infidel’, a word with emotional and derogatory overtones.
 Klett-Cotta, 1977), 64, cited in Bielefeldt, Ghanea, and Wiener, Freedom of 
Religion, 80.
 105 Jean Améry, At the Mind’s Limits: Contemplations By a Survivor on  Auschwitz 
and Its Realities (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), 28, 89.
 106 Ibid.
 107 The Armenians were not the only Christian group to be targeted for 
destruction by the Ottoman leaders. Others such as the Assyrian and Greek 
Christians were also victims of persecution and massacres; Benny Morris 
and Dror Ze’evi, The Thirty-Year Genocide: Turkey’s Destruction of Its Chris-
tian Minorities, 1894–1924 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2019).
 108 Robert Melson, Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian 
Genocide and the Holocaust (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 54.
 109 Ibid.
 110 Ibid., 56.
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In the 1800s, despite anti-Christian sentiment, Armenians were granted 
rights such as taxation rights.111 However, these rights did not materialise. Con-
sequently, Armenians began to push for implementation of these rights. When 
the Young Turks came to power in 1908, the Armenian campaign for rights 
coincided with a loss of territory for the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, the 
Young Turks linked the Armenian push for rights to the idea that Armeni-
ans were seeking independence and collaborating with Russia. This was part of 
the justification provided for what became the genocide of the Armenians. In 
doing this, the Armenians were targeted as an ethnic (or national) and religious 
group. Principally, their Christianity held them apart and sculpted them as out-
siders in an empire that was to become today’s nation of Turkey. The success 
of the Armenian minority ‘gave the appearance that it was challenging a tradi-
tional and hierarchical, Muslim and imperial, religious and political order’.112
Officially, the Armenian Genocide began on 24 April 1915. However, there 
were massacres and human rights violations preceding this, from the 1890s. 
From 1894–96, massacres were carried out under Sultan Abdul Hamid II 
against Armenians and other Christian minorities of the Ottoman Empire.113 
Up to 300,000 Armenians were killed in the Hamidian massacres.114 As part 
of these pogroms, forced Islamisation also took place, with approximately 
40,000–100,000 Christians forcibly converted. Churches and monasteries were 
pillaged, profaned, and demolished; churches were converted into mosques; 
priests and vicars115 were killed.116 The Christianity of these groups was used 
against them: ‘Ittihadists, like Sultan Abdul Hamid, employed religion as an 
instrument of propaganda to mobilise the Muslim masses’.117
 111 Ruben Safrastyan, Ottoman Empire: The Genesis of the Program of Genocide 
(1876–1920) (Yerevan: National Academy of Sciences, 2011), 32–99.
 112 Melson, Revolution and, 53.
 113 Anahit Khosroeva, ‘The Assyrian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire and 
Adjacent Territories’, in The Armenian Genocide: Cultural and Ethical 
 Legacies, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian (New Brunswick: Transaction Pub-
lishers, 2007), 26; Deborah Mayersen, On the Path to Genocide: Armenia 
and Rwanda Reexamined (New York: Berghahn Books, 2014), 40–60.
 114 Melson, Revolution and, 47.
 115 ‘Vicar’ translated from ‘desservant’ in French texts (author’s translation).
 116 Mayersen, On the Path, 49; Armenian National Archives document, ‘Liste 
abrégée, relatant exclusivement les profanations d’églizes, les conversions 
forcées et les assassinats d’ecclésiastiques, qui ont eu lieu lors des massacres 
commis dans les provinces de la Turquie habitées par les Arméniens, depuis 
les derniers jours du mois de septembre 1895’, undated, with handwritten 
notations dated 1895/6. 
 117 Simon Payaslian, ‘The Destruction of the Armenian Church during the 
Genocide’, Genocide Studies and Prevention 1, no. 2 (2006): 156. Ittihad-
ists were the Committee of Union and Progress; initially a secret society 
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The anti-Christian sentiment grew under the Young Turks, for whom 
 priority was Turkification of the empire, including Islamisation.118 Discrimi-
nation against Christians grew. No clocks were permitted on church towers, 
and only wooden bells were allowed. Church towers could not be higher than 
mosque minarets; Christians were prohibited from having houses higher 
than Muslim houses.
From April 1915 onwards, the Armenians were subject to a significant range 
of well-organised crimes. As part of this, freedom of religion was specifically 
targeted. Supreme religious leaders were deported as part of the  deconstruction 
of the Armenian Church as an entity.119 Priests and other religious leaders 
were specifically targeted in massacres. Unlike the killings of ordinary  people, 
 religious leaders were often tortured publicly before being killed. Survivor tes-
timony demonstrates that ‘[t]he clergy were treated with particular  severity, 
priests were killed through brutal torturing, their beards were torn out or singed, 
eyes blinded, tongues and noses cut off and so on’.120 One survivor recounted:
From their stories I learned that our priest (Ter Yeghiazar) and the pri-
mate (Ter Yeghishe), and all prominent Armenians were on the kay-
makam’s order to be slaughtered. And cut into pieces with daggers. 
Before murdering them, their beards would be removed by flaying their 
skin and displayed on the market wall as an ornament.121 
Another described the beating to death of a priest with sticks, after which ‘[t]
hey filled his mouth with rubbish and threw him in the river’.122
In addition to targeting religious leaders, religious buildings and icons were 
also specifically attacked. Churches were ransacked, particularly for valuable 
religious icons; less valuable artefacts were destroyed. Churches were often pro-
faned, for the specific objective of humiliating the religion and the religious. 
Further, churches were converted into stables, which resulted in profanation 
formed in 1889, the CUP later became a political party that merged with the 
Young Turks.
 118 Melson, Revolution and, 138; Raymond Kévorkian, The Armenian  Genocide: 
A Complete History (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 189–200.
 119 Payaslian, ‘The Destruction’, 160–61.
 120 National Archives of Armenia, Armenian Genocide by Ottoman Turkey 
1915: Testimony of Survivors-Collection of Documents (Yerevant: Zangak 
Publishing House, 2013), 19.
 121 No. 23 Mkrtich Alsanian on massacre of township of Akants-Archesh 
in Archesh District of Van, (testimony taken 23 Aug. 1916, Oshakan), in 
Armenia, Testimony of Survivors, 72.
 122 No. 17 Sanam Vardanian; Hamlet of Berkri in Berkri District of Van (testi-
mony taken 6 Aug. 1916, Mazra), in Armenia, Testimony of Survivors, 72.
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by cattle or sheep. Destroyed Armenian churches can still be found in Eastern 
Turkey in use as stables.123
The forcible conversion of women and children, with forced marriages of 
girls and young women to Muslim men, formed a fundamental component 
of the genocide and demonstrates how the removal of freedom of religion can 
be used as a genocidal act.124 Those who refused to convert were raped and/
or killed.125 After deportations of Armenians in later stages of the genocide 
to what is now northern Syria, many women and children were forcibly con-
verted; some women were converted by Kurds and subsequently compelled to 
have their faces and hands tattooed as per local tradition (‘deq’).
The Armenian Genocide left behind up to 200,000 orphans:126 ‘At wars end, 
Western aid officials and the Armenian ecclesiastical leadership estimated that 
the numbers of non-Muslim children housed in Ottoman State orphanages or 
in Muslim households was at least sixty thousand’, with no attempt made to 
find and reunite children with living relatives.127 These orphans ended up in 
orphanages in Armenia or other countries; some were adopted. Those adopted 
by non-Armenian families were thus not raised within the Armenian Church.128
Violations during the Holocaust 
In Nazi Germany, Jews were targeted not as a religious group, but as a racial 
group. Jews were considered ‘non-Aryan’, and Aryan was regarded as a race. 
 123 Such as the St Karapet Church at Avarabank Monastery.
 124 Or an ‘offering’ to convert for ‘safety’; Kévorkian, The Armenian, 296; Vahakn 
N. Dadrian, ‘Children as Victims of Genocide: The Armenian Case’, Journal 
of Genocide Research 5, no. 3 (2003): 422–35; Taner Akçam, ‘Deportation and 
Massacres in the Cipher Telegrams of the Interior Ministry in the Prime Min-
isterial Archive (Başbakanlık Arşivi)’, Genocide Studies and Prevention 1, no. 3 
(2006): 310–11; Keith David Watenpaugh, ‘“The League of Nations” Rescue 
of Armenian Genocide Survivors and the Making of Modern Humanitarian-
ism, 1920–1927’, The American Historical Review 115, no. 5 (2010): 1324–26; 
Lorne Shirinian, ‘Orphans of the Armenian Genocide with Special Reference 
to the Georgetown Boys and Girls in Canada’, in The Armenian Genocide 
Legacy, ed. Alexis Demirdjian (London: Palgrave, 2016), 46.
 125 See for example, No. 37 Sara Muradian [F] on massacre at village of Boghanis 
in Gyavash District (testimony taken 1916, Baku), in Armenia, Testimony of 
Survivors, 92. Many other testimonies recorded mention forced conversions 
to Islam (often with the subsequent enslavement of the women).
 126 Shirinian, ‘Orphans of ’, 45.
 127 Keith David Watenpaugh, ‘ “Are There Any Children for Sale?”: Genocide 
and the Transfer of Armenian Children (1915–1922),’ Journal of Human 
Rights 12, no. 3 (2013): 292; Watenpaugh, ‘Rescue of Armenian’, 37–39.
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Nazis were motivated by decades of changing theory about ‘race’ and the idea of 
preserving German ‘racial purity’.129 Law and decrees passed in Nazi Germany 
and occupied territories used the terms ‘race’ and ‘non-Aryan’ when imple-
menting anti-Jewish laws and policies.130 
Due to Nazi infatuation with ‘race’, the Jewish religion experienced relative 
freedom under Nazi rule. In ghettos, religion continued to be a major part of 
life for the Jews therein. Religious ceremonies were still undertaken, such as 
evening services and weddings. Sabbath and Jewish holy days were observed, 
Torah study took place, and religious education for children took place.131 Some 
ghettos had synagogues. Continuation of religious rituals served to help ghetto 
inhabitants retain some element of normality, routine, and community.
Religion was not necessarily restricted or even banned in concentration and 
death camps. Prisoners in Belzec had prayer shawls and tefillin, and prayed 
in their barracks at night.132 In Treblinka, evening services were held, with SS 
guards listening to the melodic voice of the Kapo who ran the service. Treblinka 
prisoners also had shawls and tefillin, along with prayer books, and were per-
mitted morning and evening prayers. Minyan was permitted in the carpentry 
workshop in the morning and evening before and after work. In bitter irony, the 
SS also permitted funerals in some instances, including erection of headstones. 
Weddings were even held, matzot baked for Passover, and the Kol Nidre service 
 129 Karl A. Schleunes, The Twisted Road to Auschwitz: Nazi Policy Towards 
German Jews 1933–139 (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 
1990), 15–35.
 130 See, for example, Germany: Harry Reicher, Law and the Holocaust: Cases 
and Materials, 4th ed. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Law School, 
2001); Janos Pelle, Sowing the Seeds of Hatred: Anti-Jewish Laws and Hun-
garian Public Opinion, 1938–1944 (Boulder: East European Monographs, 
2004); Vera Ranki, The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion: Jews and National-
ism in Hungary (St Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 1999); Nathaniel Katzburg, 
‘Anti-Jewish Legislation in Hungary 1940–1941’, Annual of Bar-Ilan Univer-
sity Studies in Judaica and the Humanities XVI–XVII (1979): 86–87. Italy: Lil-
iana Picciotto Fargion, ‘The Anti-Jewish Policy of the Italian Social Republic 
(1943–1945)’, Yad Vashem Studies 17 (1986): 17; Renzo De Felice, The Jews 
in Fascist Italy: A History (New York: Enigma Books, 2001), 337. Ironically, 
under French law 26 Apr. 1941 Troisième Ordonnance relative aux mesures 
contre les juifs, race was defined by religion: a person was considered ipso jure 
as pure Jewish if one grand-parent was part of the Jewish religious commu-
nity; Philippe Héraclès, La Loi Nazie en France (Paris: Guy Authier Editeur, 
1974), 180–81; J. Lubetzki, La Condition des Juifs en France sous L’Occupation 
Allemande 1940–1944 (Paris: CDJC, 1945), 137–38, 58–61, 65–70.
 131 Yitzhak Arad, The Pictorial History of the Holocaust (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 
1990), 124, 26–27.
 132 Yitzhak Arad, Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka: The Operation Reinhardt Death 
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held for Yom Kippur.133 The Kaddish was very commonly and frequently recited 
in camps, given the high number and daily occurrence of deaths.134 In one 
 incident at Auschwitz, 2,000 prisoners recited the Viddui with no reaction from 
SS guards watching.135 Auschwitz prisoners were able to access prayer books 
and tefillin.136
It should be noted, though, that the permissiveness of the Nazis towards Jew-
ish religious practice was not based on any mercy or concession, but rather 
because the Nazis assumed the Jews would be killed anyway. The ultimate goal 
was to eradicate not only the Jewish people but the entire existence of Jewish 
history, culture, and religion. Thus, individual Jews or groups of Jews practic-
ing religious tradition was irrelevant because they were going to be completely 
annihilated, including their religion.
Regardless of the fact that Jews were not targeted specifically as a religious 
group and were still permitted to conduct religious rituals, freedom of religion 
was nonetheless impeded. Jewish markers such as beards on religious men were 
often cut or pulled off as an act of humiliation. Jewish religious monuments and 
property were destroyed. Synagogues were prime targets for destruction. Dur-
ing the 9–10 November 1938 Reichspogromnacht (or Kristallnacht), in addition 
to Jewish houses and businesses, synagogues were attacked, with windows bro-
ken and many set on fire, under orders of Josef Goebbels.137 An estimated 1,400 
synagogues and prayer rooms throughout the German Reich were destroyed or 
burned.138 Religious icons such as Torah scrolls were desecrated and furniture 
smashed. Synagogues in the Polish city of Łódź, for example, were dismantled 
and burned early on under Nazi occupation (1939 and 1940).139
In ghettos, Sabbath and holy days were observed where possible, however 
the Germans did not honour these festivals and rituals. Indeed, ghetto  inhabitants 
 133 Arad, Belzec, Sobibor, 216–17.
 134 Arad, Belzec, Sobibor; Filip Müller, Eyewitness Auschwitz: Three Years in the 
Gas Chambers (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1979), 48. Recounts one incident in 
Auschwitz when another inmate recited the Kaddish as they cremated Mül-
ler’s own father.
 135 Ibid., 70–71. Prayer and song permission may have been allowed in order to 
calm victims before their deaths.
 136 Ibid., 35. 
 137 Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews 1933–1939: The Years of Perse-
cution (London: Phoenix, 1997), 272–74.
 138 Arad, Pictorial History, 54–59.
 139 Shimon Huberband, ‘The Destruction of the Synagogues in Łódź’, in Łódź 
Ghetto: Inside a Community Under Siege, eds. Alan Adelson and Robert 
Lapides (New York: Viking, 1989), 70–71. See also photographic evidence 
as taken by Henryk Ross such as Henryk Ross, ‘Ruins of a Destroyed Syna-
gogue on Wolborska Street, Which was Blown up by the German Author-
ities’, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, https://collections 
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were forced to work on these holy days, and at times Aktionen were carried 
out specifically on these days, as a way of deliberately disrupting Jewish life 
and community.140
In addition to these overt acts, in some circumstances children had to 
 suppress their Jewish identity,141 even converting to other religions such as 
Catholicism.142 For example, in France, children were hidden with families or 
in convents and converted to Catholicism, either during the war or afterwards 
when their families did not return. Some children did not even know they were 
Jewish, and discovering this led to identity crises for those who had been raised 
in a Catholic family or convent; some even rejected their Jewishness for fear of 
persecution.143 Moreover, some children as sole survivors of their family lived 
with non-Jewish families, into which they were adopted after the war. Through 
no fault of their own or the families they ended up living with, the children 
were unaware of their Jewish heritage and grew up under a different or no 
religion.144 The numbers of these children is unknown, but, like the Armenian 
Genocide, this demonstrates the long-term impact that genocide can have on 
freedom of religion, even after killing has stopped.
Violations during the Cambodian Genocide
Under the Khmer Rouge regime from 1975 to 1979, 1.7 million people died.145 
While it has been argued that the Khmer Rouge killings did not amount to 
 140 Arad, Pictorial History, 124.
 141 Vicki Gordon, ‘The Experience of Being a Hidden Child Survivor of the 
Holocaust’ (Doctor of Philosophy University of Melbourne, 2002), 140–41, 
http://hdl.handle.net/11343/39539.
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 143 Ibid., 155–57.
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Khmer Rouge: une analyse démographique (Paris: l’Harmattan, 1995), 60. 
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genocide,146 this article takes the view that genocide did take place under the 
Khmer Rouge, with the intent being to destroy in part the Khmer people,147 
in addition to destruction of certain minority groups, including Vietnamese, 
ethnic Chinese, and Muslim Cham.148
The dominant religion in Cambodia was Buddhism. The main group 
of  people targeted by the Khmer Rouge were ‘city people’, or intellectuals. 
 However, religious and minority nationality groups were also marked groups. 
Khmer Rouge communist ideals excluded religion completely. Consequently, 
freedom of religion was almost completely and at times violently restricted, 
with a goal to eliminate religion.149 
‘Reactionary’ religions were banned under the Constitution of Democratic 
Kampuchea.150 Buddhism was seen as a reactionary religion because it had 
 passivity and lacked interest in collective construction of the country. However, 
Kiernan estimates the death toll at 21 per cent; Ben Kiernan, The Pol Pot 
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1975–79, 3rd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 458.
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see Ben Kiernan, ‘The Cambodian Genocide, 1975–1979’, in Centuries of 
Genocide: Essays and Eyewitness Accounts, eds. Samuel Totten, and Wil-
liam S. Parsons (New York: Routledge, 2012), 325. Also note that while reli-
gious persons/leaders were particularly targeted for annihilation under the 
Khmer Rouge, foreign religious leaders were permitted to flee. Ponchaud 
describes the separation of Khmer Catholic monks and nuns from for-
eign (mostly French) ones, the latter being rescued by the French embassy; 
 François Ponchaud, La Cathédrale De La Rizière: Histoire De L’eglise Au 
Cambodge (Paris: CLD éditions, 2000), 205.
 149 Kiernan, ‘The Cambodian’, 322. 
 150 Article 20 ‘Every citizen of Kampuchea has the right to worship according 
to any religion and the right not to worship according to any religion. Reac-
tionary religions which are detrimental to Democratic Kampuchea and 
Kampuchean people are absolutely forbidden’.
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Buddhism was also a significant source of power in Khmer culture, with village 
life revolving around the temple(s). It was a source of authority and power that 
could threaten the authority of Angkar (‘the Organisation’, as the Khmer Rouge 
termed itself).151 
Consequently, Buddhist monks were de-robed; those who refused to do so 
were tortured and killed.152 Monks who de-robed undertook forced labour with 
the rest of the population.153 Religious practice was banned, in particular funer-
als and giving alms. However, some ceremonies still took place. These were 
the ceremonies involving the donation of money, the majority of which was 
afterwards stolen by Khmer Rouge cadres.154 There are instances of the practice 
of secret rites where possible, but these activities were rare due to the danger of 
carrying them out. 
Forced marriage took place under the Khmer Rouge. These ‘marriages’ were 
not carried out according to Khmer Buddhist tradition, but rather a group 
‘marriage’ pledging allegiance to Angkar. Survivors who were forced into these 
‘marriages’ consistently note their distress at the fact the marriage was not 
 carried out according to traditional rites with family present.155
Temples were ransacked and repurposed, with valuable statues stolen and 
temples converted into military offices, rice storage, or pigsties, or dismantled 
 151 François Ponchaud, Cambodge année zéro (Paris: Editions Kailash, 2012), 
146, 269–70. This is despite the fact that, ironically, the Khmer Rouge ini-
tially incorporated Buddhist concepts into their ideology in order to win 
over the Khmer people; Ibid., 276, 277. 
 152 Kiernan, ‘The Cambodian’, 323. ‘The Khmer Rouge didn’t believe in Bud-
dhism and wanted to eliminate it. They didn’t need monks and didn’t want 
people to celebrate any festivals. One monk in our village refused to dis-
robe, so they came in the middle of the night, tied him to a banana tree, and 
killed him’, Eng Sam Ol in Wynne Cougill with Pang Pivoine, Ra Chhayran, 
and Sim Sopheak, Stilled Lives: Photographs from the Cambodian Genocide, 
trans. by Chy Terith (Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia, 
2004), 31; see also other testimonies at 72–73, 76. Ian Harris, Buddhism 
Under Pol Pot (Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2007), 
122–27, 34–35; Chanthou Boua, ‘Genocide of a Religious Group: Pol Pot and 
 Cambodia’s Buddhist Monks’, in State Organized Terror: The Case of Violent 
Internal Repression, ed. P. Timothy Bushnell (Westview Press, 1991), 232–5.
 153 Ponchaud, Cambodge année, 147–9; Harris, Buddhism Under, 114–6; Boua, 
‘Genocide of ’, 236–37.
 154 Harris, Buddhism Under, 145–50. 
 155 See for example, testimonies before the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia, Case 002/02, transcript, Witness 2-TCCP-274, 22 and 
23 Aug. 2016; Witness 2-TCCP-224, 23 and 24 Aug. 2016; Witness 2-TCCP-
286, 30 Aug. 2016; Witness 2-TCCP-1064, 24 Oct. 2016. 
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for other use.156 Non-valuable religious objects such as statues, books, and man-
uscript were destroyed, including book burnings.157 Propaganda expounded 
Buddhist monks as leeches and imperialists.158 
Islam was specifically targeted too, considered a ‘polluted and inferior 
religion’.159 Profanation of mosques and graves took place; sacred texts were 
destroyed.160 Muslims were forced to change their names to ones that 
were ‘less Muslim sounding’ and to eat pork (refusal for which resulted in arrest, 
torture, and death).161 Religious books such as the Qur’an were destroyed, 
Qur’anic schools closed down, and religious practices such as visiting shrines 
or Qur’anic recitation forbidden.162 As with Buddhist practices, some people 
prayed in secret, despite the significant risk.163 The destruction of Muslim iden-
tity ‘was abrupt, brutal and widespread’.164
Catholic and Christian churches were not immune: many were razed to the 
ground; for example, the Phnom Penh cathedral was blown up and replaced 
with a garden.165 In Battambang, the cemetery was also destroyed.166 All Catho-
lic Church leaders and eleven evangelical pastors were executed or died from 
starvation or fatigue.167 
All persons of faith and religious leaders were subject to forced de-conver-
sion. They were made to wear secular clothing (the typical all-black attire of the 
regime), and to have their hair cut according to regime regulations.168 
Religious leaders of all faiths were tortured and killed, including Buddhist 
monks, Muslim leaders, and Islamic teachers.169 Marek Sliwinski estimates the 
 156 Ponchaud, Cambodge année, 151; Harris, Buddhism Under, 154–67
 157 Harris, Buddhism Under, 162–69.
 158 Ponchaud, Cambodge année, 149–51.
 159 Farina So, The Hijab of Cambodia: Memories of Cham Muslim Women after 
the Khmer Rouge (Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia, 
2011), 55.
 160 François Ponchaud, La Cathédrale de la Rizière: Histoire de l’Eglise au 
 Cambodge, 2nd ed. (Paris: CLD éditions, 2006), 271; So, Hijab of, 54–55.
 161 Kiernan, Pol Pot Regime, 461; Ponchaud, La Cathédrale, 271; Osman, The 
Cham Rebellion, 115. Changing names was either to another Cham Muslim 
name, to a Khmer name, or by shortening the original name, to hide iden-
tity; So, Hijab of, 61–62.
 162 So, Hijab of, 54–55, 57.
 163 Ibid., 59–61.
 164 Ibid., 64.
 165 Ponchaud, La Cathédrale, 239.
 166 Ibid., 240, 60.
 167 Ibid., 239, 65.
 168 So, Hijab of, 61–62.
 169 Ben Kiernan, ‘Genocidal Targeting: Two Groups of Victims in Pol Pot’s 
 Cambodia’, in State Organized Terror: The Case of Violent Internal  Repression, 
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mortality rate at 29.8 per cent for Buddhists, 40.6 per cent for Muslim Cham, and 
48.6 per cent for Catholics.170 In 1975, 0.18 per cent of Cambodians had a religious 
profession; this was reduced to only 0.03 per cent by 1976.171 Chanthou Boua 
estimates that fewer than 2,000 of Cambodia’s 65,000–70,000 monks survived.172
Destruction of Buddhism was particularly significant in Cambodia, where 
the essence of Khmer culture was Buddhism. François Ponchaud writes: ‘Until 
April 1975, “race” and “religion” were expressed using the same word, and in 
the everyday language, saying “khmer” meant “Buddhist” … it is at the temple 
where Khmers rediscover their khméritude’.173 In capturing the minds of young 
Khmer people, Buddhism was lost to the younger generation, who embraced the 
violence of the communist revolution and not the values of Buddhism. In elimi-
nating  Buddhism, Angkar sought to eliminate the Khmer as they existed, creating 
a completely new Khmer nation by radically transforming their culture.174
Freedom of religion and genocide: definition and prevention
These case studies show clear violation of multiple aspects of the right to free-
dom of religion. All three regimes restricted or prohibited the right to manifest 
religion or belief through worship, observance, practice, and teaching, through 
destruction of buildings, banning of religious rites and rituals, closure of reli-
gious education, and killing of religious leaders. The absolute right to not be 
coerced was violated in the Armenian and Cambodian genocides, through for-
cible conversion. Under the Nazis, people converted to Christian religions as a 
means of saving themselves; this is also coercion, conversion out of desperation 
rather than true choice.175 All restrictions on religion in the Armenian Geno-
cide and the Holocaust were carried out as discrimination against minorities. 
ed. P. Timothy Bushnell (Westview Press, 1991), 223; Harris,  Buddhism 
Under, 131–33; So, Hijab of, 54.
 170 Compared with an estimated overall death rate of 21–24 per cent of the 
general population. Sliwinski, Le Génocide, 76–77. Ponchaud provides 
numbers from specific communities, with some losing up to two-thirds of 
their Catholic population; Ponchaud, La Cathédrale, 259–65.
 171 Sliwinski, Le Génocide, 92.
 172 Boua, ‘Genocide of ’, 239.
 173 Ponchaud, Cambodge année, 145–271 (author’s translation).
 174 For discussion on the inherent connection between nationalism and Bud-
dhism in Cambodia, see John Marston and Elizabeth Guthrie, eds., History, 
Buddhism and New Religious Movements in Cambodia (Honolulu: Univer-
sity of Hawai’i Press, 2004).
 175 Of course, if their true identity was discovered, conversion did not save 
the converted Jews, because Jewishness was in the ‘blood’ and had to be 
destroyed.
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In the Cambodian Genocide, Buddhists were the majority group but minor-
ity religions such as Islam and Catholicism were discriminated against. These 
restrictions were not implemented as legitimate limitations for public safety, 
order, health or morals;176 rather to specifically discriminate and destroy. 
Raphael Lemkin delineated ‘religious techniques’ as a specific part of geno-
cide, along with political, cultural, economic, biological, physical, and moral.177 
Steven Leonard Jacobs found ‘“religion” is all too often overlooked as an impor-
tant factor in contributing to either the implementation and perpetuation of 
genocide, or as a foundational underpinning and rationalization for such col-
lective acts’.178 Leo Kuper has written of this distinct role of religion in the dehu-
manisation process within genocide:
It is striking that the cases of genocide discussed [in this book], with 
a few exceptions … are marked by religious differences between the 
killers and the victims. This suggests that religious values (even among 
those who are not devout and in conflicts quite unrelated to matters of 
faith) may be ideologically significant at a different level, shaping senti-
ments of exclusion, and derogatory stereotypes of the followers of other 
religions. And it suggests too that we underestimate the contemporary 
significance of religion in genocide.179 
More recently, Kate Temoney examined the role of religion in genocide, focusing 
on Rwanda and Bosnia.180 She categorised four broad roles of religion in geno-
cide: a religious group being targeted; use of religionised language by perpetra-
tors; the condonation of genocide explicitly or implicitly by religious leaders; 
and the role of religious groups in preventing or interrupting genocide. 
Temoney determined: ‘although religious belief is rarely the only driving factor 
in genocide, it is not merely ancillary to genocide but potentiates genocide in 
 176 Such limitations or derogations are permissible under human rights law 
during public emergency; see, for example, Article 4 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and Olivier de Schutter, International 
Human Rights Law: Cases, Materials, Commentary, 2nd ed.  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), 339–426.
 177 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (Washington DC: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 1944), 89.
 178 Steven Leonard Jacobs, ‘Introduction: Genocide in the Name of God: 
Thoughts on Religion and Genocide’, in Confronting Genocide: Judaism, 
Christianity, Islam, ed. Steven Leonard Jacobs (New York: Lexington Books, 
2009), ix.
 179 Kuper, Genocide, 90.
 180 Kate Temoney, ‘Religion and Genocide Nexuses: Bosnia as Case Study’, 
Religions 8, vol. 6 (2017), 112–25; Kate Temoney, ‘The 1994 Rwandan Gen-
ocide: The Religion/Genocide Nexus, Sexual Violence, and the Future of 
Genocide Studies’, Genocide Studies and Prevention 10, no. 3 (2016): 3–24.
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a particular manner’.181 Religion thus becomes an inherent and critical part of 
the ‘othering’ aspect of genocide. I would add to Temoney’s list a fifth broad role 
of religion in genocide: religion as a specific target of discrimination and rights 
violations (occurring even when a group is not targeted as a religious group).
Preservation of religious rituals in targeted groups continued where possible 
for normality and routine, but also as a form of resistance.182 Safeguarding cul-
ture and rituals was a means of survival through perpetuation of that group’s 
existence as it is existed as a separate and distinct cultural entity. While not all 
members of the targeted group may have been religious, the particular religion 
of their group was a significant component of their group as it existed culturally 
and whether defined as nation, race or ethnicity. 
The example of the Cambodian Genocide is particularly noteworthy, where 
we see Buddhism targeted separately from ‘urban people’, both part of Khmer 
society. To destroy Buddhism was to destroy Khmer, and part of the reparation 
of Khmer society post-1979 was rehabilitation of the ritual life of their commu-
nity. This rehabilitation was also necessary for Armenians and Jews. 
Thus, destroying religion was part and parcel of destroying a group, in whole 
or in part: destroying that group as a social structure. Religion and the freedom 
to practice are substantial elements of this social structure or figuration, and 
thus require elimination if a group is to be extinguished. When genocide is 
committed, it is done so for the purpose of destruction (in whole or in part) 
of a group of people based on their nationality, ethnicity, race, or religion.183 
As Christopher Powell noted, destroying a group is not killing multiple indi-
viduals, but rather eradicating ‘something more than or other than the sum 
of the individuals who belong to it … genocide is the killing or destruction of 
that “something more”’.184 That is, the ‘genos’ in genocide ‘must connote a type 
of social figuration. The collective object … must … have the general prop-
erty of being a dynamic relational network formed through practical social 
interactions in historical time’.185 Daniel Feierstein has referred to genocide 
as ‘a specific technology of power for destroying and reorganizing social rela-
tions’, observing that it ‘is impossible to commit genocide without first building 
 models of identity and Otherness’.186
 181 Temoney, ‘Religion and’, 3. 
 182 Stanislav Zámečník, That Was Dachau 1933–1945 (Brussels: Comité Inter-
national de Dachau, 2004), 307.
 183 For a discussion of ‘groups’ in the purview of genocide, see William A 
Schabas, Genocide in International Law, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 117–71.
 184 Christopher Powell, ‘What do Genocides Kill? A Relational Concept of 
Genocide’, Journal of Genocide Research 9, no. 4 (2007): 524
 185 Ibid., 538. 
 186 Daniel Feierstein, Genocide as Social Practice (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 2014), 205–09.
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Claudia Card describes genocide as social death, different from simply kill-
ing large number of people through, for example, terrorism, or war.187 Social 
death comes through annihilation of social vitality, which only exists through 
relationships, including those mediated through social institutions such as reli-
gion.188 Members of the group lose their context and identity that shapes their 
lives.189 Card notes:
In genocides, survivors experience a social death, to a degree and for 
a time. Some later become revitalised in new ways; others do not. 
Descendants of genocide survivors, like descendants of slaves who were 
kidnapped, may be “natally alienated,” no longer able to pass along and 
build upon the traditions, cultural developments (including languages), 
and projects of earlier generations.190 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Appeals Cham-
ber specifically noted that the goal of génocidaires is ‘to deprive humanity of 
the manifold richness its nationalities, races, ethnicities and religions pro-
vide’; in other words, it is the group as a cultural concept, a social structure 
that génocidaires seek to eliminate.191 Lemkin created the term genocide as a 
word to capture ‘the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national 
groups’, however did not necessarily see killing as the crucial component of 
that destruction. Instead, he saw the plan of destruction as encompassing ‘the 
disintegration of political and social institutions, of culture, language, national 
feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups, and the 
destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives 
of the individuals belonging to such groups’.192 Lemkin considered loss of life as 
the extreme end of genocide, but not the point around which the other crimes 
pivoted.193 His focus was the social structure of the targeted communities, the 
 187 Claudia Card, Confronting Evils: Terrorism, Torture, Genocide (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010).
 188 Card, Confronting Evils, 237. 
 189 Ibid., 254. 
 190 Ibid., 262. See also Shmuel Lederman, ‘A Nation Destroyed: An Existen-
tial Approach to the Distinctive Harm of Genocide’, Journal of Genocide 
Research 19, no. 1 (2017): 112–32.
 191 Prosecutor v Krstić, IT-98-33-A, Appeals Judgement (19 Apr. 2004), 12, 
para. 36.
 192 Lemkin, Axis Rule, 79; Schabas, Genocide in, 30. 
 193 Lemkin framed the social, cultural and economic aspects of genocide and 
the ‘biological aspect’, which was ‘physical decline and even destruction 
of the population involved’; Lemkin, Axis Rule, 80. In addition to these 
aspects, he also included religious and moral genocide techniques; Ibid., 
82–90.
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removal of rights from that group, and ‘the imposition of the national pattern 
of the oppressor’ on the oppressed group.194
Considering the specific fixation on the religion of a group, regardless of 
how the perpetrator categorises that group designated for destruction, enables 
adoption of a broader interpretation of the definition of genocide. Rather than 
a separate concept of ‘cultural genocide’, the essential destruction of a group 
includes destruction of identity, not just physical elimination. Indeed, to fall 
under the ambit of the Genocide Convention, a group is required to have a 
perspicuous identity. ‘Genocide not only intentionally strips individuals of the 
ability to participate in social relationships, activities, and traditions, it aims to 
destroy the possibility of those particular kinds of relationships, activities, and 
traditions for others in the future’.195 For survivors, there is alienation, deracina-
tion, from their people—their group.
Genocide is defined as acts committed with intent to destroy a group in 
whole or in part. The Genocide Convention and ICC definition requires acts 
be committed ‘with intent to destroy’. One of the crimes of genocide is inflic-
tion of conditions of life calculated to bring about ‘the physical destruction 
in whole or in part’ of the group. The fact that the umbrella definition does 
not include the word ‘physical’ but one of the specific crimes does, indicates 
that interpretation of ‘intent to destroy’ can be broader than simply physical 
destruction.196 International and domestic case law has referred to the bonds 
of group members as a defining element of the group, ‘as well as such aspects of 
the group as its members’ culture and beliefs’, hence the ‘intent to destroy’ ‘can-
not sensibly be regarded as reducible to an intent to destroy the group physi-
cally or biologically’.197
Violations of freedom of religion are genocidal crimes: causing serious bod-
ily or mental harm, forcible transfer of children, and killing members of the 
group. Most violations are the former—impediments to exercising freedom of 
 religion result in or constitute serious bodily or mental harm, destroying the 
social structure of that group. For example, tattooing of Armenian Christian 
women amounts to serious bodily and mental harm; destruction of religious 
buildings and icons generates serious mental harm; forced conversion creates 
serious mental harm; and cessation of religious rites and rituals also results in 
 194 Lemkin, Axis Rule, 79. 
 195 Card, Confronting Evils, 265.
 196 For further discussion on treaty interpretation in the context of the crime of 
genocide, see Elisa Novic, “Physical-biological or Socio-cultural ‘Destruc-
tion’ in Genocide? Unravelling the Legal Underpinnings of Conflicting 
Interpretations,” Journal of Genocide Research 17, no. 1 (2015): 70–73. 
 197 Prosecutor v Krajišnik, IT-00-39-T, Trial Judgement (27 Sept. 2006), 302, 
para. 854, fn. 1701. See also John Quigley, The Genocide Convention: An 
International Law Analysis (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 103–05.
52 Genocide Perspectives VI
serious mental harm. Forcible transfer of children sometimes occurs specifi-
cally for the purposes of forced conversion (as in the Armenian Genocide). 
Taking a more expansive interpretation of the crime of genocide will enable 
international criminal courts and tribunals to prosecute more perpetrators of 
genocide, reducing impunity of perpetrators for these significant and endur-
ing crimes. Attentiveness to violations of freedom of religion in the context 
of genocide is crucial, where perpetrators can be punished for causing serious 
bodily or mental harm for crimes committed that are also rights violations. 
There is a compelling obligation to look beyond torture and killing in genocide, 
to human rights violations amounting to genocide crimes that have frequently 
been neglected for prosecution in favour of prosecuting crimes of torture and 
killing. Focus on physical destruction in prosecutions ignores the seriousness 
of crimes that destroy the very fabric of a group, crimes that are ‘a deliber-
ate attempt to change the identity of the survivors by modifying relationships 
within a given society’.198 
Recognition of the role of religious freedom in the genocide process also has 
repercussions for genocide prevention. The case studies assessed here demon-
strate violations of the right to freedom of religion take place in genocides even 
if the targeted group is not exclusively a religious group, and well before kill-
ing begins. There are distinct similarities in the way that freedom of religion 
is violated in the genocide process: destruction of religious icons, buildings, 
and texts; restriction of or complete banning of religious rites, rituals, and cer-
emonies; prohibition of religious education; forced conversion; and specific 
targeting of religious leaders for torture and killing. These consistent patterns 
position the right to freedom of religion as a potentially significant genocide 
indicator/risk factor (within the broader context of human rights violations 
more generally).
There is a need for specific scrutiny of violations of religious rights in assess-
ing genocide risk factors. These rights violations can also be used to deepen 
interpretations of the definition of genocide by international criminal courts 
and tribunals. Violations of freedom of religion thus have the potential to play 
a significant role in prevention and punishment of genocide. The importance 
of this particular rights violation should not be underestimated, and therefore 
freedom of religion should be staunchly and consistently protected at domestic 
and international levels. 





At around the age of 10 I was told that, as a boy aged 12, my father had been put 
on a Kindertransport out of Vienna in late 1938, taken to a camp in England, 
fostered by an (unnamed) English headmaster and his wife, and then evacuated 
to Yorkshire where he was boarded at a school until the end of the war. To say 
this story is brief is an understatement. The details of it were not discussed, and 
as a child I gleaned these few memories and this truncated version of the story 
from my father only once, and at the direct urging of my mother.
Yet after my father died in 2017 I discovered a trove of objects, artefacts 
of a life I knew almost nothing about but which he had had in his posses-
sion for decades. These artefacts—books, photographs, letters, and other 
 documents200—had survived World War Two and the bombing of the flat in 
which his family had once lived in Vienna. But I do not, and will never, know 
 199 I presented an earlier version of this at the Yom HaShoah (Holocaust 
Memorial Day) commemoration, The University of Queensland, 1 May 2019.
 200 All the artefacts referred to in this essay were donated to the Sydney Jewish 
Museum in 2019 under the name ‘The Gelber/Altschul Collection’.
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how they survived. I just found them in his filing cabinet and on his book-
shelves. Having discovered the artefacts I felt driven to explore their meaning 
and so embarked on two years of detective work to identify the people whose 
stories I tell here. Among the artefacts were original photographs, many 100 
years old. There were also original letters, postcards, documents, school reports, 
published books, certificates, and my father’s notes. It turned out that he had 
travelled to Vienna, and further to Eastern Europe, in search of elements of 
his family history. Again, I knew nothing substantive of this until after he 
died. His notes were, typically, written in a stream-of-consciousness manner, 
 interpolating a detailed description of the cake he had eaten for afternoon tea 
in between critical pieces of family history. These notes, too, took a long time 
to decipher. All of the historically important items I have now donated to the 
Sydney Jewish Museum as the Gelber/Altschul Collection.
The obligation of second generation storytelling
Having done the preliminary work of identifying people and stories, I was 
confronted with the deeper question of why I felt compelled to explore these 
materials. This led me to contemplate the status of being a ‘second generation’201 
storyteller. Eva Hoffman famously discusses the importance of guardianship of 
the Holocaust through the transmission of stories to and by the second genera-
tion, the ‘hinge generation in which received, transferred knowledge of events 
is being transmuted into history, or into myth’.202 She has posited that second 
generation stories of Holocaust survival help us to grapple with the horrors of 
that event, even as we instinctively recoil from them.203
Efraim Sicher conceptualises the idea of a second generation, to whom have 
fallen the obligation and the difficulties of telling such stories, as broadly as 
possible, including any who choose to write about the un-writeable. 204 As the 
daughter of a survivor, I am a second generation writer. But even more saliently, 
Sicher emphasises the obligation of storytelling in the context of the ongo-
ing risks of racism and antisemitism, what he described in 1998 as the ‘new 
 201 Efraim Sicher, ed., Breaking Crystal: Writing and Memory After Auschwitz 
(Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1998).
 202 Eva Hoffman, After Such Knowledge: Memory, History, and the Legacy of the 
Holocaust (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), cited in Marianne Hirsch, The 
Generation of Postmemory: Writing and Visual Culture after the Holocaust 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1.
 203 Ibid.
 204 Efraim Sicher, ‘Introduction’, in Breaking Crystal: Writing and Memory After 
Auschwitz, ed. E Sicher (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1998), 7.
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 legitimacy of racist discourse in Europe’.205 Twenty years on his warning is even 
more prescient as racism and antisemitism are on the rise globally.
I am a scholar and researcher focussed on the justifiability of the regulation of 
hate speech, and the harms of hate speech. I have dedicated my academic career 
to understanding the power of words to do material harm.206 The obligation to 
tell these stories has, then, a source both internal in my family history and 
external in my life’s work combatting racism and antisemitism.
I am the daughter of a parent who chose ‘silence’207 as his preferred mecha-
nism for dealing with his past. Silence on the part of some survivors was not 
at all unusual and could reflect a fear of stigma, or simply the unspeakability 
of their experiences, resulting in an ‘inexpressibility’ of survivors’ anguish.208 
I have, therefore, had to glean the information that follows from the artefacts 
themselves, his disorganised notes, and my own research. I have traced the 
identities and stories of the strangers whose photographs I discovered. Mari-
anne Hirsch talks of how photographs can be used to help new audiences 
understand the Holocaust; they can help structure ‘post-memory’, memories 
of the second generation of an event they did not experience first-hand but 
which are embedded in their lived worlds. More than that, she suggests photo-
graphs can be a way of reconstituting the family you did not have,209 a means to 
‘uncover and restore experiences and life stories that might otherwise remain 
absent from the historical archive’.210
There may be errors in the detail, but this is as much of the personal stories 
as I have been able to recover.211 In the pages that follow I restore life stories to 
those whose lives were cut short or significantly altered by the Holocaust. In 
doing so, I interpolate myself into the story, uncover tales that were otherwise 
untold, seek to preserve the memory of those who have been lost, and reconsti-
tute a family I did not know enough about.
 205 Efraim Sicher, ‘The Burden of Memory: The Writing of the Post-Holocaust 
Generation’, in Breaking Crystal: Writing and Memory After Auschwitz, ed. 
E Sicher (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1998), 19.
 206 For example Katharine Gelber, ‘Differentiating Hate Speech: A Systemic 
Discrimination Approach’, Critical Review of International Social and 
Political Philosophy (2019), https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2019.1576006; 
Katharine Gelber and Luke McNamara, ‘Evidencing the Harms of Hate 
Speech’, Social Identities 22, no. 1–3 (2016): 324–41; Katharine Gelber, ‘Free-
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Political Theory 9, no. 3 (2010): 304–24.
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My father and his parents
My father was born in Vienna in 1926 and in the 1930s moved to Paris with his 
parents where he lived in the Rue Botzaris in the 16th arrondisement. He spoke 
fluent French all his life as a result. His family also spent some time in Troppau 
in then Czechoslovakia, before moving back to Vienna in 1937. They lived in 
a flat in the Wollzeile, which was bombed in November 1944. By then the only 
family member still living there was his Aunt Gretel, who spent the rest of the 
war in a flat belonging to the managing director of the Vienna Opera, Leopold 
Ludwig. After the war she transported her belongings back to the flat by hand-
cart, including a tiny Hermes typewriter. She remained living there until she 
died in 2000. I never met her.
My father was the only child of middleclass parents. Among the artefacts I 
found were studio photographs, stylised images of my father as a very young 
child. He had a nanny called Minnie and a dog called Lumpi. Also among his 
papers I found this photograph (Figure 1), in which he looks about the age of 
12. I imagine it was taken on my father’s departure for England on the Kinder-
transport. He looks the right age and very unsure of himself.
Figure 1: Harry Gregor Vladin Emil Gelber,212 circa 1930s.
 212 Born 2 June 1926 Vienna, Austria, died 10 April 2017 Hobart, Australia.
Among the papers, I discovered stories my father had written down about 
his life in Vienna before he left. He remembered Kristallnacht: people of all ages 
being beaten, shops being wrecked and plundered. He remembered antisemitic 
signs scrawled on Jewish shops in Vienna (‘Germans, don’t buy here’), and 
old men made to wear a Star of David and on their knees in the street, forced 
to scrub cobblestones with a toothbrush while being jeered and spat at. He 
remembered that it was hard to leave as few countries were taking in refugees 
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and that debates in the house were frantic, fearful, and anxious. There was talk 
of destinations such as Sweden, Uruguay, or China. Obstacles, such as fees for 
exit permits, were put in place by the Nazi regime to make it difficult to leave. 
He remembered needing to walk softly and ‘bite one’s tongue’, even at home. He 
remembered wearing a swastika in his buttonhole whenever he went out, and 
he even wore it on his journey to England.
He remembered in late 1938 that the Nazis had had a dispute with the  Cardinal 
of Vienna, so one day a mob broke in to the Archbishop’s residence opposite 
St Stephen’s Cathedral, near where he lived, ransacked it, beat up priests, and 
threw furniture and books into the courtyard and burned them. The mob then 
marched down the street in which he lived, in serried ranks that filled the entire 
street from wall to wall, chanting threatening and menacing slogans. He and 
his family took care not to stand too close to the window, lest someone should 
see them and take it as provocation. His parents were terrified and he could 
smell their fear.
After he was evacuated to England he was housed in a camp, and from there 
he was taken in by Jean and Geoffrey Turberville—for the first time in my life, 
I know their names. Although my father had told me when I was a child that 
he had been evacuated, and that he was taken in by an English couple, I had 
not known their names. Apparently, after he left their house, my father never 
contacted them again. The Turbervilles had no children of their own and so 
were prepared to take in a refugee child. Geoffrey Turberville was headmaster 
of Eltham College, and the family lived in ‘Tower House’ across the road from 
the school. My father’s first English words as they drove him home from Dover-
court Bay were, ‘I’m hungry’. He remembered watching the Battle of Britain 
overhead. He remembered air raid warnings and having to clear the school 
grounds of shell splinters before playing outside. In 1942 Eltham was evacuated 
to Richmond, North Yorkshire, and Harry boarded at Richmond Grammar—
I have no idea who paid for this. He joined the school cadet corps, and he 
remembered icicles in the winter outdoor showers at 6.30am every day.
After he left school, my father joined the army and was commissioned as 
a Second Lieutenant in the Northamptonshire Regiment (48th Foot). He 
was sent to India, then Kuala Lumpur, then Singapore. On his return to the 
United Kingdom he went to Downing College, Cambridge University, and after 
graduating obtained a position as a journalist for Reuters. Because he spoke 
German he was posted to Frankfurt, and then Berlin. There he met my 
mother, a photography student. After they married he was posted first to Bonn 
and then to Vienna. My mother told me, when I was about 30 years old, that 
while they were living in Vienna in 1955 they attended the first event held at 
the Vienna Opera since the war. My mother told me that an elderly gentleman 
had approached my father when he saw his nameplate on the table and asked, 
‘Are you the son of Dolf Gelber?’ To which my father apparently answered ‘No’, 
and turned his back on him. When my mother asked, ‘Why did you do that?’ 
my father would not reply. I have never stopped wondering who the gentleman 
was and what connections he could have made for us.
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My father’s parents (Figure 2 and Figure 3) also fled Vienna. His mother had 
trained herself as a cook before leaving. Among my father’s papers was an origi-
nal letter written for his mother, Gertrude, dated May 1938 stating that she had 
to be dismissed from her voluntary employment in the kitchen at the Hotel 
Imperial, Vienna, ‘due to the political events in Austria’. Gertrude made her 
way to England in 1938—I do not know how—and became a cook in a hotel, 
and then ran a ‘British Restaurant’ in Cloudesley Square, Islington, which also 
provided dinners for school children under the auspices of the London City 
Council. A collection of reference letters, all attesting to her diligence and hard 
work, was among the possessions I discovered that had been kept by my father.
Dolf was the last to leave Austria and he got out just before borders were 
closed in September 1939. In late August friends told him the security services 
were after him and he would be arrested the next day. Most of the frontiers 
had been warned of his departure, except the Dutch border where these friends 
would hold up notification about him for 24 hours or so. He slipped across the 
Dutch border at once, with (as he put it) only a toothbrush and made his way 
to England. He was interned on Alderney, a Channel Island, and then in South 
Wales. He joined the Pioneer Corps of the Army, repairing railways and dig-
ging latrines. He spent some time at Catterick, England’s second largest military 
complex in North Yorkshire, and told a story that when the General in com-
mand wanted entertainment for dinner guests he summoned a string quartet 
from the pioneers, which typically included the former first violin of the Vienna 
Philharmonic or a flute player from the Leipzig orchestra. After some time, Dolf 
saw an advertisement for the Royal Navy wanting German speakers to work as 
Figure 2: Dolf Otto Caesar Gelber.213  Figure 3: Gertrude Altschul.214
 213 Born 30 November 1900 Vienna, Austria, died 2 January 1976 London, 
United Kingdom.
 214 Born 2 January 1903 Vienna, Austria, died 28 January 1955 London, United 
Kingdom.
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translators. In his interview, when asked why he wished to fight the Germans, he 
replied, ‘because so many of my wife’s family died in concentration camps’. 
He became a Leading Writer Special and translated intercepted U-boat com-
munications. On D-Day he was on the HMS Eglinton off Normandy. Eventually 
both my father’s parents were able to move to Yorkshire, presumably to live near 
him while he attended school. But he never lived with them again.
The Altschuls
My father’s mother, Gertrude, came from the Altschul family. Her parents were 
Max Altschul, originally from Prague, and Bertha Knoepfelmacher (Figure 4). 
Figure 4: Max Altschul215 and Bertha Knoepfelmacher.216
 215 Born 24 September 1870 Prague, Czech Republic, died May 1944, Europe.
 216 Born 15 March 1878 Vienna, Austria, died 15 July 1944, Auschwitz, Poland.
In the collection of my father’s papers I found documentation that he had 
evidently obtained from the Austrian archives at some point, confirming the 
confiscation of their family’s assets under the Nazi occupation—first a leather 
factory, then personal belongings such as jewellery and silver tableware. At 
the time the family appealed because their pension was paid on the basis 
of their assets, and because their assets had been seized their pension was 
severely reduced, but of course this was of no use. In the later documenta-
tion, family members were forced to adopt the middle names ‘Isaac’ and ‘Sarah’, 
which was a legal way of identifying Jews.
Max and Bertha were deported from Vienna to Theresienstadt/Terezin on 
22 July 1942. Bertha worked as a ‘postmistress’ at Theresienstadt/Terezin. They 
were transported from there to Auschwitz in May 1944. Max died in the train 
on the way there; Bertha died in Auschwitz in July 1944. Before being deported 
they had owned a six volume, nineteenth century edition of the collected works 
of Heinrich Heine. I know this because when I was in my thirties my father 
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gifted me these books, as I am the only one of his children who speaks fluent 
German. In the front cover of the first volume is an annotation: ‘To my dear 
Harry, in memory of his grandparents Max and Bertha’ and signed by them. I 
have no idea how these volumes survived.
Bertha had a brother, Gustav, who moved to Brazil. Among the documents 
I found were letters exchanged between Gustav’s son Pedro, and my father, in 
which Pedro states that Gustav had identified at least 23 family members who 
were killed in concentration camps. Among them were siblings of Max  Altschul 
(Figure 5: Top row l-r Marie Wehle, Ludwig Altschul, Moritz Altschul.  Middle 
row l-r Emma Heller nee Altschul, Julie Altschul, Hugo Altschul. Bottom row 
l-r Emil Altschul, Max and Bertha Altschul, Otto and Ottilie Taussig).
Also among the documents I found in my father’s possession was an original 
letter (Figure 6) typed on the flimsiest of blue paper, so thin that the full stops 
made by the typewriter had created holes in the parchment. It is dated 14 July 
1945, and written by Kurt Wehle, a cousin of my family, after his liberation 
from Auschwitz. Kurt was a survivor of Theresienstadt/Terezin and Auschwitz, 
Figure 5: Max Altschul’s siblings.
Post-memory and Artefacts 61
and moved to the United States of America in 1951. In the letter, Kurt details 
the fate of members of the family. He uses initials to describe both places and 
names—which I presume was an instinctive safety measure. He said, ‘I am writ-
ing this first of my letters from S’, saying he is ‘conscious of being the only one of 
all the big family and I feel like crying like a child’. He goes on:
The balance sheet of our family after these six years is horrible. E. and H. 
were deported to Lodz with the first Polish transport in October 1941.  
… H. and H. died still in Prague. … There is no news from R. who was 
in a Polish labour camp. She is certain not to be alive any more. … H. O. 
and S. went to Terezin in summer 1942. H. went on to Poland, where she 
died. O. and S. died in Terezin. G. V. and their younger daughter Sonja 
were deported from Melnik to Terezin, and later on to Poland, where 
they most probably died. … E. went in summer 1942 to Terezin and 
on to Poland, where she certainly died. P.H. was since November 1941 
in Terezin and died there soon. My father went to Terezin in July 1942 
and died there in October of the same year. A. W. and his wife H. were 
deported to Terezin in December 1942 and from there, in September 
1943, to Oswiecim. They died in the gas chamber on 8.3.44 … 
The letter talks of ‘Max and Berta’ and outlines their fate:
Max and Berta were deported to Terezin in summer 1942. Alice and I, 
my wife’s parents and also A. supplied them with food, often did their 
cooking and later on, when Alice and I were ourselves in Terezin, we 
cared for them like for our own parents. Daily we took them food, sup-
plied them with clothes, helped them to better quarters; we had Berta 
accommodated in the home for the aged, and saw to it that she had 
medical aid. They longed to see their children once again. Unfortu-
nately, it came otherwise. In May 1944 they were taken from Terezin 
to Poland. Max died on the train, Berta came to Oswiecim. As I shall 
describe further down, Alice and I were in the same camp and did for 
her everything in our power. We got her medical aid, better treatment 
by overseers and superiors and took her food every day, so she did not 
go hungry. Around 15.7.44 she died.
He also describes his own circumstances:
Alice and I were taken to Terezin on 10.7.42 and from there on 18.12.43 
to Oswiecim, where we were together until 1.7.44. On this day I was 
taken away to the concentration camp of Oranienburg. From 19.4.45 
I was on the evacuation march and arrived in Terezin on 8.5.45. The 
10.5.45 I came to Prague. I have no news from Alice since 1.7.44 and 
always hope she will return. A week ago I learned that she was taken to 
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Stuffhoff concentration camp and that she was, in August or Septem-
ber 1944, in so hopeless a physical and mental state, that she must be 
 certainly dead by now. Can you imagine how I feel?
Only the first page of this letter survives.
Figure 6: Letter written by Kurt Wehle.
The Gelbers
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Vienna was a melting pot of 
 intellectuals and artists, and the parents of my father’s father moved in those 
circles. My great grandfather was Adolf Gelber (Figure 7), a Jew who had 
 originated from Podhajce in Eastern Europe. Podjajce was a once thriving 
 Jewish town with a grand synagogue built in 1529 and scholar-rabbis, but it 
had also been subjected to antisemitic pogroms. It has been part of Poland, 
then the USSR, and is now in Ukraine. He was sent to boarding school in 
 Lemberg (Lvóv, now Lviv) at a German high school, then on to the Univer-
sity of  Czernowitz. He transferred to Vienna University to study law once the 
universities became open to Jews. By this time his father had lost his wealth 
and could no longer support him. His brothers Jacob Josef and Leisor/Ludwig 
joined him in Vienna and apparently the three brothers had one pair of trou-
sers between them (the family made it a joke: Das war eine arge Chose, drei 
Brueder und eine Hose – That was a funny thing, three brothers and one pair 
of trousers).
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Figure 7: Adolf Aron Abraham Gelber217 (photograph from an original portrait 
by Rauchinger).
Adolf became a literary figure and lecturer with an interest in Shakespeare. 
His first book in this field was Shakespearean Problems: Plan and Unity in 
Hamlet, published in 1891 and influential in the staging of the play. This led 
to a highly successful production in Munich in 1896 and among the artefacts 
I found is a copy of this version of Hamlet with Adolf ’s hand-written notes 
and corrections in the margin for the theatre production (Figure 8). He inter-
preted Shakespeare’s works for a modern and German-speaking audience.218 
His version of Troilus and Cressida was premiered at the Vienna Burgtheater 
in 1902 and was also staged by the Hungarian National Theatre. Adolf would 
often bring people home to lunch with no notice, and was described in his 
obituary as having an open, welcoming house. Among his friends were Karl 
May (author),219 Otto Artbauer (author), Ferdinand Bonn (actor), and Josef 
Popper-Lynkeus (poet).220
 217 Born 13 or 15 May 1856, Podhajce, Ukraine, died 7 February 1923 Vienna, 
Austria.
 218 Adolf Gelber, Dreihundert Jahre Shylock-Schimpf: Vortrag gehalten am 5. Ja 
nner 1901 in der O sterr. Israelit. Union (Vienna: O sterr. Israelitische Union, 
1901).
 219 For further information on Karl May, see http://karl-may-wiki.de/index 
.php/Adolf_Gelber.
 220 Signed photographs of these three people are in The Gelber/Altschul 
Collection.
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Adolf Gelber was also a journalist and editor of a newspaper (Neues Wiener 
Tagblatt) for 40 years, and a traveller. He visited Greece and wrote a book about 
it in 1912, for which he was rewarded with the Greek Order of the Redeemer 
(an original publication of this book, Auf Griechischer Erde [On Greek Soil] 
and the original certificate are in the Gelber/Altschul Collection). He wrote 
another book after travelling to Poland. 221 He wrote a book on The Origins of 
the World War,222 an essay on ‘Human Rights in our Culture’,223 and a treatise 
on the poetry of Josef Popper-Lynkeus.224 I had known the bare bones of this 
story—that he was a newspaper editor and scholar—but not the details until I 
found the original books and papers in my father’s possessions.
I also found a set of fairy tales on my father’s bookshelf, published in the 
first two decades of the twentieth century and written by Adolf Gelber. I am 
ashamed to say that when I found them I had no idea what they were, and 
considered putting them in the trash. But thankfully I Googled them and dis-
covered that Adolf Gelber was a well-known writer of fairy tales, some of which 
have been preserved in open source format.225
 221 Adolf Gelber, Auf Polnischer Erde: der Sommer 1917 im Osten (Vienna: 
 Perles Signature, 1919).
 222 Adolf Gelber, Die Urheber des Weltkrieges, Sonderdruck des Geleitwortes aus 
dem ‘Heldenwerk 1914–1915’ (Vienna: Verlag des Heldenwerkes, 1915).
 223 Adolf Gelber, Der Menschenwert in unserer Kultur (Vienna: Der Verein zur 
Abwehr des Antisemitismus, 1911).
 224 Adolf Gelber, Ueber den ‘Weltangstschrei’ und seinen Dichter Josef Popper 
(Lynkeus) (Vienna: Wladarz, 1912).
 225 For further information on Adolf Gelber, see https://gutenberg.spiegel.de 
/autor/adolf-gelber-1430.
Figure 8: Hand annotated edition of Hamlet for production.
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One is a Snow White story of his own invention226 (Figure 9) and the 
 others are folk tales from different ethnic communities—African,227 Native 
American,228 and the Kalmuck people.229 I never knew these existed but I have 
now discovered that the Snow White story was reproduced in a recent edited 
collection, The Most Beautiful Christmas Fairytales.230 Adolf Gelber also wrote 
a book about the Arabian Nights tales,231 an interest that occupied him for 
16 years. In my father’s notes he said he remembered reading this four volume 
work as a child and that the books were destroyed when the flat was bombed 
in World War Two. But two volumes survived and are now in the Gelber/ 
Altschul Collection.
Some of the actors, musicians, and writers among the friends of Adolf  Gelber 
met their fate in the Holocaust. Although their photographs do not depict 
specific events from that time, they reveal people whose stories have otherwise 
become obscured by the fog of history and the chaos of war. My two years 
of detective work uncovering their identities from hand-written signatures 
produced a trove of connections.
 226 Adolf Gelber, Schneewitchens Weihnachten im Walde (Vienna: Carl Konegen 
Verlag, 1919).
 227 Adolf Gelber, Negermaerchen. Aus Imanas Landen (Vienna: Rikola Verlag, 
1921).
 228 Adolf Gelber, Indianer-Maerchen. Manito und seine Leute (Vienna: Rikola 
Verlag, 1921).
 229 Adolf Gelber, Kalmueckische Maerchen (Vienna: Rikola Verlag, 1921).
 230 Adolf Gelber, ‘Schneewittchens Weihnachten im Walde’, in Schoensten 
 Maerchen zur Weihnachtszeit (Frankfurt: Fischer Verlag, 2003).
 231 Adolf Gelber, Tausend und Eine Nacht: der Sinn der Erzaehlungen der 
 Scheherazade (Vienna: Verlag von Moritz Perles, 1917). 
Figure 9: Illustration inside Snow White’s Christmas in the Forest.
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One is a signed photograph of Conrad Veidt (Figure 10), an actor (22 
January 1893—3 April 1943), who with his wife was forced to leave Germany 
in 1933. He is best known for starring as Major Heinrich Strasser in the 
movie Casablanca.
Another is a signed photograph of composer Edmund Eysler (Figure 11), 
which is annotated ‘To Mr and Mrs Dr A. Gelber, in devotion, January 1914’. 
Edmund Eysler composed hugely popular operettas in Vienna in the early part 
of the twentieth century. Between the end of World War One and the ban on 
his works introduced by the Nazi occupation of Vienna, he composed 24 stage 
works. During the war his works were banned and a plaque outside his birth-
place was removed. He survived and, following the war, was welcomed back to 
Vienna with a return of the plaque.232
 232 For further information on Edmund Eysler, see https://forbiddenmusic 
.org/2016/02/03/the-heavy-loss-of-the-light-weight-edmund-eysler/.
Figure 10: Signed photograph of Conrad Veidt.
Figure 11: Annotated photograph of Edmund Eysler.
Post-memory and Artefacts 67
Gisela Springer (Figure 12) was a solo pianist with the Vienna Symphony. 
Her photograph is annotated, ‘To the lovely Family Gelber, with the wish that 
you hold me in as deep affection as I hold you! In true friendship, March 1916’. 
Gisela Springer moved to Berlin in the 1920s, where she remained until she was 
deported on 18 October 1941 to Lodz/Litzmannstadt, and then in May 1942 to 
Chelmno/Kulmhof where she was murdered on 8 May 1942.233
I even discovered a signed photograph (Figure 13) of Thomas Edison, inven-
tor, annotated ‘To Dr Adolf Gelber’.234
 233 For further information on Gisela Springer, see https://www.stolpersteine 
-berlin.de/de/biografie/8178.
 234 This item is in my private collection.
Figure 12: Annotated photograph of Gisela Springer.
Figure 13: Annotated photograph of Thomas Edison.
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Reflections
The reconstruction of these stories has filled gaps in my own family history. 
Uncovering the stories of loss and tragedy evoked very strong emotions as I 
undertook this work. I hope that by writing this down, these peoples’ memo-
ries will be preserved. It is interesting that my father kept all of these artefacts 
without putting them into a coherent narrative. Perhaps I have now been able 
to do what he wanted, but could not bring himself to do.
Eva Hoffman suggests that post-memory has profound effects on the children 
of Holocaust survivors, whether the events ‘were spoken about or not’.235 She 
suggests that the hinge generation moves through ‘stages of understanding’236 
the events of the Holocaust and their ongoing impact on political, social, and 
family life. The photographs I discovered, while they do not depict suffering 
or harrowing events, tell stories that contribute to our understanding of what 
was lost. They document untold stories from my family that deserve to be told.
And although in my family the transmission of the details of the stories was 
sparse as we grew up, it may well have been that the transmission of trauma 
was not. It is impossible to know how much of my father’s personality was a 
product of his being sent away from his family, to a new country, where he did 
not speak the language and at such a young age. I knew a man who aspired to 
identify as an English gentleman, and indeed he did this so successfully that 
many people with whom he worked and socialised did not know he had been 
born and raised in Vienna. He was also secretive, critical, and quick to anger. 
My mother once put a bright orange smiley face over the door of the living 
room, right opposite where he would sit and read at night in ‘his’ chair, in a 
forlorn bid to get him to smile more often.
So I also hope that the telling of these stories can help to heal the intergenera-
tional trauma237 transmitted to me and my siblings from my father. In the end, 
second generation stories are also stories of hope. Because those who survived 
became parents to second generation witnesses, many of whom (myself and 
my three siblings included) are thriving. That is an achievement of which he 
would be proud.
 235 Hoffman, After Such, xi.
 236 Ibid., xiv.
 237 Petra Fachinger, ‘Poland and Post-Memory in Second-Generation German 
Jewish Fiction’, Shofar 27, no. 4 (2009): 49–65.
CHAPTER 4
‘If You’re Different Are You the Same?’
The Nazi Genocide of Disabled People 
and Les Murray’s Fredy Neptune
Amanda Tink
Before returning to academia I worked as an Education and Training Manager, 
organising events, reviewing disability action plans and conducting disability 
awareness training. The sessions I facilitated were for staff at any level of an arts 
organisation who wanted to increase the involvement of disabled people in the 
arts as artists, audience members and arts workers. Three years into my job I 
was at a point where I could still deliver an authentic performance, and par-
ticipants’ evaluations of my style and content remained consistently high, but 
I was becoming disheartened about the possibility for my training to achieve 
nuances in others’ conceptions of disabled people that would last beyond our 
four hours together. Then, at the end of a session that seemed no different from 
any other, one of the participants came up to me after everyone else had left 
the room and said: ‘I just want you to know that you have changed my life. 
For ten years I thought I was suffering from chronic pain, and now I know I’m 
not suffering, I’m living with it’, and she began to cry. For the three years that 
I had been training people in the use of language, and all the years prior that I 
had been talking about it, it was not until that moment that I understood that 
words do not just affect us, they are us. 
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In turn, her telling me her story also changed my life: it renewed my faith 
in my work, and was one of the factors that led me to return to academia to 
research the influence of impairment and disability on Australian disabled 
writers and, consequently, to Les Murray. I was attracted to Murray’s work not 
only because of his evident love of and care for words, but also because, like me, 
he was a disabled person who was continually and profoundly influenced by 
the Nazi genocide of disabled people.
Until recently, on the infrequent occasions when the genocide of disabled 
people by the Nazis is acknowledged in public discourse, it has been framed 
as a sidenote to the Holocaust. This suggests that little was done, for a short 
time, to few people. In fact, from July 1933 to the end of World War Two, 
400,000  disabled people were forcibly sterilised as a result of Nazi policy.238 
Furthermore, as soon as Adolf Hitler had war to co-opt as a justification, the 
Nazis’ euthanasia policies were rapidly implemented and regularly expanded. 
Since Nazi records of the murders of disabled people were often haphazardly 
kept and meticulously destroyed, the most conclusive thing that can be said 
about any estimate of the number of victims is that it is likely to be too low. 
In Suzanne Evans’ thorough survey of the six Nazi euthanasia programmes 
targeting  disabled people, she estimates the total number of disabled people 
murdered to be 750,000.239
I was born in Australia thirty years after the Nazi genocide ended, and there-
fore do not claim to know the terror experienced by my people in Germany, 
and around the world, at that time. However, I remain continually conscious 
that, as someone who was born totally blind, if I had been born in Germany or 
a Nazi-occupied country thirty years earlier I would at the very least have been 
sterilised, and my older autistic brother would have been murdered. 
Les Murray was born in 1938 and thus was not distanced from the Nazi gen-
ocide by time, only by the much more precarious factor of country of birth. 
Though he did not explicitly identify as autistic until he was in his fifties, had 
he been born in Germany or a Nazi-occupied country, he too may have been 
murdered.240 Someone close to Murray who probably would have been a victim 
of Nazi genocide if he had been born in Germany or a Nazi-occupied country 
before the end of World War Two, is Murray’s fourth child, who was diagnosed 
as autistic when he was three.241 
This consciousness drives a two-part commitment: one of those is to resist 
the sidelining of the Nazi genocide of disabled people, its victims and its 
 238 Carol Poore, Disability in Twentieth-Century German Culture (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2007), 78.
 239 Suzanne E. Evans, Forgotten Crimes: The Holocaust and People with Disabili-
ties (Chicago: Ivan R Dee, 2004), 18.
 240 Peter F Alexander, Les Murray: A Life in Progress (South Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 25.
 241 Alexander, Les Murray, 215.
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 consequences. The other is to draw attention to the fact that the Nazi genocide 
of disabled people did not begin on 14 July 1933. As with all genocides, its roots 
are in language, and language around disability remains resolutely dehumanis-
ing even today. This, contrary to the popular belief that genocide is an event 
rather than an ongoing threat, raises questions about where the line between 
the genocide and non-genocide of disabled people is, and which side of the line 
our society is on. For example, when you say ‘never again’ do you have disabled 
people in mind?
Both of these commitments featured throughout Murray’s 60-year writing 
career. He explicitly centred the victims and consequences of the Nazi genocide 
of disabled people in his poem ‘Dog Fox Field’, which he chose as the title poem 
for his book published in 1990.
‘Dog Fox Field’
 The test for feeblemindedness was, they had to make up a sentence using 
the words dog, fox and field.
Judgement at Nuremberg
These were no leaders, but they were first
into the dark on Dog Fox Field:
Anna who rocked her head, and Paul
who grew big and yet giggled small,
Irma who looked Chinese, and Hans
who knew his world as a fox knows a field.
Hunted with needles, exposed, unfed,
this time in their thousands they bore sad cuts
for having gaped, and shuffled, and failed
to field the lore of prey and hound
they then had to thump and cry in the vans
that ran while stopped in Dog Fox Field.
Our sentries, whose holocaust does not end,
they show us when we cross into Dog Fox Field.242
Although Murray is known for creating unusual and complex metaphors in his 
poetry, on this important topic he chooses to speak plainly: He lays bare the 
 242 Les Murray, Collected Poems (Carlton: Black Inc, 2018), 325.
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arbitrary and simplistic ways in which the Nazis determined who was ‘feeble-
minded’. He highlights the fact that disabled children were the first victims of 
the Nazi genocide, that eugenics, for all its theory, contains no complexity or 
humanity, and the variety of ways in which the children who failed the dog fox 
field test were murdered. Significantly, he emphasises that the Nazi genocide of 
disabled people was and is not an isolated incident—it is ‘this time’, implying 
that there were previous and successive times, and that crossing into dog fox 
field remains a matter of ‘when’ not if.
Murray explicitly centred his thesis on the roots of genocide in his second 
verse novel Fredy Neptune, which he wrote between 1993 and 1997. The book 
is the first person narrative of Fredy Boettcher, beginning in 1914 when he is 
19-years-old, and covering the next 35 years of his life. Fredy is an autistic Aus-
tralian man with German parents, who acquires a physical impairment when 
he is 20 as a result of witnessing mass murder during the Armenian Genocide. 
The novel also features a significant minor character called Hans, an intellec-
tually impaired young man whom Fredy kidnaps in 1933 from Germany and 
brings back to Australia, so that Hans will not be forcibly sterilised by the Nazis. 
This paper identifies and explores the arguments advocated in Fredy Neptune 
with respect to the genocide of disabled people. 
Impairment and disability
It is important to note that throughout this paper, the terms impairment and 
disability represent a social model of disability position, and not a traditional 
medical model of disability position.
While eugenics by name may have declined as a result of the Nazi genocide, 
eugenics by practice continues in the ways disabled people are segregated from 
and by society. One of the legacies of eugenics is the labelling of differences 
in human biology as ‘defects’ rather than ‘variations’, fostering the idea that a 
single measurement can sum up all that a whole human is or will be. According 
to eugenic thinking, disabled people never measure up, therefore their primary 
goal should be to do all they can to become ‘normal’. Of course, this deliberately 
sets disabled people up to fail, because eugenics is predicated on the idea that a 
certain percentage of people are not ‘normal’.
In 1975, the Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS) 
outlined ‘The Fundamental Principles of Disability’.243 Instead of continuing 
the eugenic tradition of labelling medical conditions as disability, the Union 
labelled them as impairment. Disability, it stated, is what happens to people 
with impairments when they are prevented from participating in society as 
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equal citizens. This is now known as the ‘social model of disability’.244 Similar to 
other social movements of the time, UPIAS members recognised that it was not 
their biology preventing them from participating in society; rather, it was the 
attitudes of people who judged themselves to have better biology than someone 
with an impairment.
Silence and silencing
Before exploring the claims that Murray makes in Fredy Neptune, I want to 
consider the significant work this novel does in interrupting the silence and 
silencing on the Nazi genocide of disabled people. This silence began with how 
disabled victims of the Nazis were treated after World War Two. The victims 
of the forced sterilisation law, which was not declared unconstitutional until 
2007, endured decades of negative treatment and lack of recognition. As Carol 
Poore describes: 
Having been told repeatedly that they were inferior and having been 
warned by Nazi authorities not to talk about sterilization, many of these 
victims remained silent for the rest of their lives. Forty years after the 
end of the war, for example, a West German organization of blind peo-
ple issued a statement that read, ‘Most of the blind who were sterilized 
at that time and who are still alive today met their fate in their youth. 
They were usually not at home but in an institution for the blind, where 
no one supported them and where they often had to endure the scorn 
and contempt of others. That affected them so deeply that they are still 
ashamed to talk about their sterilization today’.245 
It was argued that since disabled people were not persecuted on racial grounds, 
they were ineligible for the compensation offered to other victims of Nazi geno-
cides in 1953 (the Federal Law for the Compensation of the Victims of National 
Socialist Persecution).246 As Evans notes: ‘One reparations court declared that 
disabled victims were ‘people below the level of ciphers.’ Another court refused 
to punish those who acted in the euthanasia programme because euthanasia 
had its supporters before the Nazi era, therefore the act was not punishable as a 
specifically Nazi crime’.247 In 2011, the German Government finally recognised 
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disabled people equally with other victims of the Nazis, but this has not yet led 
to compensation.
Similarly, disabled people are marginalised in public remembrance of Nazi 
genocides. A memorial to the victims of the T4 programme was not opened 
until 2014 and was the last of the four Berlin memorials of the victims of Nazi 
genocides to be constructed. Access for disabled visitors to other memorials is 
not uniformly available, and has not even been a priority at the sites specifi-
cally commemorating disabled victims. At Grafeneck, for example, Susanne C. 
 Knittel points out that:
[i]t is surprising and puzzling to note that there are currently no special 
measures being taken to accommodate visitors with disabilities, beyond 
whatever structural features the site already has due to its function as 
a care facility. On average, 10 percent of all groups that visit Grafeneck 
include people with disabilities, and of the 400 groups, 20 to 30 consist 
entirely of people with disabilities or learning difficulties. The docu-
mentation center is wheelchair accessible and there are plans to create 
supplementary texts in simple language to accommodate visitors with 
mental disabilities and learning difficulties, but so far only a leaflet in 
simple language has been produced.248 
Moreover, since Grafeneck is both a Holocaust memorial and a residential 
care centre for disabled people, the residents are limited in their own access 
to the memorial while playing a central role in nondisabled peoples’ public 
remembering.249
Continuing this silence and silencing are researchers, journalists, critics, 
novelists and publishers who have rarely sought out the experiences of either 
the disabled victims of the Nazi genocide or, in the case of victims who were 
murdered, their families, friends or colleagues. Similarly, it is rare that accounts 
or discussions of the Holocaust mention disabled victims. There are, of course, 
exceptions but too often these mention the Nazi genocide of disabled people 
only to diminish its significance or excuse the perpetrators of their crimes. 
Giorgio Agamben, for example, says that there was a ‘humanitarian’ basis for 
the euthanasia programme.250 As Knittel observes: ‘it would be outrageous 
for anyone to make a similar claim regarding the “Humanitarian” motivations for 
the “final solution”’.251
Given the persistence of the silence and silencing on the Nazi genocide of 
disabled people, the existence of Fredy Neptune is significant in three equally 
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important ways. The first is that it locates the genocide of disabled people 
in the context of Nazi genocide more broadly, as well as the Armenian and 
Greek cases. Second, it highlights their relationships, while not subordinat-
ing nor devaluing the experiences of any of the  victim groups. In addition, 
the main character, Fredy, and a significant minor  character, Hans, are both 
disabled. So far as I have been able to find, prominent disabled  characters 
have not been featured before in novels set during the Nazi era. Finally, the 
author is also a disabled person. This is rare but not unheard of in German 
literature on Nazi genocides but, as far as I can tell, had not occurred in 
English literature on Nazi genocides before Fredy Neptune. There are also four 
ways in which the text comments on the Nazi genocide of disabled people, 
which I now explore.
Dehumanising language
Critics often link, or, as Murray labels it, ‘hogtie’ Fredy Neptune to the epic 
tradition. However, classifying the novel in this way foregrounds Fredy’s travels 
and diminishes the importance of his embodied experience. As Murray says 
about the novel: ‘There is quite simply no other story that could be called The 
Man Who Lost His Sense of Touch. Or The Man Who Gave Up His Body Out 
of Shame’.252
Fredy’s lack of sensation begins early in the novel when he witnesses, as part 
of the Armenian Genocide, a group of men pouring kerosene over a group of 
women and setting them on fire, burning them to death. His inability to men-
tally assimilate that one group of humans could be so cruel to another group of 
humans, coupled with his inability to prevent or halt this particular mass mur-
der, cause in him trauma that manifests as physical numbness. To one degree 
or another, many critics have suggested that Murray employs Fredy’s physical 
impairment throughout this novel purely for metaphorical purposes. Charles 
Lock, for example, in ‘Fredy Neptune: Metonymy and the Incarnate Preposi-
tion’, emphatically states that the numbness ‘is a poetic device, not a medical 
condition’. However, in ‘How Fred and I wrote Fredy Neptune’, Murray explains 
that Fredy’s numbness is an impairment based in part on discussions with psy-
chiatrists, but mostly on his personal experience: ‘For most of the dissociative 
dimension, I could draw on things I knew from within myself. And because 
dissociation goes back in me to times before my conscious memory, I could 
put it into Fred’s mouth in stumbling baby talk free from all analysis, the semi-
articulate speech of innermost things’.253 In other words, the character of Fredy 
both draws on and represents embodied experience.
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Furthermore, foundational to this text is objection to equating humans with 
anything other than humanness, since this practice is one of the places where 
mass murders, such as those witnessed by Fredy, originate. As Murray explains: 
I know a poet who is careful to flag his every image with ‘like’ or ‘resem-
bles’ or some such. The surf doesn’t fold its long green notes and cash 
them in foam-change on the beach, with him; rather, the waves of the 
surf are like long green folded notes cashed in foam on the beach. By 
the same strict token, no prime minister was ever a drover’s dog. My 
colleague doesn’t go beyond simile into the farther ranges of metaphor 
because to telescope statements overmuch is to lie. He is scrupulous not 
to let metaphor collapse into identity. This is very Protestant of him, 
though he is not Christian. It is also very responsible, because metaphor 
is dangerous stuff, the more so, perhaps, as it becomes worn and baggy 
with overuse and we forget it is metaphor.254 
In summary, metaphorising humans and using human embodied experience as 
metaphor can both be dehumanising; a group that is frequently dehumanised 
in these ways is disabled people. The metaphorisation of the embodied expe-
rience of disabled people might be extremely common but its commonness 
does not make the practice ethical, and there is plenty of evidence, including 
the treatment of disabled people by the Nazis featured in ‘Book IV’ of Fredy 
Neptune, to demonstrate that the real world consequences of this practice for 
disabled people are devastating and ongoing.
One does not have to read far into Fredy Neptune to encounter careless 
 metaphorisation of embodied experience. In the third verse Fredy says: ‘That’s 
how we came to be cooking alive that August, [1914] in Messina, plumy under-
takers’ city’. Here he is simply referring to the ship’s crew’s experience of the 
weather, but very soon, in Trabzon, as part of the Armenian Genocide, he 
 witnesses people literally being burned to death:
Their big loose dresses were sopping. Kerosene, you could smell it. 
The men were prancing, feeling them, poking at them to dance – 
then pouf! they were alight, the women, dark wicks to great orange flames, 
whooping and shrieking.255
Witnessing this atrocity and being unable to intervene causes in Fredy a 
 condition that he first experiences as burning: ‘I just curled up in my  hammock, 
like a burnt thing myself, and turned my back. The POs couldn’t scream me 
to work’.256
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Fredy’s description of himself as ‘like a burnt thing myself ’, although he does 
not realise it yet, connects his condition to the mass murder he has recently wit-
nessed. Both echo his earlier careless ‘cooking alive’ metaphor, and together are 
the first of many instances that demonstrate the significant ways in which met-
aphor and embodied experience affect each other. There are a number of times 
throughout the novel when Fredy travels through or lives in high-temperature 
climates similar to Messina but, after witnessing the mass murder in Trabzon, 
this is the last time he uses the metaphor ‘cooking alive’ or anything similar.
Throughout the novel Fredy continues to encounter situations where the 
metaphorisation of a group of humans indicates that that group will soon be 
targeted for genocide. For example, four years later, when Fredy is travelling 
with a Turkish Colonel and they arrive in the town that the Turkish call Izmir 
and the Greeks call Smyrna, the Colonel refers to the Greeks as ‘the dogs’: ‘The 
dogs, he said, call this Smyrna. They say it is part of Greece’. Fredy, pointing 
out the Colonel’s dehumanisation of the Greeks asks ‘what do the humans 
say?’257 But the Colonel does not answer. Later that day Fredy meets Takis, a 
Greek man who assists Fredy to find work on a ship home to Australia. In 
return, Fredy gives Takis his suits, and later learns that Takis was wearing one 
of them when he was shot and killed two years later during attacks against the 
Greek community. 
The Nazi genocides, too, are foreshadowed by the Nazis’ deliberate use 
of dehumanising words to describe future victims. In early 1933, when Fredy 
is in Kassel, Germany, he sees SA (Sturmabteilung) officers chasing a man into 
a side alley and then hears a gunshot. The SA officers notice Fredy watching 
them and encourage him to ‘Go and look! See how we treat trash’.258 When he 
does, he realises they murdered the man for the specific purpose of indicat-
ing to the public how some of the disabled victims of Nazi genocide would 
be labelled:
There was a cardboard placard 
hung round his neck, as he sat there dead in his blood: 
Congenital Criminal, it read. They must have been carrying it 
from where they’d meant to shoot him. They’d had no time 
to letter it there in the alley.259
Demonstrating that the line between target of genocide and free citizen is often 
blurred for disabled people, Hans, the intellectually impaired young man whom 
Fredy rescues from being forcibly sterilised by the Nazis, is routinely described 
using dehumanising labels. These include: ‘cretin’, ‘dough-cock’, ‘zany’, ‘mad 
baby man’, ‘idiot’, ‘mental defective’ and ‘imbecile’. The people choosing to use 
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these labels to refer to Hans are not Nazi officers but members of the public 
whom Hans encounters everywhere he goes.
The influence of metaphor is also demonstrated by the ways in which 
Fredy refers to his physical impairment. Initially he refers to it using a simile 
 (‘shedding like a gum tree’), but this becomes a metaphor three years later when 
he is mistaken for a spy, captured and tortured. Torture is traditionally a reli-
able method for dominating a person, but both Fredy and his torturers soon 
realise that Fredy has the upper hand. This is due to Fredy’s numbness: ‘They 
drew their truncheons, they started chopping a new me/ out of my trunk, not 
knowing it was dead timber’.260 Ironically, this is a situation that frightens both 
of them: the torturers because it is unprecedented and gives them a story they 
want to tell, but that nobody else will believe; and Fredy because he knows the 
torturers would rather kill him than have to try to tell their story about him. 
However, Fredy soon becomes aware that the torturers have a second option 
of entertaining themselves by exhorting other prisoners to try to kill him. It is 
this fear that results in his first realisation about the advantages of his acquired 
impairment. He has already experienced one advantage—when he was able 
to save someone from burning to death, but not sense that his own skin was 
 burning—but it has not yet occurred to him that this is an advantage.
Fredy’s lack of sensation means he can not only endure but escape the 
torturers and their guards: 
I walked straight out of there 
past a sergeant blinded by his cap-peak who screamed HEY! 
I sat him flat on his bum, so fierce did I scream back! 
I was the wilder ape, and tottered like one out the door 
because this horse I rode inside of had started 
to float, and yaw.261
His metaphorical descriptions of his body change from being a tree, something 
with life, but not much agency in comparison with humans, to a Trojan horse, 
something that appears to others to have no life, but in fact has all the skills it 
needs to win the war. From then on, however, Fredy mostly refers to his physi-
cal impairment as ‘the null’, or ‘the nothing’. It is not until he tells his best friend 
Sam about his impairment that this changes, due to Sam’s response:
If you told that to one of your moderns
who think any name they can give to a phenomenon
is its social superior, he finally told me, they’d snub it
into line with a term like Shock or Reaction
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or Flight from Reality. To contain it and make it barren.
I think myself it’s a story of law that you’re carrying
for all places. You’re wrong to call it the Nothing.
You should never accept any name for it, even from you.
Names don’t last. When it ends, you’ll have to tell it.262
Fredy takes Sam’s advice, which creates the conditions for Fredy to be able to 
pray with a whole heart, and hence to be cured: ‘I brooded, and the Nothing 
no-named inside me/ started to thin away. I had patches of feeling’.
Eugenic thinking and acting
The evidence for Murray’s thesis that dehumanising language leads to dehu-
manising action is also demonstrated throughout the novel. In the case of the 
Nazi genocide of disabled people, the belief system used to justify it was eugen-
ics. One of Murray’s claims in Fredy Neptune is that eugenic thinking is perva-
sive, and in the case of disabled people, acting on that thinking is both common 
and limited only by what a person believes they can get away with. Fredy, as a 
disabled man, already knows this but the circumstances of his impairments 
mean that he does not have to engage deeply with some of the more frightening 
consequences of eugenic thinking. However, once Hans is part of Fredy’s life, 
they are regularly confronted with the full reality of eugenic thinking and Fredy 
can no longer avoid acknowledging it. 
As soon as Fredy’s numbness develops, he quickly becomes aware of the need 
to hide it from other people due to their reactions. At work in particular, he 
learns that as soon as his colleagues are aware of his condition, they become 
suspicious of him:
a hatch-coaming dropped on my boot
was supposed to hurt. The blokes were looking at me.
Good, these steel toecaps, I thought to say, feeling nothing.
but hearing bones. I would have to learn quick, and practice
cracking normal, as I call it.263 
He also soon learns that his impairment means he is the only one with the abil-
ity to avert many dangerous situations. On a ship he saves a boy from burning 
to death when the boy’s clothes catch fire; after a car accident he lifts the car off 
the two people who are trapped under it; he stops a falling pole from crushing 
a work mate; and he rescues a child playing in water from being electrocuted 
by fallen electricity wires. In all these cases, even as the people involved are 
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 grateful, they nevertheless react negatively to their awareness of Fredy’s impair-
ment. Consequently, they either throw Fredy out of where he is living or fire 
him from his job. There are also dozens of lower stake situations where people 
discover Fredy’s impairment, either because he forgets to pretend to be non-
disabled or because he sacrifices appearing nondisabled to help them. In almost 
all cases he is rejected by them afterwards.
The constant rejection Fredy experiences is a consequence of eugenic 
 thinking—the idea that there is one correct way for humans to be, and that 
humans who do not measure up must be limited in all possible ways. Since 
most of the people Fredy encounters are not authorities in the eugenics system, 
and they discover he is a disabled person through a display of his strength, they 
feel frightened by him. Thus, the best they can do in limiting him is to remove 
him from his job or his house. Unsurprisingly though, there is one group of 
people who are not afraid of Fredy—those who have authority in the eugenics 
system, medical staff. For example, when Fredy visits Hans in the institution 
to which he has been committed in Australia and witnesses a nurse forcing 
another patient to cry, Fredy threatens the nurse, but the nurse is unconcerned:
I was up and holding the window bars. That was a mongrel act, 
I said to the nurse fellow. He looked me up and down. 
Fuck you, squire, he said. I snapped the fastenings of the bars 
and dropped them out beside him. Now, care to say that again? 
But he was no coward. Come inside here and you’ll be detained. 
As a patient, he said. We often see that strong-man stuff from them. 
We just sedate them; the padded cells soak up their flash.264 
Unlike Fredy, Hans does not have superhuman strength. Hans also has an intel-
lectual impairment, making him the epitome of everything eugenics stands 
against. Consequently, not only are people unafraid of him but they feel enti-
tled, even justified, in victimising him. The frequency and degree to which 
other humans are willing to victimise Hans is something that Fredy tries to 
come to terms with from the moment they meet. For example, while Fredy and 
Hans are at the zoo, where Fredy has taken Hans while he considers how to 
prevent the forced sterilisation, Fredy thinks:
What will I do with him? I’m asking myself. Next week
He’ll get another letter with maybe a cop to ensure
he keeps his appointment this time. I’d have to keep him,
kidnap him, get him out of Germany
to where? No country would want him, they’d send him back
to Germany and the doctors. Who were only doing what others
didn’t do, but agreed with.265 
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On the issue of compulsory sterilisation, Fredy’s conclusion is incorrect. Other 
countries would certainly have sent Hans back to Germany, but other countries 
were also already sterilising their disabled citizens. Sterilisation policies and 
the resulting practices against disabled people had begun much earlier in the 
century and were becoming common around the world. Indiana, the first of 
the 29 US states to pass a law making the sterilisation of disabled people compul-
sory, did so in 1907. Over the next 20 years, many European countries followed 
suit. Adolf Hitler, in fact, based his 1933 law on a Swiss law passed in 1928.266
Fredy’s incorrect conclusion is not an historical error, but a reflection of just 
how much Fredy is struggling with the knowledge that humans will willingly 
be cruel to other humans. It is the same type of reaction that Fredy experienced 
when he saw the Armenian women being burned alive, and it is Fredy’s resist-
ance to this knowledge that caused his physical impairment.
Fredy learns that his conclusion that no other country would sterilise Hans is 
incorrect eight years later, while still expressing his inability to accept just how 
far people who believe in eugenic thinking will go:
I told their official what I’d rescued Hans from, and showed him 
what a Yank paper had reported: the T4 Programme, 
Tiergartenstrasse 4, for killing off cretins and incurables. 
We’d heard of the sterilization, of course, but this! 
You’d been in Berlin, Mr Beecher. Recently? 
Since you abducted Hans there? No? Castrating a defective 
guilty of sexual misconduct can be ordered here in some States. 
Let your Hans beware the Tasmanian Chief Secretary!267 
Most of the time however, in the company of Hans, Fredy’s conclusions about 
the limits or lack thereof to eugenic thinking are quickly corrected. Putting the 
specific policy of sterilisation aside, the idea that people born with an impair-
ment do not have the right to be in public space, or otherwise lead the kinds of 
lives that nondisabled people lead, is seen everywhere Hans goes. Hans is not 
just rejected, but harassed: at the castle where Fredy and Hans land while try-
ing to escape by boat from Germany, one of the castle’s servants torments Hans 
with a whip and then, later that day, a group of the servants convince Hans to 
masturbate in front of them; then, on the ship travelling to Australia, the cook 
tries to talk Hans into something similarly sexual and exploitative. In Australia, 
Hans cannot be anywhere in public without someone objecting to his pres-
ence, to the extent that Fredy and his wife Laura decide their family must move 
out to the bush for his safety. As soon as anyone feels they have the opportunity 
to push beyond harassment, they do. On the ship, the cook, who Fredy beats 
up for his behaviour towards Hans, then threatens to throw Hans overboard. 
Laura’s mother takes advantage of Fredy serving in World War Two to have 
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Hans committed to an institution. Then, at the institution, Hans is repeatedly 
raped by the staff.
Irreducible impairment
Another important point Fredy Neptune makes as a direct challenge to eugenic 
thinking is that impairment is dynamic and complex. A foundational principle 
of eugenic thinking is that all a person can or will be is a result of their heredity. 
This fallacy leads eugenicists to deduce two more principles: that a person who 
has an impairment has always had it; and that the capacities a person with an 
impairment has at the time when they are assessed by a medical professional is 
all they will ever have. Their consequent conclusion is that genocide of disabled 
people is justified. 
In contrast to these ideas, Hans’ and Fredy’s experiences of impairment are 
complex and dynamic, and are primarily determined by their environment. 
Hans is declared by the Nazis to have a hereditary impairment. Although there 
is a possibility that this is true, there is no evidence of it for Hans, or indeed any 
disabled person targeted by the Nazis, because there was no way to prove hered-
ity at that time. Also, there is no mention of Hans having any family members 
with the same condition, or even of Hans having had his impairment when he 
was born. While Hans does clearly and consistently have an intellectual impair-
ment of some kind, this, true to reality, and in opposition to eugenic thinking, 
does not in any way limit his ability to learn, and thus increase his capacities. 
While Hans is living with his family who clearly have a limited conception of 
his capacities and future—including that Hans does not have the capacity to 
have a romantic relationship or have children—he is still able to travel indepen-
dently and to ask strangers for assistance. Once Hans is living with Fredy and 
Laura, who have a much broader understanding of Hans’ capacities and future, 
he acquires skills at an impressive rate. These include learning to swim, fish, 
speak English and shoot birds away from the vegetables the family are growing; 
as well as the tasks involved in a number of jobs including working on a ship, 
working on a truck, and fetching and carrying. By the end of the novel Hans 
is in a romantic relationship and there is nothing to suggest that he will not be 
successful at that relationship, or another relationship, or having children.
Fredy has a different experience of impairment, but one that is equally 
dynamic and complex. Many of the people who reject Fredy because of his 
acquired impairment do so with words such as ‘unnatural’ or ‘freak’, suggest-
ing that they believe his impairment is something he was born with. However, 
Fredy’s physical impairment developed when he was 20, and since he remem-
bers his life without it and feels that he is missing out on opportunities because 
of it, he is constantly searching for a cure. Or thinks he is. In fact, soon after his 
numbness develops he also learns exactly what he needs to do to cure it, but 
he chooses not to until the very end of the novel. He knows that in giving up 
‘If  You’re Different Are You the Same?’ 83
the numbness, he will also be giving up strengths and abilities that will not be 
available to him as a nondisabled person:
I was coming home to my suspicion
that the null had more strength in it, greatly more than I’d get
just by not hurting. That it was the disguise of huge strength.268 
Here the novel is making the point that not only do disabled people continue 
to develop capacities, but they also have capacities nondisabled people do not 
have. The other reason Fredy chooses not to cure his impairment until the end 
is that his impairment is the direct result of becoming aware of knowledge 
that he does not feel equipped to handle. Repeated exposure to that knowl-
edge through how Hans is treated by other people, develops Fredy’s capacity to 
cope. It also develops because Hans, as someone who constantly experiences 
this treatment while learning to live in a country that is completely unknown 
to him, represents for Fredy an example of incredible endurance.
Futures of worth
Another important point Fredy Neptune makes is that disabled people can have 
futures that are valuable and add value, challenging those who justified the Nazi 
genocide of disabled people at the time or have justified it since, on the basis 
that their own future is more valuable. Of course, eugenicists do not express 
their beliefs this way. They do not say their future is the future with the most 
value. They say the future of a particular category of people has the most value, 
and it just so happens that they belong to that category of people. Not belong-
ing to that category is then justification for sterilising or murdering a person. At 
least 750,000 lives were taken, and at least 400,000 lives were severely damaged 
due to these beliefs. Hans would certainly have been sterilised, and may well 
have been murdered also, if Fredy had not kidnapped him. Therefore, Hans’ 
life is an example of a life that any of the disabled victims of the Nazi genocide 
could have had. While Hans’ life is still negatively affected by eugenic thinking, 
he has a job, a romantic relationship, the possibility of having children, and a 
life he enjoys, just as the other members of his Australian family do. 
Consequential lines
Another important point that Fredy Neptune makes, in contexts that sometimes 
involve impairment and disability and sometimes do not, is that humans are 
always drawing lines between themselves and other humans. Given this, the 
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84 Genocide Perspectives VI
novel continually asks the reader to consider who they would or would not put 
on the opposite side of the line to them, and what consequences that decision 
has for both the reader and the other person.
The divisions that humans create and the consequences of those divisions, is 
raised directly in the text in discussions that Fredy (who has German parents) 
has with Sam, who has an Aboriginal father and a Jewish mother. Both men 
grow up in Australia and travel around the world. Fredy begins this exchange:
How do you know so much, Sam? — We are studious people. —
We Jews, or we blackfellows?—Both.—First you’re one, then the other. —
And I always will be. Surely you would know about division? —
No. The world’s divided. Not me. I won’t shoot my left hand, nor my right. —
True: both are white. Is a Jew white? Tell me, Fred. —269 
This conversation continues when Fredy and Hans stay with Sam in France on 
their way to Australia. Beginning with Sam:
You getting Hansel away equipped for Gretel is a start.
Millions more need to go. Then he added I’ve also got some to leave
your parents’ Fatherland. Mad, though. Most Jews won’t listen.
Run, from that corporal? We’re Germans too. It’ll return to normal. —
Aren’t they really Germans, though? I asked. Are blackfellers Australian?
Sam asked me. If you’re different are you the same?270 
Throughout the novel, as the characters continually draw lines between them-
selves and other people, the novel is asking the reader, ‘Who would you put on 
the other side of the line to you?’ Would that person be someone who saves 
another person from burning to death but does not notice that they themselves 
are burning, or someone who is half Jewish and half Aboriginal, or some-
one who is German or someone with an intellectual impairment? And once 
you have put them on the other side of the line to you, what is it that you 
would have happen to them? Would you take their job, take their house, make 
them move to another country, remove their testicles or murder them? Would 
you be willing to implement this yourself or would you have the government do 
it on your behalf? Would you do it on the government’s behalf?
Fredy Neptune does not ask the reader to unthinkingly take a particular posi-
tion but instead to consider that being on the other side of the line is continu-
ally difficult and often life threatening. As I have described, Fredy has either 
his job or his house taken from him every time a person discovers his physical 
impairment. This also happens to Fredy’s parents in Australia during World 
War One because they are German. Further, being kidnapped by Fredy saves 
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Hans from sterilisation and probably murder, but even in Australia he is held 
in an institution for five years for no reason other than his intellectual impair-
ment. Sam, after living abroad for the whole novel and helping many Jewish 
people escape Germany, travels by ship from China back to Australia, but kills 
himself just before he arrives. The novel is deliberately unclear about the spe-
cific reason for the suicide beyond the general toll on a person of the divisions 
between humans. The last time Sam and Fredy meet, Sam says:
I feel like Noah, he said
safe on the Ark while all his fellow humans were drowning.
I’ve always felt that about my Dad’s people. Now it’s my mother’s
people too. Both my worlds.271 
 When Fredy is told that Sam has killed himself, he is also given a message 
from Sam:
‘Tell Fred that Noah couldn’t bear
to look at the ground’ or maybe ‘to look at the drowned’.
The sailor wasn’t sure which, exactly.272 
Conclusion
Given that the Nazi genocide of disabled people is often excused, minimised or 
completely unacknowledged, Murray’s contribution to Holocaust literature is 
both vital and momentous. It can of course never be a substitute for the writ-
ing of disabled victims of the Nazis. However, as a novel on this topic written 
by a disabled author and featuring two significant disabled characters, Fredy 
Neptune is writing generated from lived experience that cannot be replaced by 
theory or research.
Fredy Neptune is an account of how words influence embodied experi-
ence, particularly for disabled people, since medicalised descriptions of us 
create  ‘suffering’, and metaphors effect our lives, and deaths. It demonstrates 
how  dehumanising language can lead to eugenic thinking, the influence 
of eugenic thinking on Nazi ideology and genocide more generally, and how 
eugenic  thinking is still active in the minds of so many. Arguing against eugenic 
 thinking, the novel presents impairment as continually changing and influ-
enced by many factors, and people with impairments as capable, endurant and 
above all, human.
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CHAPTER 5
Nursing in Nazi Germany 
and the ‘Euthanasia’ Programmes
Linda Shields and Susan Benedict
Nursing is one of the supposed ‘caring professions’. The most widely recognised 
definition of nursing comes from Virginia Henderson, who said, ‘[t]he unique 
function of the nurse is to assist the individual, sick or well, in the  performance 
of those activities contributing to health or its recovery (or to peaceful death) 
that he would perform unaided if he had the necessary strength, will or 
knowledge’.273 Nursing bodies around the world have codes of ethics based on 
this definition and the main tenet is that ethical behaviour for all nurses centres 
on the human rights, well-being, dignity and autonomy of the patient, regard-
less of age, creed, race, culture, disability, sexual orientation, gender, nationality, 
class, politics.274 These modern day principles reflect the morals that Florence 
Nightingale saw as necessary for nurses—‘diligence, perseverance, observation, 
personal neatness, simplicity, carefulness, obedience, punctuality, honesty, 
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sobriety, and having a single eye to the patient’s good’,275 and these, also, were 
the principles that Theodor Fliedner taught the women he trained as nurses in 
Germany before Nightingale.276
Nonetheless, nurses have been involved in crimes against humanity. These 
have ranged from nurses who killed patients suffering from mental illness, such 
as in Great Britain in 1991,277 to active participation in large scale genocide, for 
example in Rwanda in 1994.278 The aim of this essay is to examine the role of 
the nursing profession in Nazi ‘euthanasia’ programmes in Germany during the 
Third Reich. We describe nursing in Nazi Germany and explain its theoretical 
underpinnings, including how it became part of the racial hygiene machine. 
It is important to understand that only a minority of nurses became actively 
involved—most nurses at the time performed their duties as nurses by looking 
after the sick and providing care to those in need. It is equally important to 
understand that the nurses, although clearly influenced by Nazi propaganda, 
often participated in murder of their own free will. In some instances, if a nurse 
refused to participate, he or she was transferred to another ward or unit, or to 
another hospital, but suffered no more severe repercussions. Much is known 
about the role doctors played in the killings of patients, but the role of nurses, 
who made up the largest proportion of the workforce in any hospital, has not 
been well studied. It was only in the 1980s that a German nurse and historian, 
Hilde Steppe, began a discourse on nurses at Hadamar Psychiatric Hospital. 
Since then others have begun to examine how nurses became involved in the 
genocide of the disabled and mentally ill.
A framework for killing
In 1920, a book was published entitled Die Freigabe der Vernichtung leben-
sunwerten Lebens (The Sanctioning of the Destruction of Lives Unworthy to be 
Lived).279 The authors, Alfred Hoche (1865–1943), Professor of Psychiatry at 
the University of Freiburg, and Karl Binding (1841–1920), a German judge 
and former president of the Reichsagericht, the highest criminal court in 
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Germany,280 advocated the killing of people who were ‘mentally ill or mentally 
defective’. They believed that the right to live should be earned and justifiable 
in light of contribution to humanity, and that those who had no capacity for 
human feeling were living lives not worth living. Hoche and Binding declared 
that it would be humane to kill such people.281 
Soon after the publication of this book, at a Nazi party rally held in  Nuremberg 
on 5 August 1929, Adolf Hitler stated the following and laid out his plans for 
the future:
If Germany was to get a million children a year and was to remove 
700,000–800,000 of the weakest people, then the final result might even 
be an increase in strength. … As a result of our modern sentimental 
humanitarianism we are trying to maintain the weak at the expense of 
the healthy … even cretins are able to procreate while more healthy peo-
ple refrain from doing so. … Criminals have the opportunity of procre-
ating, degenerates are raised artificially and with difficulty. And in this 
way we are gradually breeding the weak and killing off the strong.282
People with mental or physical disabilities were viewed as detrimental to 
the health of the race. Propaganda posters portrayed the financial burden 
placed upon all Germans by the disabled. Films were shown in cinemas to 
promote ‘euthanasia’.283 These were intended to criminalise, degrade and 
 dehumanise the mentally and physically disabled.284 Such films were made for 
general consumption, always with the aim of socialising people into the accept-
ance of the killings as ‘euthanasia’. Objections were raised by both Catholic and 
 Protestant church leaders, some of whom tried to stop parishioners from seeing 
the films.285 
Propaganda was wider than the cinema, however. Children’s school exercise 
books contained examples of how much ‘useless eaters’ cost the nation; posters 
were displayed showing the ‘burden’ of caring for people with disabilities.286 
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Children were taken on school trips to institutions for the disabled. There they 
were told to observe the patients and see how much they were suffering, and to 
consider the benefits if Germany did not have to support such a burden. Adults 
could join guided excursions to psychiatric hospitals and this augmented pub-
lic pity and loathing of those with mental disabilities.
It was not only those with mental illnesses, but also the elderly and people 
with serious illnesses who were considered a burden, and as the war progressed, 
even badly wounded soldiers were considered encumbrances on the state.287
In July 1933, the Law for the Prevention of Offspring with Hereditary 
 Diseases was passed, stating, ‘Any person suffering from a hereditary disease 
can be sterilised if medical knowledge indicates that his offspring will suffer 
from severe hereditary physical or mental damage’.288 Among the stipulated 
conditions were ‘feeblemindedness, schizophrenia, bipolar conditions, heredi-
tary epilepsy, Huntington’s chorea, hereditary blindness and deafness, severe 
hereditary physical deformity or severe alcoholism on a discretionary basis’.289 
Individuals who had one of these conditions could apply for sterilisation, or if 
they were inpatients or prisoners, the administrator of the facility could apply 
on their behalf.
Hereditary health courts were formed to hear the cases. The courts com-
prised one judge, one public health service physician and one physician with 
knowledge of genetics and heredity. If the court decided in favour, surgical ster-
ilisation could be carried out without the consent of the individual.290 Between 
1934 and 1936, approximately 170,000 surgical sterilisations were undertaken 
with the greatest number being for ‘feeblemindedness’, a vague category that 
could apply to ever-greater numbers of victims.291
In September 1935, the Nuremberg Laws (Reich Citizenship Law, and the 
Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honour) were enacted. 
The first law forbade Jews to marry or have sexual relations with non-Jews.292 
One month later, a similar law was passed against the disabled: the Law for the 
Protection of the Hereditary Health of the German Nation, or the so-called 
Marriage Health Law. This law required couples to obtain a Marriage Fitness 
Certificate indicating that there were no hereditary or contagious conditions.293
It soon became apparent to the Nazi administrators that limiting marriages 
and forcing sterilisations were insufficient to rid the Reich of the ‘undesirable’ 
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segments of the disabled and ‘inferior’ races. Thus, in September 1939, a plan 
to kill institutionalised disabled people was implemented under the name of 
‘euthanasia’ and doctors were granted permission (though not required) to end 
the lives of their patients. It is also important to note that such acts were never 
passed into legislation.294 Hitler was initially concerned about a possible back-
lash from church leaders and the community, and so did not publicly advocate 
killing the disabled until the war had begun, at which time he anticipated a 
change in community sentiment with the deaths of German soldiers. He could 
also promote the ‘euthanasia’ programme as saving valuable resources for the 
war effort.295
Eugenics and ‘euthanasia’
Germany, like multiple other nations, embraced the pseudo-science of eugenics 
in the late 1800s and into the 1900s. Eugenics, or ‘racial hygiene’ as it was known 
in Germany, was based on the belief that many ‘undesirable’ characteristics could 
be eliminated from societies by the breeding of only healthy citizens. Against the 
backdrop of eugenics, the ‘Aryan’ race became the exemplar of a healthy Ger-
man while those not fitting this model were viewed as ‘inferior races’. Among 
these were the Jews, primarily, as well as Roma and Sinti (‘Gypsies’), Blacks and 
Slavs.296 Similarly, institutionalised people with disabilities were regarded as con-
taminants of race and an economic burden. They were labelled as ‘useless eaters’ 
and ‘life unworthy of life’,297 draining resources from the already financially des-
perate Germany, and hazardous to the health of the German Volk. Approximately 
300,000 people were murdered under the ‘euthanasia’ programmes,298 70,000 of 
whom were patients in psychiatric hospitals.299 The Nazis’ first programme of 
planned, industrialised killing was called Aktion T4 because its headquarters was 
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based at Tiergartenstraße 4 in Berlin. Disabled people, and those with mental 
illnesses, were killed in their hospitals and nursing homes. Protests from the 
public, led largely by Bishop Clemens August Graf von Galen, meant interrup-
tions in the programmes,300 yet they continued on an individual basis until well 
after World War Two ended, when disabled children continued to be murdered 
in special paediatric wards (Kinderfachabteilungen), ‘hunger houses’ (Hunger-
häuser) and specialised asylums.301 Across all programmes, nurses routinely 
assisted in killing their patients in their everyday practice.302 Nurses actively and 
intentionally killed thousands of their most vulnerable patients. 
Nurses were essential to the implementation of Nazi ‘euthanasia’. Nurses often 
had a choice about whether or not to participate, although putative duress was 
indeed present. In a number of instances, some nurses who refused to take part 
were moved to another ward of the hospital, or simply were not asked by their 
supervisors to take part; there are also accounts of doctors and nurses who were 
coerced to carry out the killings despite repeatedly asking to be transferred.
Nurses were just as susceptible to Nazi propaganda as any other part of the 
German community, and nursing education included substantial teaching 
about those who were ‘life unworthy of life’, ‘useless feeders’ and the benefits 
of ‘euthanasia’. While this cannot excuse those who murdered their patients, 
nor the bystanders, it perhaps goes some way to an understanding of how they 
came to believe that such intentional murder was, aside from being mandated 
by the government, humane and moral. 
The children’s ‘euthanasia’ programme
‘Euthanasia’ started with children. In early 1939, the father of a child named 
Gerhard Herbert Kretschmar who was born blind, missing one leg and part 
of an arm, and ‘seemed to be an idiot’,303 wrote to Adolf Hitler to ask if his 
child could be killed in the interest of ‘mercy’. Hitler ordered Dr Karl Brandt 
to inform the child’s doctors, in Hitler’s name, that they could ‘euthanise’ the 
boy,304 making him the first known victim of the Nazi ‘euthanasia’  programme.305 
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Subsequent requests for ‘euthanasia’ were dealt with at the Kanzlei des Führer 
(Chancellery of the Führer) and kept secret in the interests of the state. Chil-
dren’s ‘euthanasia’ was hidden under the title of ‘The Reich Committee for the 
Scientific  Registration of Serious Hereditary-and Congenitally based Illnesses’ 
(Reichsausschuss zur wissenschaftlichen Erfassung von erb-und anlagebedingten 
schweren Leiden), or ‘Reich Committee’.306 One of its goals was to find new-
borns with health conditions or developmental issues and to initiate their 
killing, as well as that of children with disabilities who were already institution-
alised.307 Community health nurses played a significant role in this phase of the 
children’s ‘euthanasia’ programme.
Midwives as well as nurses became involved in ‘euthanasia’. On 18 August 
1939, the State Ministry of the Interior mandated that doctors and midwives 
report all newborn infants with physical and/or mental disabilities:
RE: The duty to report deformed births etc.
In order to clarify scientific questions in the field of congenital deformi-
ties and intellectual under-development, it is necessary to register the 
relevant cases as soon as possible … therefore instruct that the midwife 
who has assisted at the birth of a child—even in cases where a doctor 
has been called to the confinement—must make a report to the health 
Office nearest to the birth place on the enclosed form, which is available 
from Health Offices, in the event of the new-born child being suspected 
of suffering from the following congenital defects:
i.  Idiocy and Mongolism (particularly cases which involve blindness 
and deafness).
ii.  Microcephalie (sic) (an abnormally small skull).
iii.  Hydrocephalus of a serious or progressive nature (abnormally large 
skull caused by excessive fluid).
iv.  Deformities of every kind, in particular the absence of limbs, spina 
bifida etc.
v. Paralysis including Little’s disease (spastics).
In addition, all doctors must report children who are suffering from one 
of the complaints in (i–v) and have not reached their third birthday in 
the event of the doctors becoming aware of such children in the course 
of their professional duties.
The midwife will receive a fee of 2 Reichmarks in return for her trouble. 
The sum will be paid by the Health Office.308
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Reports received from doctors and midwives were reviewed by medi-
cal  examiners: Professor Hans Heinze (Director of the psychiatric facility at 
Brandenburg-Gorden), Professor Werner Catel (Director of the University 
Paediatrics Clinic in Leipzig) and Dr Ernst Wentzler (a paediatrician and direc-
tor of a private clinic in Berlin). These doctors evaluated the infants’ health 
purely from written reports and never examined the children themselves. If the 
child was to be killed, the doctor wrote a ‘+’ on the form, or ‘-’ if the child was 
to be allowed to live. Parents of disabled children were informed that paediatric 
units were being established and were persuaded to allow their children to be 
sent to the institutions, where, the parents were assured, the child would receive 
the very best of care. There were 22 of these institutions.309 Parents could refuse, 
but had to sign a form stating that they took full responsibility for the child, no 
matter what their circumstances. If, for example, a mother was called away for 
war work and the father was already serving in the armed forces, the family 
had no choice but to place the child in one of the institutions,310 thereby giving 
all responsibility to the state. It is unlikely that any of these children were ever 
returned to their homes or transferred to an ordinary hospital.311 
Many disabled children removed from their homes became victims of Nazi 
medical experiments and research. Doctors and scientists performed experi-
ments without consent or ethical considerations of any kind, and the effects 
could be immediately evaluated by killing the child and dissecting the child’s 
body. Children exhibiting neurological disorders were murdered and their 
brains retained at institutions such as Am Spiegelgrund, even well into the 
twenty-first century.312 Some children were starved to death while others were 
given drugs such as Luminal (phenobarbital), either mixed with their food 
or on their own. Others were killed by injections of morphine and scopola-
mine.313 The nurses working in the wards where the killings took place received 
a supplemental payment of 25 Reichmarks per month, and the doctors could 
receive bonuses of 250 Reichmarks at Christmas.314 Approximately 3,000 to 
5,000 children were killed by nurses and doctors in the children’s ‘euthanasia’ 
programme,315 though accurate numbers are difficult to determine. 
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The adult ‘euthanasia’ programmes
In August 1939, Hitler ordered expansion of the ‘euthanasia’ programme to 
include adults with physical and/or mental conditions and illnesses, and the 
programme was to begin in secret.316 The question of a written law permit-
ting the killings arose among Nazi functionaries.317 Viktor Brack reported that 
 Hitler did not want to the programmes enshrined in law in case it could be used 
as propaganda by his enemies.318 However, as Führer and Reichschanceller, 
 Hitler was able to issue ‘Führer orders’ (‘Führermanifest’), which were  similar in 
effect to laws. Several doctors continued to draft legislation permitting ‘eutha-
nasia’. Each draft was shown to Hitler and he eventually signed the following 
in October 1939, backdating it to coincide with the invasion of Poland and the 
start of the war:319
Berlin 1 September 1939
Reichsleiter Bouhler and Dr med. Brandt
 Are charged with the responsibility to extend the authorization of certain 
doctors designated by name in order to treat patients who must be consid-
ered incurable on the basis of human judgment, may be granted the mercy 
death after a critical evaluation of their illness.
Signed: Adolf Hitler.320
During October 1939, psychiatric institutions and hospitals that cared for 
patients with epilepsy, developmental disabilities and other conditions, were 
required to complete questionnaires.321 Meldebogen (questionnaire) I was used 
to describe individual patients, and Meldebogen II assessed the institution 
itself. Meldebogen I included, among other questions, the patient’s diagnosis, 
probability of recovery, possibility of discharge, war-related injuries and work 
ability. Some questionnaires were incompletely filled out or were inaccurately 
completed because they were believed to be routine surveys. Other doctors 
were concerned that the purpose of the questionnaire was to remove patients 
capable of work and thus described patients as more disabled than they actually 
were. Some were rightly suspicious that the questionnaires would be used to 
inform a plan to kill the patients, and refused to complete the questionnaires.322 
The result was a commission of doctors sympathetic to the ‘euthanasia’ cause 
being sent to those hospitals whose compliance was lacking. Some institutional 
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doctors and administrators resisted and complained about the competence of 
the commission. The Director of Neuendettelsau hospital, Dr Rudolf Boeckh, 
complained about the commission’s visit on 7 November 1940:
Contrary to the instructions of the Bavarian State Ministry, the com-
mission completed several hundred of these forms and sent them off 
to Berlin without the presence of the senior doctor responsible for 
the asylums. … The commission did not examine a single one of the 
1,800 patients. The majority of the patients are not in Neuendettelsau 
but in branch asylums distributed all over northern Bavaria. Thus, the 
 commission was incapable of forming its own judgment of the situa-
tion. … Only the nurses were questioned … and their objections were 
largely ignored. Indeed, it was even observed that the opposite of the 
true statements of the nursing personnel were recorded on the forms. 
The staff who composed the commission cannot really be blamed  
since the majority were medical students and typists who were com-
pletely incapable of properly assessing the statements of the nursing 
staff. The senior doctor on the commission, who worked in a separate 
room on his own, received the forms that had been completed by the 
assistants and then gave his judgment without any personal knowledge 
of the individual cases and without looking at the medical records.
As the doctor responsible for the asylums I protest against this unpro-
fessional method of working by the commission which goes against 
all the traditions of the medical profession. … In view of the fact that 
the public is aware of the ultimate objectives of this registration of the 
patients, I have been burdened with a grave responsibility as the senior 
doctor responsible for these institutions.323
Completed questionnaires were sent to the T4 central office where they were 
recorded on a card register with copies sent to various functionaries in the 
 system.324 In the beginning, fewer than ten doctors evaluated the question-
naires, but as the workload grew, 30 to 40 were employed. The evaluators 
decided if the patient was to live or die and marked a red ‘+’ if the patient 
was to die, a blue ‘–’ to live, and a ‘?’ or a ‘Z’ for undecided. These decisions 
were reviewed by the chief evaluators, Drs Heyde, Nitsche and Linden, who 
 indicated a  confirmation of the decision. Approximately 200,000 question-
naires were processed by August 1941.325
At a meeting held on 9 October 1939, the following calculation of the 
number of patients to eventually be killed was presented by Brack:
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The number is arrived at through a calculation on the basis of a ratio 
of 1000:10:5:1. That means out of 1,000 people ten require psychiatric 
 treatment; of these five in residential form. And, of these, one patient  
will come under the programme. If one applies this to the population  
of the Greater German Reich, then one must reckon with 65,000 to 75,000 
cases.326 
Much planning went into how the victims were to be killed. Several doctors 
were involved in discussions about the most efficient methods and how they 
would be operationalised.327 Suggestions included substances such as mor-
phine, scopolamine, prussic acid and carbon monoxide. A chemical engineer, 
Dr Widmann, suggested that carbon monoxide could be pumped into the 
wards while the patients slept.328 Hermetically sealed vans into which exhaust 
gases were pumped, and gas chambers at selected psychiatric hospitals were 
eventually developed, becoming the prototype for the factory-style murders of 
the ‘Final Solution of the Jewish Question’.329 A complicated system of transfers 
and transport between institutions was set up to make the process less detecta-
ble.330 During its initial phases, patients were taken by bus or train directly to 
a killing centre but in late 1940, patients were first transferred to intermediate 
institutions and then, within a few days, to a killing institution.331 This phase of 
the ‘euthanasia’ programme was known as T4.332
Six institutions served as killing centres for adults although not all were 
operational at the same time. The first was located in an abandoned prison 
in Brandenburg, an hour from Berlin.333 A tiled room measuring three by five 
metres and three metres high was built as a gas chamber. A pipe with small 
holes fed carbon monoxide from tanks into the room. Two crematoria were 
built to dispose of the bodies.334 The first patient was killed on 4 January 1940. 
Nurses were an integral part of the system:
For this first gassing, about 18–20 people were led into the ‘shower 
room’ by the nursing staff. These men had to undress in an anteroom 
until they were completely naked. The doors were shut behind them. 
These people went quietly into the room and showed no signs of being 
upset. Dr Widmann operated the gas. I could see through the peephole 
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that after about a minute the people had collapsed or lay on the benches. 
There were no scenes and no disorder. After a further five minutes the 
room was ventilated. Specially assigned SS people collected the dead on 
special stretchers and took them to the crematoria. When I say special 
stretchers I mean stretchers specially constructed for this purpose. They 
could be placed directly in the ovens and the corpses could be pushed 
into the oven mechanically by means of a device without the people  
carrying them coming into contact with the corpse.335 
Brandenburg was closed in September 1940 because of problems with body 
disposal and thereafter, patients were sent to Bernburg,336 used as a killing site 
until spring of 1943. Brandenberg is still a major centre for the treatment of 
mental illnesses. 
Grafeneck, a medieval castle of the Dukes of Württemberg, was a Protestant 
hospital for people with disabilities. It was closed and then re-opened as a state 
institution, and became a killing centre from January until December 1940. 
A coach house that was part of the castle complex was used for the killings.337 
Grafeneck was closed after the public became aware of the killings there,338 and 
the patients transferred to another psychiatric hospital at Hadamar. In addi-
tion, the staff who were trained in the killing techniques moved to Hadamar.
Another killing centre opened at Hartheim, a Renaissance castle of the Prince 
of Starhemberg near Linz in Austria. It, too, was a hospital for the mentally ill.339 
Killings by gas occurred between May 1940 and December 1944.340 Patients 
with disabilities came from Austria, Germany, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, 
and because of its proximity to Mauthausen and Dachau, prisoners from these 
concentration camps who became too ill or debilitated to work were killed at 
Hartheim under the 14f13 programme.341
Aktion 14f13 or ‘Sonderbehandlung’ (‘special treatment’) was a particularly 
nefarious programme of specific killing of those already incarcerated in con-
centration camps who were sick, disabled or exhausted from overwork. The 
techniques and skills developed in T4 were employed in the gas chambers at 
Hartheim, Bernberg and Sonnenstein where the prisoners were sent for effi-
cient disposal. This occurred between 1941 and 1944, by which time the T4 
programme had officially ceased and the gas chambers were no longer in use 
(the patients continued to be killed using methods other than gas). Hartheim 
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was staffed by two doctors and 14 nurses (seven males and seven females).342 
There were some exemptions from the killings—those who were diagnosed as 
being senile, war veterans, mothers who had been awarded the Mutterkreuz 
(the Nazi medal awarded to mothers of more than four or more children), and 
relations of staff who worked in the T4 programme.343
Sonnenstein, near Dresden, also served as a T4 killing site from June 1940 
and until mid-1943.344 This was the only institution where other parts of the 
hospital operated simultaneously with the killing centre. The killing facility and 
living quarters for T4 staff were located in three buildings beside the perimeter 
of the hospital, while the other building was a functioning psychiatric hospital 
called Mariaheim.345 Hadamar was the biggest of the killing institutions and 
is perhaps the best studied and understood. As with the other sites, it was a 
psychiatric hospital, and continues to be so today. 
Nurses and adult ‘euthanasia’
While nurses worked at all the killing centres, those employed at Hadamar 
were from two groups: some were already employed at Hadamar, while 
others were recruited to the work in the killing centre by the T4 central admin-
istration in Berlin. Many had been employed at Grafeneck from January until 
December 1940 and hence were experienced in the killing process.
Post-war trial interviews of the nurses reveal little pressure on them to par-
ticipate in the killings. Nurses were usually referred by doctors or administra-
tors to T4 as being potential candidates for the programme. Pauline Kneissler, 
a nurse from Grafeneck and Hadamar, described the process in which T4 
administrators Werner Blankenburg and Gerhard Bohne informed a handful 
of young nurses that a new secret government programme was being initiated:
[We were told that] every creature should be allowed a merciful death. 
This certainly made sense to me, although on the other hand, I was irri-
tated that it should be I who was asked to do this. I would have preferred 
to act as a Red Cross nurse. … I was asked if I wanted to participate. 
Whoever didn’t agree could back out … 346
Kneissler felt that she was under a certain ‘voluntary compulsion’: ‘We received 
a few minutes to think about things. Herr Blankenburg had left the room dur-
ing this time. … We didn’t discuss the matter further amongst ourselves. No 
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one said that she couldn’t do it’.347 The nurses were then sworn to an oath of 
silence and Blankenburg assured them that the doctors would be respon-
sible for their actions; ‘We didn’t feel very good about it but had no moral 
 reservations’.348 
Initially, the nurses’ work consisted of preparing the patients for transport 
and accompanying them on buses from their home institutions to the killing 
facility. When the buses arrived at the killing centre, nurses helped the patients 
undress, took them to be ‘examined’ by the doctor, to have photographs taken 
and then to the waiting room and finally the gas chamber.349
It was not just in psychiatric hospitals in Germany and Austria that the killing 
of mentally ill people occurred. Patients from institutions in Danzig, eastern 
Prussia, Upper Silesia, and Poland were shot by the Nazis as the army moved 
through Eastern Europe. Psychiatric hospitals were cleared of their patients 
and the hospitals used as barracks for soldiers. A Polish bulletin entitled 
Biuletyn Glownej Komissji Badania Zbrodni Niemieckich w Polsce describes:
The patients were generally taken out of the institution, brought to 
an unpopulated area and there shot. All traces of the annihilation 
were carefully covered up. At other times the patients were gassed in  
special motorcars. In very few cases were they brought to an extermina-
tion camp.350 
Trial documents reveal that a Schutzstaffel (SS) unit met trains carrying patients 
from psychiatric hospitals in Pomerania and took them to secluded woods 
where they were shot. Twelve Polish prisoners from Camp Stutthof were made 
to dig burial pits for the patients and they, in turn, were also shot.351  Victims 
included elderly people who were considered a burden on the state. From tes-
timony of the trial of Dr Georg Renno in 1962, Anna Stosik, a  caregiver at a 
nursing home stated:
I was sent to Tiegenhof [a town in Poland] (1942 or 1943). One day in 
Tiegenhof we admitted several older people from an old folks’ home  
in Posen. They were not mentally ill, only old. After two or three weeks, 
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they were picked up by the SS in special buses that were absolutely 
 airtight. I asked one of the SS men why they were built that way. He 
asked why I was interested and I said I was a caregiver and just inter-
ested. He told me to mind my own business and that I had better get 
out of his sight. I still did not quite know what all this was about but I 
had a real bad feeling and from that day I tried to get away from my job  
as caregiver.
There was another group of patients picked up in these airtight  vehicles. 
Maybe two more times but I cannot state how many patients and if 
they were severely ill or not. I remember that the patients fought and 
screamed when they were loaded on these buses.
I remember two older women from the home in Posen who went to a 
window saying, ‘Come on, let us see God’s sun one more time’ before 
they were loaded on those buses. Did they know that this was a trip to 
their death?
For me it was now clear what would happen to those loaded into those 
buses. They were scantily dressed and without any provisions or lug-
gage. There were no seats in the bus, only some straw on the floor. The 
first patients were bedded on the straw and the rest were just pushed in, 
falling or standing.352
Severely wounded soldiers were killed as well, sometimes by gassing. For 
example, a train returning soldiers wounded in Russia was stopped in a tunnel. 
According to Professor André Balser, a doctor from Switzerland:
The whole staff, conductors, nurses accompanying soldiers, etcetera, 
were summoned by the train commander, and were told to put on their 
gas masks and not to take them off before a special ‘air clear’ signal 
would be given.
… [When] Balser asked the commander, ‘What about the wounded?’ he 
was told ‘Don’t you know that they are in gas-proof compartments?’353
All the wounded men died. Rumours in Germany suggested that wounded sol-
diers were purposely being killed so they would not have to be transported 
home, but radio broadcasts tried to counteract such rumours.354
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T4 was officially stopped in August 1941 due to public awareness and  protests. 
Much of the resistance came from churches and clergy, such as the Catholic 
Bishop of Münster, August Claus von Galen, who spoke out about the Nazi 
‘euthanasia’ programme.355 Nonetheless, the killings continued on an individ-
ual basis (known as Wild or Decentralised ‘Euthanasia’). Doctors ordered that 
disabled patients be murdered by means other than gassing, and nurses carried 
out their orders—giving drug overdoses, starving their patients to death and 
leaving them out in cold weather to die of hypothermia.
‘Euthanasia’ as a template for the Final Solution
At the end of 1941 and early 1942, some of the men who worked in T4, includ-
ing male nurses and caregivers, were moved to Lublin.356 These men were 
experienced in the killing techniques developed in T4; in particular, they had 
knowledge of the gassing method. In other words, T4 was the site of the devel-
opment of prototypes of the mass murder techniques so effectively employed 
in the death camps. This programme was known as Aktion Reinhard. The men 
involved were in the SS or soon joined it—but they remained under the man-
agement of T4, and were able to take advantage of the many perks available to 
T4 employees, such as holidays in the ‘euthanasia’ programme’s rest and rec-
reation facilities at the Attersee Lake in Austria.357 Many of the guards were 
Ukrainian, recruited into Aktion Reinhard by T4 personnel, and the SS staff 
numbered from 20 to 25 at each of the death camps.358 
Only male nurses participated in Aktion Reinhard, although it is hard to find 
recorded reasons why women were excluded.359 The work of nurses and car-
egivers in the death camps was the very antithesis of nursing care. Not only 
did they kill their patients, they did so under the most brutal and inhumane 
conditions with no recourse to the compassion that is supposed to predicate 
nursing. At least three of them, Karl Schluch and Heinrich Unverhau of Belzec, 
and Heinrich Arthur Matthes of Treblinka, returned to nursing after the war.360
Wild or decentralised ‘euthanasia’
Under ‘Wild Euthanasia’, institutionalised patients were selected by doctors 
for death, largely based upon their ability to work, an essential part of  psychiatric 
 355 Burleigh, Death and Deliverance, 171.
 356 Yitzhak Arad, Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka: The Operation Reinhard Death 
Camps (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 12.
 357 Ibid., 17.
 358 Ibid., 193.
 359 Sereny, Into that Darkness, 86.
 360 www.deathcamps.org/treblinka/perpetrators.html.
Nursing in Nazi Germany and the ‘Euthanasia’ Programmes 103
care during that era. Psychiatric institutions were severely overcrowded and 
underfunded. They were expected to be largely self-sufficient by maintaining 
vegetable gardens, repairing their own clothing and linens and raising rabbits. 
Patients who were able to contribute even minimally to the ongoing labour 
of the institution were initially spared from ‘wild euthanasia’. Patients who were 
totally dependent were the first to be killed in this phase of the ‘euthanasia’ 
programme.361
Unlike the T4 programme in which the nurses facilitated the process by 
escorting patients, nurses were active killers in the ‘wild euthanasia’ pro-
gramme.362 Doctors typically designated the patients to be killed, often with 
input from the nurses, but it was up to the nurses to murder the patients. 
These murders were done with lethal doses of oral sedatives such as Lumi-
nal or with injections of morphine and scopolamine, or a combination of all 
three. More patients were killed in the ‘wild euthanasia’ programme than in the 
T4  programme.363
A particularly egregious institution of the ‘wild euthanasia’ programme was 
Kaufbeuren in Bavaria, only 95 kilometres from Munich. Although the war 
had officially ended, the killings at Kaufbeuren continued less than half a mile 
from the US military police headquarters.364 In April 1945, the American Army 
occupied Kaufbeuren, but the killings continued at the hospital for another 
33 days.365 In July 1945, the Americans heard that the hospital needed 
 investigating, and two Public Health Section officers and 18 soldiers visited the 
institution, despite road signs in English saying the place was a ‘lunatic asylum’ 
and off-limits. Kaufbueren Hospital was large—it housed over 3,000 people in 
what was once a baroque monastery. On asking to see the doctor in charge 
the Americans were informed that he had suicided the previous day. The hos-
pital morgue contained bodies of the most recently killed. The adult patients 
weighed between 26 and 33 kilograms; and a 10-year-old child weighed only 
10 kilograms.366 The distressed American personnel volunteered to serve on the 
squad which would, they felt, be needed to execute the hospital personnel.367
Documents from the 1965 trial of 14 nurses employed at one of the major 
‘wild euthanasia’ hospitals, Meseritz-Obrawalde, and obtained from the 
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archives in Munich, have provided extensive ‘rationale’ from nurses who killed 
their patients.368 The word ‘rationale’ is in quotation marks because this tes-
timony was provided a full 20 years after the killings, and of course there is 
never a ‘rationale’ for genocide. These 14 nurses not only had time to come 
to terms with their actions, but their lawyers had the benefit of knowing what 
testimonies had been effective in attaining acquittals in other ‘euthanasia’ cases. 
Susan Benedict and Jane Georges have explained how the characteristics so 
inherent in nursing philosophy at the time—duty and obedience—were factors 
that contributed to the nurses’ actions.369 Nonetheless, even though the nurses 
felt bound by the values of the day, they crossed boundaries that should never 
have been crossed when they saw killing their patients as a legitimate part of 
their caring role. Excuses used by defendants included: needing to keep her job 
because she was supporting her grandparents,370 afraid of losing her job371 and 
being obligated to follow the orders of superiors.372
The nurses involved in the programme came to be so by varying degrees of 
willingness. For the T4 gassings, nurses were selected, often by doctors, based 
upon perceived loyalty to the ideals of National Socialism.373 These nurses 
were brought to the T4 Berlin headquarters, told they had been selected for 
a secret and important mission, informed of exactly what the mission was—
the ‘euthanasia’ of the disabled in institutions—and then given a few minutes 
to decide.374 These nurses were then assigned to one of the six killing centres 
and often transferred from one to another. Involvement of nurses in the later 
phase—‘wild or decentralised euthanasia’ occurred more subtly. It was often 
the hospital administrators who told staff that this ‘aktion’ was to take place 
in their hospital, on particular units, and personnel assigned to those units 
were expected to carry out the mission. 
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Some nurses were enthusiastic participants, whereas others were gradually 
drawn in. For example, a nurse’s participation could have started by moving 
a patient into the ‘killing room’ or preparing the medication. Later the same 
nurse could have taken a more aggressive role, such as holding the patients 
and forcing them to drink the lethal medications. Little is known about nurses 
who refused to participate because they were not defendants in post-war 
trials. Some nurses requested transfers, some quit their jobs and others became 
pregnant so as to be excused from working.375
What happened to the nurses after the war?
Few nurses received maximum punishments for the killing of their patients. 
Helene Wieczorek, a nurse from the ‘wild euthanasia’ hospital Meseritz-
Obrawalde, along with physician Hildegard Wernicke, were arrested soon 
after Meseritz-Obrawalde was discovered by the Russians in January 1945. 
They were sentenced to death in March 1946. The head female nurse from the 
same hospital, Amanda Ratajczak, was given a brief trial by the Russians dur-
ing which she was made to re-enact one of the killings. She and the male head 
nurse, Hermann Guhlke, were shot by the Russians on 10 May 1945.376
There were two trials that involved some of the nurses from Hadamar: the 
first Hadamar trial concluded in October 1945 and two male nurses, Heinrich 
Ruoff and Karl Willig were sentenced to death by hanging. The head female 
nurse, Irmgard Huber, was sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. The second 
Hadamar trial occurred in 1947. Irmgard Huber received an additional sen-
tence of eight years. Other Hadamar nurses were tried in the second trial and 
received sentences of two to five years.377 Nurses from other hospitals including 
Grafeneck and the children’s ‘euthanasia’ hospital, Am Spiegelgrund, received 
prison sentences for killing or assisting with killing their patients.378 Anna 
 Katschenka at Am Spiegelgrund was sentenced to eight years in prison and the 
loss of her government pension.
In 1965, 14 nurses from Meseritz-Obrawalde were tried and, despite 
their admission of guilt, acquitted.379 The verdict in this trial is particularly 
 baffling in that there was no doubt of the guilt of some of the defendants, yet 
the court declined to prosecute their crimes. The fact that 20 years had elapsed 
since the war and the general weariness of the post-Nazi era trials certainly 
coloured the judgment of the court when viewed in comparison with verdicts 
of earlier trials.
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Conclusion
While medicine as a profession has received much attention in relation to the 
actions of doctors in the ‘euthanasia’ programmes, genocide and the Final 
 Solution, scholarship about nurses has been minimal. Many nurses actively 
killed their patients and the nursing profession was an integral part of the geno-
cidal strategies used against both disabled people and Jews. At the T4 institu-
tions, nurses helped with the transports of patients and led them to the gas 
chambers. Some of the T4 ‘euthanasia’ nurses were subsequently transferred to 
the death camps to set up the gassing mechanisms for killing. In the ‘special’ 
paediatric units, nurses gave children overdoses of drugs, starved them or left 
them in the cold to die of hypothermia. In the ‘wild euthanasia’ programme, 
nurses became direct murderers of their patients. The reasons for their actions 
varied and cannot be fully and accurately judged by legal testimonies that were 
guided by lawyers whose interest was in gaining acquittals. In many cases, 
most notably the Meseritz-Obrawalde trial, so many years had elapsed that the 
defendants had plenty of time to develop a rationale of self-preservation and, 
similarly, their lawyers had ample time to prepare defences based upon the suc-
cessful strategies of preceding ‘euthanasia’ trials. We cannot understand the 
horrific tortures endured by disabled patients during the Nazi era. Likewise, it 
is hard to understand, at this remove, how nurses could become so inculcated 
with the propaganda of the time about ‘useless feeders’, ‘life unworthy of life’ 
and subversion of the concept of ‘a good death—euthanasia’—that they lost 




‘No one ever lacks a good reason for suicide’.
Cesare Pavese380
‘Death crises occur more often for American Indians at an earlier age 
and, furthermore, the deaths of their ancestors (which came close to 
genocide) remains a powerful tribal memory. American Indians are 
aware of their isolation from mainstream culture. They are both  isolated 
geographically and suffer from racism. … Suicide by the American 
Indian, for example, may be seen as seeking freedom in death’.
David Lester381
Connections and disconnections
The killing of one and the killing of thousands or millions may seem a dis-
cordant relationship but there is a connection between suicide and genocide 
that calls for analysis. The connection can occur during genocide, as in the 
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 Armenian and Jewish cases described in this essay; but it can occur after 
 genocide, even generations after. This has been referred to as ‘tribal memory’ 
of victim groups: the legacy of history that is transmitted or osmosed over the 
generations and results in what is called transgenerational trauma. 
The genocide experience and its legacy usually includes such factors as:
• experience of minority group status; 
• separation from a mainstream society—politically, socially, physically 
and culturally;
• continuing wardship status of entire populations; 
• a history of genocidal massacres or attacks of the kind that came to be called 
pogroms in the Jewish case but which befell other minorities in similar ways;
• forcible removal of children from parents, for long periods or for life; 
• long-term institutionalisation of youth; 
• radical geographic relocations; 
• endemic and pervasive racism; 
• early deaths, commonplace deaths and often violent deaths; and
• conscious efforts to escape such circumstances.
Many genocidal events warrant study for their connections to suicide, some a 
century old, others of much more recent times, but none more so than the expe-
rience of Indigenous peoples in Australia and North America. These two cases 
illustrate all of the above aspects and the legacy of genocide in current commu-
nity experiences of suicide. In this essay I discuss both cases, while  criticising 
current approaches to suicide and encouraging an approach of ‘understanding’ 
rather than ‘explaining’ and ‘medicalising’ the behaviour.
According to biomedicine, the very foundation of suicide resides in a ‘mental 
health disorder’ of some kind, usually ‘depression’ or a depletion of a hormone 
like serotonin, or a chemical imbalance in the brain.382 The futile search is now 
on for a depression gene, even for a genetic marker that will explain all suicide. 
In The Sealed Box of Suicide, Simon Tatz and I analyse 33 categories of suicide, 
the majority of which have nothing to do with ‘mental disorder’, ‘depression’ or 
genes.383 Among those who survive genocide, the biomedical equation ignores 
external contexts like history, geography, religion, sociology, philosophy and 
culture, and neglects the transmission of trauma from communal experiences 
such as genocide. These are the conditions or the circumstances that the father 
of modern suicide studies, Emil Durkheim, described in Le Suicide in 1897.
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Defining the factors
Before it had a name, human beings understood what genocide is, and why and 
how rulers and states turn to biological solutions to solve social and  political 
problems. We have known what suicide is since history began to find its writ-
ten form. We have known a great deal about suicidal behaviour over millennia 
and tolerated it, even celebrated it in some cultures and historical eras. But in 
the twentieth century in particular, Western societies deemed suicide a scourge, 
a blight upon themselves, a rogue manifestation (much like smallpox or polio) 
that grows apace and needs prevention by some kind of  pharmaceutical or ther-
apeutic prophylaxis. ‘Personality disorders’ are rampant, we are told, and are 
being addressed by more and more funds in search of a possible vaccination. 
But what is mental illness, a condition said to be suffered by one in five Aus-
tralians? The Blackdog Institute, a major Australian agency in this field, insists 
that mental illness, especially among youth, is related to ADHD, anxiety dis-
order, major depressive disorder and conduct disorder, and its factsheets out-
line the genetic and biochemical factors in depression.384 The Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,385 now in its fifth edition and known as 
DSM-V, describes the hundreds of ‘disorders’ that bedevil us. 
This ‘bible of psychiatry’ exercises an unparalleled influence on Western soci-
ety. It has been much criticised, particularly by non-Americans, for telling us—
amid the truly serious and verifiable brain diseases and lists of psychoses—that 
you have a ‘mathematical deficit disorder’ if you have trouble with arithmetic; 
that you suffer a ‘communications disorder’ if you wave your hands and point 
too much; that you have a ‘substance use disorder’ if you smoke cigarettes or 
gag for your morning coffee; and you exhibit a ‘social phobia’ if you are shy. An 
‘adjustment deficit disorder’ arises where a stressor causes a great deal of worry 
in one’s life—‘like a wedding or buying a new home’. No matter how inane or 
banal the reaction, the emotion or the behaviour, once it has the label of  disorder 
or a ‘diagnosis’ of ‘a mental health issue’, it becomes a significant social tattoo 
forever visible in the files of every institution. For much of the general public, 
‘deficit’ and ‘disorder’ are characterised not just as ‘disease’ but as a socially 
pejorative disease, code for the once common (and now reviled) expressions 
of ‘psycho’ or ‘nuts’. Contexts, external factors or a legacy of communal trauma 
have no place in the sovereign domain of this biomedical approach.
Increasingly, scholars and some practitioners embrace ‘critical suicide 
studies’, a movement that looks outside the insistent biomedical framework. 
These professionals examine history, the role of suicide in history and think 
outside ‘the sealed box of suicide’. The title of Said Shahtahmasebi’s book, 
 384 See the website https://www.blackdoginstitute.org.au/docs/default-source 
/factsheets/causesofdepression.pdf?sfvrsn=2. 
 385 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Arlington: American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013).
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Suicide: The Broader View, sums up the movement’s foundation. As a member 
of this group, I join those who look beyond, even way beyond the conventional 
‘at-risk’ factors for suicide. Critical suicidologists compare suicide in diverse 
arenas; they try to understand rather than explain the place and impact of sui-
cide in specific communities; they address more openly a taboo-laden topic 
and explore why it is that we, as a Western society, are so affronted by suicide, 
especially among the young. 
For and against suicide
The Italian sociologist Marzio Barbagli posits two spurs to suicide: those who 
do it for self or for others, and those who take their lives as a form of revenge 
against others.386 The Bologna professor does not mean honour or shame sui-
cides (present in some cultures), nor does he include suicide bombers who, in 
intent and effect, are dedicated to killing others. Barbagli’s dyad is based on 
the consciously rational perception that impels for and against. Another emi-
nent Italian, Cesare Pavese, took his life—but he understood that reason has as 
much, if not more, of a role in suicide, as does unreason. 
During at least two twentieth century genocides existed the simultaneous 
 sister categories of for and against suicide: among the Armenians in Turkey 
from 1915 to 1923, and among the Jews in Nazi Germany in the 1930s and 
1940s. The literature, albeit limited, on these two cases tells us something about 
rational, premeditated suicide. A few Holocaust scholars have talked about the 
need for new words to define the unprecedented events let loose on the world 
by nationalistic Turkey and then escalated to a more industrial scale by National 
Socialist Germany. Die Endlösung  der Judenfrage—‘the final solution to the 
Jewish question’—was the name the Nazis gave to their programme to elimi-
nate both the physical being and the very concept of ‘Jew’. For the American 
historian Lawrence Langer, what befell that victim group was ‘facing choiceless 
choices’.387 For Terrence des Pres—who analysed surviving a death camp—it 
was ‘an excremental assault’. 388 From the viewpoint of one group of victims, 
those who suicided, we can look to the words of yet another American—this 
time the satirist and literary critic HL Mencken. In his inimitably acerbic way 
he declaimed that ‘of all the escape mechanisms, death is the most efficient’.389 
Thus, while most people view suicide as resulting from ‘disease of the mind’, 
 386 Marzio Barbagli, Farewell to the World: A History of Suicide (New Jersey: 
Wiley, 2015).
 387 Lawrence Langer, Versions of Survival: The Holocaust and the Human Spirit 
(New York: State University of New York Press, 1982), 72.
 388 Terrence des Pres, The Survivor: The Anatomy of Life in a Death Camp 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).
 389 HL Mencken, A Book of Burlesques (New York: Alfred J Knopf, 1916). 
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for those imperilled by grotesque circumstances, self-destruction was, and is 
indeed, the best way out, the effective ‘ultimate refuge’. 
Apart from the Nazi invention of specific-purpose death factories, the  Turkish 
nationalists set most of the precedents for the Holocaust a quarter of a cen-
tury earlier. They articulated a formal ideological, sociological,  anthropological 
and linguistic presentation of a superior civilisation confronted by an enemy 
within, with an ill-fitting, pernicious minority, a fifth-column and an ‘abscess’ 
in the midst of a burgeoning nationalistic state. They initiated deportations, 
population transfers and the confiscation and transfer of property; they 
rounded-up men, disarmed Armenian civilians and soldiers and created slave 
labour camps. The genocide involved the desecration of churches and cemeter-
ies; sexual violence, trafficking and forced marriage of women; abduction and 
forced Turkification of women and children; elementary gas chambers; medical 
experiments; drownings and burnings; and large-scale death marches—all of 
which led to the annihilation of up to 1.5 million Armenians. 
One major difference between the Armenian and Jewish cases was that 
Armenian children could be ‘saved’ by conversion and Turkification; and in 
some instances women could live, but only as trafficked objects or forced wives, 
completely cut off from their own community. While their physical life may 
have been saved, this programme of forced assimilation was a central part of 
the genocide of Armenians. 
Sexual violence against Armenian women was common and systematic. 
Many survivor and witness testimonies mention suicides by women and girls, 
sometimes carried out collectively. Gendered notions of morality (that is, it 
was preferable to die than to be raped or abducted by the enemy), seem to have 
influenced at least some of these suicides. In addition, the way the suicides are 
remembered and narrated present the women as heroes for having done so. 
Raymond Kévorkian, a noted historian of the genocide, commented on one 
Armenian response to the events: 
Suicides were also quite frequent. If the main reason for this was simply 
despair, many of those who took their own lives were young women, 
who chose to throw themselves into the Euphrates rather than submit 
to rape. Mothers also frequently refused to submit to the will of their 
torturers, killing themselves and their children instead. 390
Two scholars of the Armenian Genocide, Donald and Lorna Touryan Miller, 
have addressed the responses of Armenian women and children during the 
onslaught.391 They note numerous references to suicide when interviewing 
 390 Raymond Kévorkian, The Armenian Genocide: A Complete History  (London: 
I.B. Taurus, 2011), 407.
 391 Donald Miller and Lorna Touryan Miller, ‘Women and Children of the 
Armenian Genocide’, in The Armenian Genocide: History, Politics, Ethics, 
ed. Richard Hovanissian (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1992), 152–72.
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 survivors. Their conclusions are of particular interest, given that few suicide 
scholars have attempted to frame differing categories of suicide, something 
essential if we are to make any progress in alleviating or mitigating the ‘prob-
lem’. The Millers posit three acts: altruistic suicide, despairing suicide and, signif-
icant for this analysis of suicides undertaken when a community is persecuted, 
defiant suicide. Thus, grandmothers and mothers who sacrificed themselves by 
giving their food rations to children were performing acts of altruism in dying 
for others. Grandmothers staying behind so that younger relatives could walk 
away faster was another example. The despairing ones were those who could 
physically walk on, but chose to stay behind and die; and those who were men-
tally exhausted and whose support structure had collapsed. 
The defiant category is important: it fits Barbagli’s dyad of both for 
and against. Some Armenian women took their lives rather than submit to 
the  commonplace torture and sexual abuse by their Turkish oppressors. The 
 Armenian Apostolic Church regards suicide as a grievous sin, placing the sui-
cide as beyond salvation and beyond burial by the church (except where mental 
illness is evident). These women defied both biological instinct and Church 
doctrine. Yet in April 2015, the hundredth anniversary of the start of the geno-
cide, the Apostolic Church sanctified all who died as martyrs—including those 
who suicided.
Most people made aware of such circumstances would understand what 
was involved in these decisions—the defilement aspect, at least, if not the life-
long stigma—and would acknowledge the actions of these women as honour-
able, perhaps admirable, certainly as comprehensible. There would be some 
sense of appreciation of actions that are consonant with martyrdom. Many 
would argue that such actions were the result of coerced choices, even Langer’s 
‘choiceless choices’. But these women exercised their wills, their rational wills, 
in appalling contexts. 
Other genocides and atrocities are also worth noting for the links to gender 
and suicide:
• Herero, Dama and Nama women in German South-West Africa [Namibia] 
following the genocide and rape of women by the German military between 
1904 and 1906;
• Congolese women who suffered Belgian genocidal brutality between 1885 
and 1908;
• Bosnian Muslim women forced into dedicated rape centres during the Wars 
of Yugoslav Succession between 1991 and 2001;
• The abduction and enslavement of Yazidi women and girls by ISIS in Iraq 
in 2014;
• Sexual violence and displacement of hundreds of thousands of Rohingyas 
in Myanmar from 2017;
• Brutal and violent treatment of arranged child brides in Syria and 
other countries.
Genocide and Suicide 113
We know less about the suicide of Armenian men than women, and not a great 
deal about Jewish men or women in the Nazi era, except that suicide among Jews 
in the early Nazi period was fairly common.392 The esteemed suicide scholar 
David Lester found the suicide rate in concentration camps much higher than 
was once believed by the eminent survivor Elie Wiesel, a rate found to be of the 
order of 25 per 100,000.393 That was remarkable because traditional Judaism 
regards suicide as unacceptable. Judaism, among major religions, generally has 
the fewest suicides. Yet suicides were common enough in crisis times and Jews 
experienced seemingly endless crises: they were deemed responsible for the 
death of Jesus, and as the transmitters of the Black Plague; they were expelled 
from European societies like Spain, Portugal and England; blamed for famines 
and the deaths of Christian children at Passover (the blood libel by which Jews 
were alleged to have made unleavened bread out of their blood); they endured 
pogroms in Russia, Ukraine and Poland; and a third died in the Holocaust. 
There are two exceptions to the Jewish decree of suicide as sinful. One is 
Kiddush Hashem, the taking of one’s life in defence of God, which is choosing 
martyrdom rather than forced apostasy (especially during the Crusades in the 
Middle Ages). The other, introduced by Rabbi Isaac Nissenbaum in the Warsaw 
Ghetto in the 1940s, is Kiddush Ha-Hayim, ‘the sanctification of life’, that one 
could and should defend one’s soul against those who want to extinguish it by 
taking one’s life away from the oppressor. In that sense, Kiddush Ha-Hayim is 
defiant suicide rather than despairing suicide. 
The Roman Jewish historian Flavius Josephus was the first to describe what 
has come to be called ‘the Masada complex’.394 So the story goes that atop Her-
od’s rocky citadel adjacent to the Dead Sea in Israel, the Jewish Zealots held 
out against the Roman army, but by 73 CE it was clear they could not sustain 
the siege. Rather than submit to slavery or possible ‘de-Judaising,’ 960 men, 
women and children took their lives. Regardless of the controversy about this 
‘complex’—that it is memorialised and celebrated as resistance by many, and 
condemned as a form of cowardice by others—it is a tale of terrible choices 
and of a political and wilful act of defiance in the face of the unthinkable, 
namely, the surrendering of one’s Jewishness. 
Whether German Jews in the 1930s consciously thought about Masada is not 
really known. But what is plain from the definitive analysis by historian Konrad 
Kwiet is that German Jewish suicide rates increased markedly in the Nazi era. 
There were two aspects of the escalation: suicide by those who had converted to 
 392 Konrad Kwiet, ‘The Ultimate Refuge: Suicide in the Jewish Community 
under the Nazis’, Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 29, Iss. 1 (1984): 135–68.
 393 David Lester, ‘The Suicide Rate in the Concentration Camps Was Extraor-
dinarily High: A Comment on Bronisch and Lester’, Archives of Suicide 
Research 8, no. 2 (2004): 199–201.
 394 Flavius Josephus, The Jewish War (London: Penguin Books Reissue 
Edition, 1984). 
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Christianity, even back two generations, and were then confronted by Nazi def-
initions of ‘Jew’ as anyone having at least one Jewish parent or one maternal or 
paternal grandparent. To be a devout Christian and a Vaterland-loving patriot, 
and to find one’s citizenship removed by the Nuremberg Laws of 1935, being 
banished from public service of any kind and then having to wear a yellow arm-
band, was more than enough for some who put an end to what they foresaw as 
an impossible Jewish life under the Nazi regime. Then there were those who, in 
a real sense, resisted the Nazis by taking their lives before the Reich took them. 
Some Jews bought and hoarded barbiturates and, judging that the time had 
come, found ‘the ultimate refuge’. Remarkably, or perhaps not, wherever Nazis 
found Jews in a comatose or parlous state, they took them to hospitals to save 
them—in order to kill them in times and places of Nazi choosing. Here we see 
Lester’s contention that victims seek freedom in death. We also see resistance 
in suicide during times of oppression.
The Austrian essayist, Jean Améry, who survived Auschwitz and Buchen-
wald, wrote agonising and acute analyses of the Holocaust, later a carefully 
considered book on suicide—and then ended his life. 395 People, he contended, 
kill themselves out of a sense of dignity, preferring annihilation to a continu-
ing existence lived in ignominy, or in desperate pain (physical or mental), or in 
utter helplessness. Améry conceived of suicide not so much as an exit from life 
but entrance into another state, death—a cognition I came across in my years 
of fieldwork in Aboriginal societies. 
Michel Foucault’s concepts of biopower and biopolitics, and Barbagli’s pair-
ing are pertinent here. 396 The state exercises power over one’s body in a range 
of ways—from birth control practices and compulsory sterilisation, to vaccina-
tion regimens, prohibitions on circumcision, marriageable ages, restrictions on 
multiple marriages, divorce, assisted dying and, as we have seen, suicide. Nazi 
administration of life and, of course, death is the ultimate example of total state 
control of the physical bodies under their domain. What would the biomedical 
world have to say about suicides among communities caught in the vortexes 
of genocidal catastrophe? The professionals may acknowledge the Hobson’s 
choices and would likely agree that altruistic, defiant or despairing suicides did 
not occur as irrational acts, or as disordered behaviour arising from brain dys-
functions. Why then do the helping professions not accord to suicides among 
these populations, or indeed suicides of individuals in less calamitous circum-
stances, an attempt at understanding or accommodation of historical, social 
and cultural contexts?
 395 Born as Hanns Chaim Meyer (1912–78). See Jean Améry, On Suicide: A 
Discussion on Voluntary Death (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1999).
 396 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: The Will to Knowledge, Volume 1, 
trans. Robert Hurley (London: Penguin Books, 2006).
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There are two possible answers to the question. An obvious explanation is 
that biomedicine has little interest in the social history of medicine or in the 
anthropology of specific diseases, subjects no longer taught in medical schools. 
A few paragraphs may be offered on Ebola, HIV infection and similar eso-
teric killer infections. There was a time when every medical student in the West 
had to read Hans Zinsser’s Rats, Lice and History, first published in 1935. The 
Harvard biologist’s work has been replaced by writers on current epidemics and 
pandemics whose literature appears to be confined to those few who choose 
epidemiology as a profession. Then again, medical school curricula rarely offer 
space for social science elective courses, and where they do, few take up history, 
geography or anthropology. 
Indigenous suicides
In some societies suicide is rare, in others, rampant. Several communities 
have an historic and cultural practice of suicide. However, a number of Indig-
enous communities have experienced an alarming escalation of suicide rates 
over recent decades, their common experience of genocide and colonialism 
undoubtedly a major factor. The affected groups are turning to community in 
preference to Western biomedical models of intervention. 
We have an acute observation on the Western approach to suicide from the 
American psychologist James Hillman (1926–2011): 
Understanding is … based on sympathy, on intimate knowledge, on par-
ticipation. It depends upon a communication of souls and is appropriate 
to the human encounter, whereas explanation belongs to the viewpoint 
of the natural sciences. Understanding attempts to stay with the moment 
as it is, while explanation leads away from the present, backwards into a 
chain of causality, or sideways into comparisons.397
Today we can glimpse a different kind of suicide analysis in contemporary com-
munities that have suffered one or more acts of genocide, especially Indigenous 
communities such as Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders, Native 
Americans, Canadian First Nations and Inuit; Inuit Greenlanders; the Sami 
peoples of Norway, Sweden and Finland (once known as Lapps or  Laplanders); 
Pacific Islanders and the New Zealand Maori peoples of Oceania. Several schol-
ars of suicide in those regions are stepping outside the conventional box. Hill-
man asks who owns the soul. For him, ‘self-killing … means both a killing of 
community and involvement of community in the killing’.398 Just as Dr Jack 
 397 James Hillman, Suicide of the Soul (Woodstock: Springer Publications, 
1997), 49.
 398 Ibid.
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Kevorkian’s assisted suicide campaign in the United States opened up that issue, 
so Hillman’s plea was that suicide should be judged ‘by some community court’, 
comprising legal, medical, aesthetic, religious and philosophical interests, as 
well as by family and friends. In that way, self-death can ‘come out of the closet’. 
The act of suicide will, of course, remain individualistic, ‘but judgement of the 
suicide as part of, or interior to, a community may help to liberate Western civi-
lisation’s “persecutory panic” when suicide, or the threat of it, arises’. ‘We must,’ 
he concludes, get away from ‘police action, lockups, criminalisation of helpers, 
dosages to dumbness’.399 
We have done nothing of the sort, or very little of it, in North America or in 
Australasia. We insist on explanation, on causality—inevitably ‘mental health 
issues’, on seeking out ‘at-risk’ factors, on prescribing more medication rather 
than following Hillman’s recourse to understanding. Some inroads have been 
made into the sovereignty of biopower and of the individualisation and isola-
tion of suicide—by native communities in Australia, the United States, Canada 
and New Zealand. The communities—not the specialists’ consulting rooms, the 
hospitals or Al Alvarez’s ‘isolation wards of science’—have become the locus 
and focus of suicide, especially that of youth. The ‘community’ has taken on the 
phenomenon and the problem it presents.400 However defined or perceived by 
others, the community knows itself: who belongs, who does not, and where the 
social and geographic boundaries are drawn.401
Aboriginal Australia
The 2016 census enumerated the combined Aboriginal, Torres Strait Islander 
and South Sea Islander population as 649,200, or 2.8 per cent of the national 
population.402 In northern Australia in the 1960s and 1970s there was no 
 evidence, let alone any record of any suicide in remote, rural or in urban 
 399 He means the benumbing of the emotions that often flows from antidepres-
sant drugs. 
 400 For example, a major segment of the second National Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Suicide Prevention Conference in Perth in 2018 was ‘The 
Importance of Community Partnerships’.
 401 For example, while the word Nyoongar or Nyungar is the generic word of 
choice for, and by, Western Australian Aboriginal people, Nyoongar is also 
the name of a specific, tight geographic community in the south-west of 
Western Australia, from Geraldton on the west coast, to Esperance on the 
south coast, consisting essentially of fourteen language groups. Their Coun-
try numbers some 6,000 to 10,000 persons.
 402 New South Wales 216,176; Queensland 186,4582; Western Australia 
75,978; Northern Territory 58,248; Victoria 47,788; South Australia 34,184; 
Tasmania 23,572; Australian Capital Territory 6,508. 
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 communities—quite a contrast with suicide practice among Arctic Inuit and 
Indian communities. 
‘Ethnopsychiatry’ became a research fad in Australia from 1960 to 1990, 
and several studies in the Northern Territory and Western Australia— 
by, among others, John Cawte in 1968, Malcolm Kidson and Ivor Jones in 
1968 and Harry Eastwell in 1988—found no ‘mental health issues’ and ‘noth-
ing alarming about Aboriginal suicide’.403 The specific suicide aspects of this 
research tended to be of the conventional variety, whereas the ethnopsychiatric 
approach to ‘mental  illness’ was always less about studying native belief systems 
and much more about Western-perceived illness among the clans. This kind 
of  ethnopsychiatry—always conducted in [academic] English among dialect-
speaking people (and sometimes by observing ‘subjects’ at a distance through 
binoculars)—was, for the most part, a dismal art, unproductive and without 
any portending quality. Towards the end of the 1980s, Ernest Hunter began his 
pioneering work on Aboriginal history, health and suicide.404 
My interest in suicide began in 1989 when I explored the role of sport in 
deflecting Aboriginal youth from criminal activity.405 Conducted across 79 
communities, this continent-wide fieldwork coincided with the appointment of 
a Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, which was to investi-
gate 99 such deaths between 1980 and 1989.406 There was a mistaken belief that 
most of these deaths were ‘assisted’ and highly suspicious—but very few were. 
Noteworthy is that half of the custody deaths were of men who were members 
of the Stolen Generations; that is, children forcibly removed from their natural 
parents. Stories abounded of suicide and attempted suicide among young peo-
ple, seemingly more common outside of custody than inside. So it proved to be.
 403 For evidence of that reality, see, inter alia, the following: J Cawte, D Baglin, 
G Bianchi, D McElwain, J Money, and B Nurcombe, ‘Arafura, Aboriginal 
Town: The Medico-sociological Expedition to Arnhem Land in 1968’ (n.p., 
1968). Unpublished Manuscript; copy held by AIATSIS Library, Canberra 
(restricted use, call number MS 483). H. Eastwell, ‘The Low Risk of Suicide 
among the Yolgnu of the Northern Territory: The Traditional Aboriginal 
Pattern’, Medical Journal of Australia 148, no. 7 (1988): 338–40. M Kidson, 
and I Jones, ‘Psychiatric Disorders among Aborigines of the Australian 
Western Desert’, (n.p., 1968). Unpublished Typescript, copy held by AIAT-
SIS Library, Canberra (call number PMS 918). 
 404 Ernest Hunter, Aboriginal Health and History: Power and Prejudice in 
Remote Australia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
 405 Colin Tatz, Aboriginals: Sport, Violence and Survival, 1994 Criminology 
Research Council Research Report, http://crg.aic.gov.au/reports/18–98.pdf.
 406 National Report, RCIADIC (Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in 
Custody) (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1991).
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Apart from a literal handful of cases, there was no record of Aboriginal sui-
cides before 1960,407 and suicide had no place in any Aboriginal belief systems, 
languages and material culture. Nor did Aboriginal suicide appear in prison, 
police or hospital records, the files of children’s institutions, in anthropologists’ 
writings or notes, or in any missionary or governmental documents. Yet in the 
past 50 years their rates of suicide have soared to among the highest in the 
world, especially in the younger age groups—not just 15 to 24 but the even 
younger 10 to 14 cohort. Lamentably, eight-year-olds are attempting suicide—
‘playing hangsies’ as it is described in the Kimberley region of Western Aus-
tralia. Even allowing for David Lester’s comment at the head of this essay about 
Native American youth inured to death at an early age, how does an eight-year-
old, deemed in law not to have the capacity to form any intent, understand, let 
alone intend, and then act out self-cessation?408 Official statistics tell us that 
while the national suicide rate is now 10.4 per 100,000 of the population, for 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples it is 21.4. In three states the rate is 
closer to 30. For the years 1996 to 1998, I found rates of 40 in specific rural New 
South Wales Aboriginal communities.409 In 2014, the Kimberley rate was 74.
My book Aboriginal Suicide is Different was first published in 2001. Reac-
tions varied: most readers were surprised or astonished, and one or two critics 
demanded to know how and in what ways Aboriginal suicide was, or could 
even remotely be considered, ‘different’. Academic psychologist Joseph Reser 
saw the ‘differentness’ as ‘ostensible’, ‘rhetorical’, with dangerous consequences 
for professional practice.410 Wedded as they are to the axiom that an inexorable 
factor in suicide is previous suicide in families, Reser and others insist that 
there simply has to be a history of Aboriginal suicide—even in the absence of 
historical evidence. 
In subsequent writings, and after research visits to New Zealand and Nuna-
vut in Canada, the ‘different’ or varied quality was made clear: one sharp look 
at the social, political and historic contexts revealed the divide. While suicide 
 407 Christine McIlvanie, ‘The Responsibility of People’ (BA honours thesis, 
University of New England, 1982). This thesis examined the death in cus-
tody of Eddie Murray in the cells at Wee Waa (NSW), and contained replies 
to the candidate from the NSW Prisons Service about records of Aboriginal 
deaths in custody for some eight decades.
 408 Sigmund Freud once proposed that youth understand physical death but 
believe their spirits live on. My experience of a few eight-year-old parasui-
cides is that despite ‘playing’ at hanging they appear to comprehend death 
as the outcome. 
 409 Colin Tatz, Aboriginal Suicide is Different: A Portrait of Life and Self- 
Destruction (Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 2005), 59–69.
 410 Joseph Reser, ‘What Does it Mean to Say that Aboriginal Suicide is  Different? 
Different Cultures, Accounts, and Distress in the Contexts of Indigenous 
Youth Suicide’, Australian Aboriginal Studies 2, no. 23 (2004): 34–53.
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is suicide, the origins, social factors and the legacies of history make for a very 
different kind of analysis, the kind most health professionals are not exposed to. 
Aboriginal Australians trail a history like no other segment of the population, 
here or abroad. They experienced a genocidal era of episodic physical killings 
from 1804 to 1928, with some 250 massacre sites documented to date.411 Some 
20,000 to 30,000 people were killed, by intent, in sporadic but systemic acts of 
‘dispersal’. To prevent the killings, federal and state governments (between 1897 
and 1912) introduced policies of protection-segregation—incarceration on iso-
lated reservations. Between 1897 and the mid-1970s, governments sequestered 
between 70,000 and 90,000 people by erecting legal and geographic fences.412 
A reign of systemic forcible child removal began in the late 1830s in colonial 
Victoria and lasted until the mid-1980s, with around 35,000 children taken. 
The aim—enshrined in government policy—was to eliminate Aboriginal-
ity by biological and social assimilation, by ‘breeding out the colour’ and by 
child re-acculturation, ‘to erase them from the landscape’—to the point, said 
the authorities, that no one would know that Aboriginal people ever existed.413 
Throughout these phases, Indigenous individuals had no civil or civic rights as 
generally understood: they were officially declared wards of the state, with gov-
ernment officials and Christian missionaries their legal guardians, irrespective 
of their age or ability to manage their own affairs.414
Harsh as it was in terms of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the 
institutional era did maintain ordered communities. There were containable 
levels of physical violence, usually traditional methods of conflict resolution. 
But with the opening up of these near-prison-like regimes in the mid-1970s, 
disorder set in, with increasing deaths from non-natural causes. Officially called 
‘accidents and poisonings’, this statistical category has, alarmingly, included 
high numbers of homicide and suicide.
In the name of ‘protection’, nomadic hunter-gatherers had become seden-
tary, stationary and segregated as welfare recipients, pauperised in all aspects of 
life. The draconian settlement and mission practices attempted to ‘civilise’ and 
 411 Calla Wahlquist, ‘Evidence of 250 Massacres of Indigenous Australians 
Mapped’, Guardian, July 27 (2018), https://www.theguardian.com 
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 412 For a full account of these eras see: Colin Tatz, Australia’s Unthinkable 
 Genocide (Bloomington: Xlibris, 2017). 
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Christianise them, to imbue them with notions of property ownership, aspi-
ration and individualism. Then suddenly, in the early 1970s, these governing 
authorities moved out and effectively abandoned them under the policy slo-
gans of ‘self-determination’, then ‘self-management’ and then ‘autonomy’. The 
assaults on traditional culture thus occurred twice in less than 60 years. When 
the controlling authorities walked away, virtually overnight, there was loss of 
both the traditional and the imposed structure, resulting in the trauma that 
Durkheim would call ‘anomie’; that is, instability and normlessness. 
Johann Hari has written eloquently about ‘lost connections’ as the way to 
understand mental illness.415 The Aboriginal loss of connections has been 
calamitous: loss of land, of life, of kin, children, language, traditional culture 
and ritual (often forbidden by statute), of freedom of movement, of lifestyle. 
They have experienced forcible relocation, loss of choice of living space. As 
recently as 2007, the conservative federal government introduced an ‘interven-
tion’, ostensibly to quarantine Aboriginal communities from excessive alcohol, 
drugs, sexual predators and trespass from those deemed undesirable. This was 
essentially a reprise of the policies implemented in colonial Queensland in 
1897: the strictest possible segregation and isolation but, in this instance, not to 
protect Aboriginal people from outside predators but from themselves.
In sum, in the period of 230 years since colonisation began, there have been 
massive impacts on Aboriginal lives: dispossession of land, massacres,  isolation, 
strict segregation, forcible child removals, forced assimilation, fragmentation, 
denial of civic and civil rights, ‘interventions’ and, in more recent times, prison 
incarceration rates that are grossly disproportionate. For many, pretending that 
such events did not occur, or that they occurred in some less reprehensible way, 
is a preferable pathway. Such are the contexts of ‘difference’. Public policies of 
equality that rely on ‘levelling the playing fields’, do not appreciate or accom-
modate difference: Aboriginal experiences get in the way of universality and 
expediency, two qualities precious to bureaucracies.
Both Louis Wekstein’s A Handbook of Suicidology and Barbagli’s book pro-
vide broad but definable categories of suicide. Both acknowledge something 
society wants to avoid, namely, the very idea of rational suicide, what Hillman 
would call ‘persecutory panic’. There is no denying or relativising the reality 
that a percentage of the young who are bipolar or schizophrenic do commit sui-
cide, but I emphasise that the majority of suicides I have studied did not have 
such professionally diagnosed and confirmed mental illness. Nor do coronial 
files and witness depositions reveal presentations of that kind. A fair percent-
age of the remote population does not have regular, or even irregular, contact 
with the professionals who can diagnose mental illness. As mentioned above, 
between 1960 and 1990 the major psychiatric studies by reputable research-
ers found no evidence of any mental illnesses among Aboriginal Australians. 
Certainly, the many doctors and nurses I met during my early 1960s work 
 415 Hari, Lost Connections. 
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never reported or talked about mental illness cases. Individuals may have been 
unhappy, sad, even given to forms of melancholia, but they were neither clini-
cally depressed nor inclined to undue violence, to self or to others. An inability 
to cope with neo-liberal expectations and aspirations in modern society, or to 
manage the symptoms of transgenerational transmission of trauma, is not an 
illness as such. Often in rational ways—at least according to many interviews 
of those who survived suicide attempts—they were not merely seeking an exit 
from life but, seemingly, an entrance to Amery’s other state, death, a ‘place’ up 
there where life may possibly be better than the miserable lives they have down 
here. Just as rationally, there are many who reject broader society, and tell us 
so, more often than not by confrontational methods of death—like hanging in 
public places. In their own way, such public actions are political statements.416 
Hanging, generally, is hugely more prevalent than gun use, imbibing poison, 
jumping, train-surfing, drowning, self-immolating or climbing onto electricity 
power lines. 
Two contextual factors loom large in the Aboriginal experience: their very 
short lives, forever confronted by young deaths, as well as the legacies of a 
recent past, and a never-certain present. A number of social indicators illus-
trate the gap between contemporary Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal life. One is 
life expectancy. Aboriginal males can expect to live to 67, some 11.5 years fewer 
than non-Aboriginal males. A recent book on Aboriginal sports  achievers has 
an entry on the Rovers Football Club from Ceduna in South Australia, win-
ners of a regional premiership in 1958. 417 Of the eighteen young men in that 
 Australian Rules football team, only one lived to the age of 50. 418 The Rovers 
team is a truer indicator of Aboriginal life (and death) than the numerical por-
trait provided by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
During decades of fieldwork it was obvious that in most communities there 
is at least one death, natural or unnatural, one funeral, one wake, every week. 
Children are inured to death at a very early age. Grief suffuses communities 
and the notion of grief counselling is not seen as culturally relevant. Horwitz 
 416 Ernest Hunter, ‘On Gordian Knots and Nooses: Aboriginal Suicide in the 
Kimberley,’ Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 22 (1988): 
264–71. 
 417 Colin Tatz and Paul Tatz, Black Pearls: The Aboriginal and Islander Sports 
Hall of Fame (Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 2018). 
 418 Australian football (sometimes called Australian Rules football, or Aussie 
Rules or ‘footy’), is played by two teams on an oval-shaped field, with eigh-
teen players on each team. The ball is kicked or handled in any direction 
between players, and the object is to kick the ball through the opponent’s 
goalposts at the end of the field. The goalposts comprise four posts, each 
around 6.5 m apart; the two inner posts are taller than the two outer posts. 
Kicking the ball between the centre (or inner) goalposts scores six points, 
and through the adjoining side posts scores one point.
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and Wakefield lament the ‘loss of sadness’ and the way psychiatry has turned 
sadness into a mental disorder.419 There is no shortage of sadness in Aborigi-
nal life. Sadness is not clinical depression; and sadness is reason enough to 
end the body that is overcome by it. Grief does not go away in specified time-
frames. In a remote New South Wales town I was asked to meet four young 
Aboriginal men who had attempted suicide and were heavily dosed with the 
antidepressant Prozac. They took me to the cemetery where they pointed to 
the grave of a 16-year-old once promising footballer who had knocked down 
an old lady while trying to steal her purse and thought, wrongly, that he had 
killed her—whereupon he took a skipping rope from his gym bag and hanged 
himself, all too visibly, in the public park. The four had bought a 24-can carton 
of beer: as they each sank a can, so they poured a matching one into the grave 
for Peter. Why are you doing that? ‘We want to join him’, was the unanimous 
and  unambiguous reply.
Native North America
The literature on suicide among Native Americans, Canadian First Nations and 
Inuit and Indigenous Alaskans has grown remarkably in the past three dec-
ades. In 1989, for example, David Lester’s Suicide from a Sociological Perspective 
 covered New Mexico Indian suicides in three pages; in 1997, he was moved to 
publish a full-length book on Suicide in American Indians. Suicide in Indig-
enous communities is increasing each year. 
Andrew Woolford and Anthony Hall are leading the research into the 
genocidal legacy of Indian communities in North America, especially 
the impact on children who experienced the compulsory residential board-
ing schools (similar to the Stolen Generations in Australia).420 Canadians have 
the benefit of major investigations: The Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
 People (1991–96), and the Truth and Reconciliation of Canada Report of 
2015. The latter gave an eloquent voice to the genocidal nature of colonial and 
 post-colonial policies: 
Physical genocide is the mass killing of the members of a targeted group, 
and biological genocide is the destruction of the group’s reproductive 
 419 Allan Horwitz and Jerome Wakefield, The Loss of Sadness: How Psychiatry 
Transformed Normal Sorrow Into Depressive Disorder (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007). 
 420 Andrew Woolford, This Benevolent Experiment: Indigenous Boarding 
Schools, Genocide, and Redress in Canada and the United States (Nebraska: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2015). See also Anthony J Hall, ‘A National or 
International Crime? Canada’s Indian Residential Schools and the Geno-
cide Convention’, Genocide Studies International 20, no. 1, (2018): 79–91. 
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capacity. Cultural genocide is the destruction of those structures and 
practices that allow the group to continue as a group. States that engage 
in cultural genocide set out to destroy the political and social institutions 
of the targeted group. Land is seized, and populations are forcibly trans-
ferred and their movement is restricted. Languages are banned. Spirit-
ual leaders are persecuted, spiritual practices are forbidden, and objects 
of spiritual value are confiscated and destroyed. And, most significantly 
to the issue at hand, families are disrupted to prevent the transmission 
of cultural values and identity from one generation to the next. In its 
dealing with Aboriginal people, Canada did all these things.421
In 1994, the American and Alaska Mental Health Research Center published 
the proceedings of a major conference. ‘Calling from the Rim’ may well be the 
most important accounts of youth suicide amongst indigenous peoples.422 Doz-
ens of medical and psychiatric journal papers cite diverse rates of Indian sui-
cide within tribal groups, while others point to sharp differences in prevalence 
between tribes. The diversity can be partly attributed to the different experi-
ences between different tribes: some genocidal, some plain violent, a few with 
relatively peaceful relations. As discriminating as these studies appear to be, 
there remains the problem of the all-embracing title of ‘tribe’. Custer Died for 
Your Sins by Vine Deloria Jr, a well-known Indian rights advocate and a former 
Executive Director of the National Congress of American Indians, remains the 
most searing, and unrebutted, indictment of American Indian policy, and of 
white academic attitudes, especially those of anthropologists.423 He deplores the 
‘Little Big Horn’ and ‘wigwam’ stereotyping of his people, and I suspect that, 
while he has not written specifically about suicide, his admonitions of anthro-
pology would apply as strongly to suicidology. In essence, he condemns aca-
deme for creating ‘unreal’ Indians in their attempts to establish ‘real’  Indians. 
Thus, the ‘bicultural people’, the ‘folk people’, the ‘drink-too-much people’, 
the ‘warriors without weapons people’, the ‘between-two-worlds people’ are 
academic constructs imposed on a people who then came to believe, and live 
out, these external perceptions. Deloria reminds us that when academics talk of 
the Chippewas or the Sioux, they appear not to recognise that ‘there are nine-
teen different Chippewa tribes, fifteen Sioux tribes, four Potawatomi tribes’, 
and so on. There is an identical perspective among non-Aboriginal  Australians: 
 421 Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future (Canada: The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015), 1.
 422 ‘Calling from the Rim: Suicide Behaviour Among American Indian and 
Alaska Native Adolescents’, American and Alaskan Mental Health Research 
Center, Journal of the National Center 4 (1994). 
 423 Vine Deloria Jr., Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto (Norman-
ton: Oklahoma University Press, 1988). 
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 Aboriginal people are Aboriginal, no matter how different their histories, cul-
tures and experiences. 
Anthropology may well have committed many ‘sins’ against Indian peoples. 
But the anthropological approach at least attempted to get to know ‘their’ peo-
ple and ‘their’ tribes. Other social science and medical disciplines have adopted 
a distant, statistical approach, even where there are attempts at differentiation 
between reservation and non-reservation residents. There is no detail of life-
style difference, only difference in geographic domain. There is no understand-
ing of ‘tribal memory’ and the legacy of genocidal trauma. In short, there is 
no context—social, historical, political—provided in these studies, apart from 
stating the inevitably obvious that these communities are impoverished, with 
high rates of unemployment, and so on. 
Every study is concerned about under-reporting and about inadequate proto-
cols for identification. The ‘Calling from the Rim’ report states, ‘suicide among 
aboriginal people cannot be studied through the use of such traditional data 
sources as vital statistics records, since ethnic background is not recorded on 
the death certificates in any jurisdiction’.424 Every study reports more attempts 
by females, but makes an important point that clustering is more common 
among females and that more females succeed in their purpose when among 
the cluster. Without being explicit, there is a strong message that attempted 
suicide by female youth is in need of serious attention. 
Lester provides the best statistical summary of youth suicide, albeit with 
data at least two decades old. Despite regional differences, there is a sameness 
about many of the figures and ostensible causes. Indigenous rates of suicide are 
at least 10 times higher than the national rates. Attempted suicides are vastly 
more prevalent. 
Lester admits the unreliability of standard psychology tests when used 
with Native Americans. His checklist of the ‘standard’ underlying factors is 
similar to the one in common use in Australia and New Zealand: depression, 
 hopelessness, immaturity, aggressiveness, a history of suicidal behaviour, psy-
chiatric  problems, substance abuse, parent and family conflict, lack of family 
 support, physical and sexual abuse and recent stress. He lists sociological factors 
as social disintegration, family breakdown and cultural conflict (noting the latter 
is rarely ‘listed among the precipitating causes’, although it is not clear whether 
he is being critical of that omission or whether he, himself, believes it not to 
be significant). 
What we can learn from this brief excursion into North America is that there 
may well be room for a philosophy that is neither proactive nor intrusive, one 
that waits patiently until one is asked to intervene, explain, or better still, to 
understand. Of all human behaviours, suicide may just possibly be the one that 
always needs attention, that cannot be left alone, but which needs an attention 
of a very different kind from the present strategies. 
 424 ‘Calling from the Rim’.
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Lost connections
To date, little has been written about the Indigenous genocide-suicide relation-
ship. There is enough scholarship to say that in the more studied genocides of 
Armenians and Jews there is an understanding of ‘tribal memory’, an osmo-
sis of the past that invades the present, or transgenerational transmission of 
trauma from genocide survivors to subsequent generations. That must surely 
be considered when examining the factors impinging on the predilection for 
suicide among Indigenous societies today.
We are beginning to comprehend the long-term legacy for Armenian, Jew-
ish, Bosnian and Rwandan communities but the impact beyond the second 
and third generations is not yet recognised. Genocidal memory always lingers. 
It diffuses to the descendants; it hovers in the background and often perme-
ates and suffuses the foreground. It surrounds and invades life, and is found in 
songs, stories, legends, attitudes to food, in art, language and idiom. And while 
youth may not know the details, they feel and absorb the emotions. One only 
has to ask an eight-year-old Armenian child, anywhere, what makes him or her 
Armenian, or different, and the essential answer will be heard. There is, indeed, 
an ineluctable phenomenon that Lester calls tribal memory, an understanding 
memory rather than an explanatory memory. Second generation Holocaust 
survivors say they can actually remember events their parents experienced, 
as though they were themselves present. They can hear the tragedies in their 
parents’ silences and know there are ghosts all around them. 
Indigenous peoples are among the world’s best oral historians and the stories 
of their persecution transmit down the generations. In the space of some 180 
years, six generations, Aboriginal Australians have endured genocidal massa-
cres, culturally destructive incarceration on reserves, wholesale child removals 
and physical relocations, and then, in the name of autonomy with the elec-
tion of the Labor government in 1972, the sudden removal of all infrastructure, 
however authoritarian, leaving an ill-prepared population to fend for them-
selves in isolation. Add former Prime Minister John Howard’s ‘intervention’ in 
remote communities and the re-infantilising of whole populations in the name 
of saving them from themselves. In short, five (rather than just two) dramatic 
onslaughts on a people in a very short historical timeframe. Aboriginal sui-
cide, unknown before 1960, erupted savagely after then, a time that coincided 
roughly with so-called equal rights, civil rights and ‘autonomy’. 
Among the many flaws in the DSM dictionary of disorders, the disregard of 
grief is one of the most grievous. Grief, or bereavement, is normal, not a medi-
cal condition, or a condition that can be limited to two weeks of compassionate 
leave. Grief is not a fortnight’s worth of tears, or a yearlong sackcloth and ashes 
regimen found in some religions. Grief, as in a formal funeral and an alcohol-
fuelled wake, may be the norm in Western Anglo societies but in many cultures 
mourning rituals are intrinsic to being (and dying). Much has been written 
about traditional Aboriginal mourning ceremonies and their significance. The 
present-day absence of those rites, and their lack of substitution, is a key factor 
126 Genocide Perspectives VI
in long-term grief, unresolved and unrequited grief. The grief of the Aboriginal 
quartet discussed earlier was manifesting a full two years after the footballer’s 
suicide. What is unhelpful in all of these contexts is the particularly strident 
Australian penchant for an often inappropriate mantra—‘move on’. 
In the Aboriginal case—as with other persecuted minority victims—there is 
collective grief, a tone and a tension that is diffused across a community. It is 
not particularly difficult to comprehend what the German sociologist Ferdi-
nand Tönnies termed gemeinschaft, commonly a tight-knit community of peo-
ple with like tastes, values, attitudes and beliefs. Western society, urban society, 
with its more insular, privacy-seeking nuclear family structure (gesellschaft) 
tends in such situations to grieve alone, or in tighter circles. 
We have before us a remarkable catalogue of collective grief in the 1997 report, 
Bringing Them Home.425 After nearly two decades of Aboriginal agitation for an 
inquiry into the Stolen Generations of Aboriginal children, the federal Labor 
Government appointed Sir Ronald Wilson to inquire into ‘the separation’ of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children from their families. The word 
‘separation’ in the Commission’s terms of reference was meant to infer that 
removal was temporary. It never was. The whole purport of the child removal 
policy was that ‘transfer’ would be permanent. Nevertheless, the Inquiry heard 
523 witness testimonies and came to the conclusion that genocide was, indeed, 
committed by the act of forcible transfer of children from one group to another 
group (as defined in Article II(e) of the UN Genocide Convention). 
The essential themes of Bringing Them Home were grief and loss. The stolen 
children’s testimonies were, of course, gut-wrenching—endless tales of coer-
cion, undue cruelty, physical and mental trauma while incarcerated in ‘assimi-
lation homes’, constant sexual and physical abuse, humiliation, denigration, 
dehumanisation, all of which often led to attempts at self-harm. I have quoted a 
number of testimonies in Australia’s Unthinkable Genocide; two short testimo-
nies here illustrate the experiences. As Rosalie Fraser described: 
The date was 13 March 1961, the place was Beverley in Western 
 Australia. On that day my brother and sister, Terry aged eight, Stuart 
aged six, Karen aged four-and-a-half, Beverley aged eight months, and 
myself, were all made Wards of the State through action taken by the 
Child Welfare Department of Western Australia. The boys and girls 
were sent to separate institutions and Rosalie was later ‘collected’ by her 
foster mother, Mrs Kelly. When we first went to the Kellys, we had no 
idea where our parents were, we never saw or heard from them and we 
were unaware of what efforts they might be making to get us back. The 
 425 Bringing Them Home: Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families (Sydney: 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 1997).
Genocide and Suicide 127
Welfare communicated not with us but with the Kellys. The separation 
was total; our new life was the only one we knew.426
Marjorie Woodrow was born in a small New South Wales country town. It was 
alleged that she had stole (sic) a pair of stockings. Told that her mother 
was dead, she was sent to Cootamundra Girls’ Training Home, one of the more 
notorious of many such institutions: ‘We were all Aboriginal, we were never 
called by our names. It was always ‘number 108, step forward!’ We had num-
bers sewn on our uniforms. Everyone could see that we were from the Girls’ 
Home. We were branded just like cattle’.427
There is a thread that runs through child removal practices: grandmothers, 
daughters and daughters’ daughters; grandfathers, sons and grandsons endured 
such institutional lives. We know of several generations of families who have 
that experience. It was not often that an Aboriginal youth experiences a one-off 
incarceration: the norm was and still is systematic and systemic. 
In the aftermath of the Holocaust, the eminent neurologist and psychiatrist 
Viktor Frankl published Man’s Search for Meaning (1946). He wrote about those 
who survived the concentration camps but who had been beaten, starved, tor-
tured. Survivors, he wrote, had purpose in life. Another camp survivor, Italian 
chemist Primo Levi, also attempted to discover the difference between those 
who survived and those who perished, in The Drowned and the Saved.428 Read-
ing Aboriginal testimonies, one can sometimes see who were salvati, people 
determined to ‘outlive’ those who incarcerated and mistreated them, and those 
who drowned—by alcohol, drugs, violence to others or to selves. Surviving, 
coping and resilience are nigh impossible to pinpoint as ‘characteristics’, as 
inherent or learned responses to grim circumstances. Decades of Holocaust 
and genocide research has not clearly determined why people behave the way 
they do in the immediacy of a crisis. Frankl and Levi based their beliefs on their 
own experiences of genocide. 
Is there any correlation between these historical experiences and depleted 
reserves of serotonin? Can antidepressants address such contextual acts of 
 violence and their transgenerational impact? I think not.
 426 Tatz, Australia’s Unthinkable, 118.
 427 Ibid.
 428 Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved (New York: Abacus Books, 2013).

CHAPTER 7
Apprehending the Slow Violence 
of Nuclear Colonialism 
Art and Maralinga
Jacob G. Warren
Standing in the south-eastern Western Desert, barely north of the Nullarbor 
Plain, at ground zero of a nuclear test, is an uncanny experience. From 1956 to 
1963, seven ‘conventional’ nuclear weapons explosions and hundreds of other 
unconventional and dirtier experiments were carried out at the South Austral-
ian site that the British and Australian testing authorities named ‘Maralinga’ 
(an appropriated Garig/k word from the other side of the continent that meant 
‘thunder’ or ‘place of thunder’).429 We stood at the spot where the weapon 
 429 Elizabeth Tynan, ‘Thunder on the Plain’, in Black Mist Burnt Country: 
 Testing the Bomb, Maralinga and Australian Art, ed. Jan Dirk Mittman 
(Upwey: Burrinja, 2016), 21–35; Kingsley Palmer, ‘Dealing with the Legacy 
of the Past: Aborigines and Atomic Testing in South Australia’, Aboriginal 
History 14, no. 1 (1990): 206; HM Cooper, Australian Aboriginal Words and 
Their Meanings, second ed. (Adelaide: South Australian Museum, 1952), 16; 
Crawford Pasco, ‘Port Essington’, in Australian Race: Its Origin, Languages, 
Customs, Place of Landing in Australia, and the Routes by Which It Spread 
Itself Over That Continent, ed. Edward M Curr (Melbourne: John Ferres, 
Government Printer, 1886), 268–9.
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Breakaway was detonated from a 100-foot tower on 22 October 1956. There is 
still a large round clearing in the lightly wooded plain and lumps of Trinitite 
or ‘bomb glaze’, a green ceramic-glass created as the intense atomic heat melted 
the silica in the red sand, litter the surface (Figures 1 and 2). 
Figure 1: Breakaway marker with tree line in background. Photo © the author.
Figure 2: The author holding Trinitite at Breakaway site. Photo © the author.
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I stood there, taking notes in the furious wind, as part of a tour group com-
posed mostly of caravaners, hoping to learn something not present in history 
books nor official documents.430 Being there, I came to appreciate the ‘sensory-
disorientation produced by the phenomenon of radiation’, what Joseph Masco 
has called the ‘nuclear uncanny’, as well as the many types of ‘invisibility’ that 
intersect in radioactively contaminated landscapes.431 Radiation is itself not 
able to be visually sensed; the colossal burial pits that contain contaminated 
buildings, vehicles and soil also obscure this material from view; and finally, 
for many decades, Maralinga and its victims have been invisible to the national 
historical and cultural consciousness. In a way there was nothing to see; or, 
more precisely, what had happened and is still happening there could not be 
seen: half-lives are both too slow (tens of thousands to billions of years) and 
too fast (nanoseconds), and contamination too small (atomic) and too large 
(spread across thousands of square kilometres) to be apprehended first hand 
as they elude and disorient the senses. What I experienced was the strange and 
complex material reality of an invisibly scarred and toxic region only two hours 
north of the much-used Eyre Highway. The radiation, the multi-millennial half-
lives of trans-uranic elements, and the ecological and physiognomic impacts of 
these materials were all nowhere to be seen under the banality of a midday sun. 
At the same time these violent realities were everywhere.
The overlapping invisibilities encountered at the site illustrate the many rep-
resentational issues facing cases of what Rob Nixon has termed slow violence: 
violence so slow (like multi-millennial half-lives) that it is invisible as a form of 
violence at all.432 Simply put, slow violence describes the manifestation of power 
relations (economic, political, racial, class) in the environment: in the case of 
the appropriated desert site known as Maralinga, these power relations are 
those of a nuclear colonialism. The slow violence of nuclear colonialism con-
stitutes an example of what genocide scholar Kjell Anderson has termed ‘cold 
genocide’, a genocide that unfolds in slow-motion.433 In this essay, the sand-
covered painting Maralinga (1992) (Figure 3) by painter Jonathan Kumintjara 
Brown (Pitjantjatjara, 1960–97), and the five-metre tall installation of blown-
glass bush yams Thunder Raining Poison (2015) (Figure 4) by artist Yhonnie 
Scarce (Kokatha, Nukunu, 1973–) are closely analysed in order to shape an 
account of the slow violence of nuclear colonialism in the context of Maralinga. 
 430 Accompanying me on this trip was Hilary Thurlow, who took photos as 
furiously as I took notes.
 431 Joseph Masco, The Nuclear Borderlands: The Manhattan Project in Post-Cold 
War New Mexico (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 30.
 432 Rob Nixon, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor  (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011).
 433 Kjell Anderson, ‘Colonialism and Cold Genocide: The Case of West Papua’, 
Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 9, no. 2 (2015): 9.
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These works of art grapple with the slow and uncanny violence of a coloni-
ally induced radiotoxicity and each, in its own way, explores the impacts of 
the Maralinga tests on the ecology, cultural meaning and inhabitants (human 
and non-human) of the desert in Australia’s central south. Through these 
works the siting of a nuclear testing facility in the desert is argued to be an (re)
iteration of colonial logics that read the continent as terra nullius more than 
two centuries ago: in fact, Brown’s Maralinga was the first of a series entitled 
‘ Maralinga  Nullius’ (1992–97). The South Australian desert, as will be shown, 
Figure 3: Jonathan Kumintjara Brown, Maralinga, 1992, acrylic, sand and 
 lizard skeleton on linen, 167 x 106 cm. Ebes Collection. Reproduced courtesy 
of Burrinja Cultural Centre. © artist estate.
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Figure 4: Yhonnie Scarce, Thunder Raining Poison, 2015, blown glass yams, 
dimensions variable. Installation view ‘Tarnanthi’, AGSA. Courtesy the artist 
and This is No Fantasy (Dianne Tanzer and Nicola Stein), Melbourne.
was fashioned in the ontology of the Anglo-Australian testing authorities as a 
barren wasteland, a Maralinga nullius and, as such, was deemed an appropriate 
void for the high-stakes experimentation of weaponised nuclear physics. The 
works by Brown and Scarce not only interrogate and problematise this colonial 
ontology and the multi-millennial violence of radioactive contamination that it 
delivered, but form examples of how works of art can make the invisible reality 
of nuclear harm visible and apprehensible. Unpacking the ways in which they 
do so will form the focus of this paper.
Slow violence, cold genocide and radioactive contamination
In his 2011 book Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, Nixon 
writes in the folds of postcolonialism, environmental injustice and ecocriticism 
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to introduce the concept of ‘slow violence’.434 The term seems oxymoronic as 
violence is commonly imagined as a burst, an instant, something fast and spec-
tacular, such as machinegun firefight or an explosion. Radioactive contami-
nation fails this imagination however, since it is ‘cumulative, measured over 
the course of an entire life, not in individual doses. This means that radiation 
sickness or cancer is temporally separated from the moment of exposure’.435 
Nuclear harm lags, has gaps and is millennially ongoing. Nixon’s observation of 
‘slowness’ productively unearths precisely this different and often overlooked 
register of violence. Slow violence is, he writes: 
a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed 
destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional vio-
lence that is typically not viewed as violence at all. … A violence that 
is neither spectacular nor instantaneous, but rather incremental and 
accretive, its calamitous repercussions playing out across a range of 
temporal scales.436
Forced child removal, mining induced erosion, heavy water and radioactive 
contamination are all examples of forms of violence that incrementally play out 
on the scale of years (decades, centuries, millennia), as well as the instant (the 
second, the minute, the present). This is not to say that explosions or gunshots 
do not have multi-generational impacts; instead, that within slow violence the 
moment of violence is considered as if the explosion lasted thousands of years, 
taking lives over a long period of time, rather than in an instant. This is vio-
lence reconsidered with a view to the massive timescales and global awareness 
produced by the Anthropocene and calamities like climate change. As such, 
Nixon’s concept is one that addresses both human and environmental trauma, 
exploring damage done to ‘peripheral’ and ‘disposable’ ecologies as well as the 
politically, racially or economically (that is, neoliberally) irrelevant populations 
inhabiting them. All of this serves to decelerate understandings of the speed of 
violence so that, for example, genocides and ecocides that may not rhyme with 
traditional definitions can, first of all, become visible and named as such and, 
further, be addressed, analysed and remembered. Deceleration allows such 
events and situations that are so massively distributed in time and space to be 
considered as urgently as the ‘immediate’ manifestation of violence. The far-
reaching and fundamentally interdisciplinary concept therefore allows for an 
adjustment to the spatiotemporal assumptions within the conceptualisation of 
forms of violence, such as genocide. Could the colonisation of Australia be con-
sidered an example of slow violence? Could colonisation that advances itself 
through policy, social and cultural assimilation, missionisation and so on, be 
 434 Nixon, Slow Violence.
 435 Masco, The Nuclear, 32.
 436 Nixon, Slow Violence, 2.
Apprehending the Slow Violence of  Nuclear Colonialism  135
understood as a slow genocide, supporting evidence of massacres and other 
more overt forms of violence? 
Although missing the link to Nixon’s theorisation of slow violence, Kjell 
Anderson’s article ‘Colonialism and Cold Genocide: The Case of West Papua’ 
looks at precisely these questions from a genocide perspective. Anderson 
argues that the thinking of genocide is dominated by the model of the Holo-
caust, stating that ‘many cases of genocide are atypical in the sense that they do 
not conform closely to these Holocaust-based understandings of genocide’.437 
This leads Anderson to decelerate orthodox understandings of genocide and 
demarcate between hot and cold genocides, wherein the latter occurs incremen-
tally and is ‘characterised by gradual destruction and limited killing’ through 
‘systemic oppression or wilfully reckless policies … rooted in dehumanising 
constructions of indigeneity’.438 Such constructions of indigeneity and desert 
ecologies were, as will be shown, instrumental to the nuclear programme at 
Maralinga. To modify a passage on West Papua that rings true of the context of 
Maralinga, the policies and practices of the nuclear programme ‘may not have 
been intentionally directed at the destruction of [Indigenous groups], yet they 
were undertaken with deliberate disregard for the welfare of the [group] and 
knowledge of the destructive consequences’.439 The urge to reconstitute under-
standings of violence and genocide by Nixon and Anderson creates new per-
spectives that allow radioactive contamination, the subsequent inaccessibility 
of contaminated ancestral land and the intergenerational impacts to be recon-
sidered as violent and genocidal.
Reviewing Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, Allison Car-
ruth observes that slow violence expands on the tenets of structural violence 
by mixing in issues of large temporal and spatial protraction, and focussing on 
ways in which spatiotemporally ‘invisible’ traumas have been and can be repre-
sented.440 With timescales so extended that they are beyond human perception 
or experience, Nixon argues that instances of slow violence, such as radioac-
tive contamination with its multitude of half-lives in excess of a human life-
time, face and present representational, narrative and practical ‘challenges of 
visibility’.441 In the particular case of radioactive contamination, the difficulty in 
sensing radiation produces an uncanny experience, ‘for the invisibility of radia-
tion can make any space seem otherworldly, strange, and even dangerous’.442 
How do artists therefore render the representationally difficult and uncanny 
violence of radioactive contamination apprehensible?
 437 Anderson, ‘Colonialism and Cold,’ 9.
 438 Ibid. Emphasis on ‘indigeneity’ removed.
 439 Ibid., 13.
 440 Allison Carruth, review of Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the 
Poor, by Rob Nixon, MFS Modern Fiction Studies 59, no. 4 (2013): 847.
 441 Nixon, Slow Violence, 5.
 442 Masco, The Nuclear, 33.
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Unlike the news image, which thrives on mass killings and explosions, slow 
violence happens too slowly and over too large an area to become a spectacular 
image, bringing to mind my experience at Maralinga. Applying slow violence to 
a media studies account of art in the Anthropocene, Jussi Parikka summarises 
this representational upshot of Nixon’s argument, wherein there is ‘the neces-
sity to apprehend this sort of slow reality … and to ask how to extend the cog-
nitive and affective capacities of talking about what lies outside the first hand 
sensory, or even the time-span of human perception’.443 How, following Nixon 
and Parikka, can artists, filmmakers and writers ‘extend the cognitive and affec-
tive capacities’ of representation, narrative and practice so that catastrophes 
that are hard to visualise (both in the sense of represent and imagine) begin 
to register in our consciousness? Through the work of Brown and Scarce I will 
begin to answer this question, focusing on how their art explores and renders 
visible the slow violence of radioactive contamination in the context of nuclear 
colonialism in South Australia. How, I ask, is the cosmically slow and ‘invis-
ible’ presence of radioactive materials in the South Australian landscape made 
to appear in their work? In doing so, I necessarily address their formal and 
conceptual strategies for overcoming the ‘challenges of visibility’ presented by 
nuclear violence. The exploration of these questions necessarily flows through 
and requires an unpicking of the discourse and ontology of nuclear colonialism 
that both artists confront in their work.
Nuclear colonialism and the wasteland desert
The link to colonialism and environmental injustice along racial or class lines 
is a key factor in Nixon’s assessment of the localities in which slow violence is 
played out: the use of socially or colonially peripheral land or labour in order 
to outsource, and therefore distance, toxicity and risk. In order to describe 
one such context of outsourced risk (the nuclear complex in and around the 
deserts of Nevada and its mapping over First Nations territories and reserves), 
Ward Churchill and Winona LaDuke introduce the notion of ‘radioactive 
colonialism’.444 Coalescing with the practice of internal colonialism, another 
practice based on the need to distance and ‘minimise’ risk, the authors used 
radioactive colonialism to describe the discourses and practices through which 
nuclear testing, storage and mining sites in Nevada (and, by extension, globally) 
were selected and came into existence. This radioactive or nuclear colonialism 
 443 Jussi Parikka, A Slow, Contemporary Violence: Damaged Environments of 
Technological Culture (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2016), 15–16.
 444 Ward Churchill and Winona LaDuke, ‘Native North America: The Political 
Economy of Radioactive Colonialism,’ in The State of Native America: Geno-
cide, Colonization, and Resistance, ed. M. Annette Jaimes (Boston: South 
End Press, 1992), 241–66.
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can be described as the system of imperial, governmental or corporate power 
that actively and disproportionately claims the lands and labour of subjugated 
groups of people in the name of nuclear development and production, subse-
quently concentrating radioactive toxicity in these regions and populations.445 
Summarised in connection with the idea of violence, Valerie Kuletz writes that: 
nuclear colonialism in the United States constitutes a peculiar sort of 
environmental violence deriving from its manifestation in vast desert 
areas, its association with the military, its execution in areas primar-
ily occupied and used by indigenous groups and some marginalised 
non-indigenes, and its deployment of transuranic materials, which have 
complex and unique characteristics.446
Clearly, as Danielle Endres argues, nuclear colonialism is an instance of envi-
ronmental injustice, the understanding ‘that toxic waste and pollution are dis-
proportionately linked to marginalised communities—people of colour and 
the poor’.447 Slow violence is similarly tied to environmental injustice and the 
observation that waste sites and other toxic industry are often concentrated in 
economically, racially or politically subjugated communities and landscapes.448 
 445 Churchill and LaDuke, ‘Native North’, 241–66; Valerie L Kuletz, The Tainted 
Desert: Environmental Ruin in the American West (New York: Routledge, 
1998), 3–18; Danielle Endres, ‘The Rhetoric of Nuclear Colonialism: Rhe-
torical Exclusion of American Indian Arguments in the Yucca Mountain 
Nuclear Waste Siting Decision’, Communication and Critical/Cultural Stud-
ies 6, no. 1 (2009): 39–60; Elizabeth DeLoughrey, ‘Radiation Ecologies and 
the Wars of Light’, MFS Modern Fiction Studies 55, no. 3 (2009): 468–95; 
Robert Jacobs, ‘Nuclear Conquistadors: Military Colonialism in Nuclear 
Test Site Selection During the Cold War’, Asian Journal of Peacebuilding 1, 
no. 2 (2013): 157–77.
 446 Valerie Kuletz, ‘Invisible Spaces, Violent Places: Cold War Nuclear and Mil-
itarized Landscapes’, in Violent Environments, eds. Nancy Lee Peluso and 
Michael Watts (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 243.
 447 Endres, ‘The Rhetoric’, 54; see also Robert D Bullard and Benjamin 
Chavis, Jr., eds., Confronting Environmental Racism: Voices from the Grass-
roots (Boston: South End Press, 1993); Richard Hofrichter, ed., Toxic 
Struggles: The Theory and Practice of Environmental Justice (Salt Lake City: 
University of Utah Press, 2002).
 448 The context of downwind Mormon communities in Utah should be 
acknowledged also, since the American government justified testing near 
these communities based on their pro-government and patriotic attitudes. 
This is a case where vehemently supportive, rather than subjugated com-
munities, were exposed to risk because of a strong trust in the government. 
Since being affected by cancers and stillbirths however, this situation has 
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What Churchill and LaDuke point out, is that the Cold War nuclear arms race 
was a mid-twentieth century extension of old (or saw the creation of new) colo-
nial projects. These were colonial projects of environmental injustice supported 
in turn by certain discourses and ontologies, certain imaginations of land and 
people, which allowed for the quick and careless production of the ‘long dying’ 
danger of radioactive contamination.449
In analysing the impacts of nuclear modernity in the United States upon 
First Nations, Kuletz has formatively linked nuclear colonialism with the 
West’s ‘wasteland discourse’ of the desert.450 For Kuletz, radioactive colonial-
ism is supported by this lingering Anglo-European imagination of the desert 
as a barren wasteland—a convenient rhetoric for those seeking to distance risk 
and for those seeking to use and extract land that is already inhabited by oth-
ers, who are rhetorically and literally made to disappear. The danger (known 
and  potential) of atomic testing and radioactive materials required distant, 
‘empty’ spaces outside and away from the dominant publics’ view and imagina-
tion, spaces often found in desert landscapes.451 Academic Robert Jacobs has 
argued that the inhabitants of these landscapes form a ‘virtual nation’ of victims 
rendered invisible by nuclear colonialism: ‘their value to their colonial occupi-
ers or national governments is that they could be dismissed as though their 
lives and health did not matter, without political consequence’.452 Furthering 
an understanding of this dismissal of indigenous groups, Anderson, in link-
ing colonialism and cold genocide, writes that ‘colonialism seeks to exert total 
power over the environment of which indigenous peoples are [seen to be] a 
been reversed. For an in-depth study of the Utah downwinders see Sarah 
Alisabeth Fox, Downwind: A People’s History of the Nuclear West (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2014).
 449 Nixon, Slow Violence, 232.
 450 Kuletz, ‘Invisible Spaces,’ 13.
 451 A list of global test sites may be illuminating: the Los Alamos National Lab-
oratory (LANL) and Jornada del Muerto desert site on Pueblo First Nations 
land in New Mexico; the Nevada Proving Grounds (or Nevada National 
Security Site) in the Shoshone First Nations deserts of Nevada; the Semi-
palatinsk nuclear testing site in the steppes of what is now Kazakhstan, Rus-
sia’s former colony; the numerous Pacific Islands, used by the United States, 
France and Britain, in the blue desert of the Pacific Ocean; the Reggane 
region of the French colonised Algerian Sahara Desert; the corporately col-
onised uranium mines throughout sub-Saharan Africa; the Pokhran site in 
the Thar Desert of ‘provincial’ western India; the dried salt lake plain of Lop 
Nur in the north western deserts of China; the Montebello Islands off the 
arid coast of northern Western Australia; and the sites of Emu Field and 
Maralinga on Aṉangu land in the lower reaches of the Western desert of 
South Australia.
 452 Jacobs, ‘Nuclear Conquistadors’, 174.
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part. … Total possession is only possible if the indigenous inhabitants are a 
non-entity, either destroyed or invisible’.453
Within the wasteland discourse of nuclear colonialism, the desert is not only 
a physical site, but an uninhabited void empty of the possibility of life, let alone 
of anything actually living. In 1962, Ivan Southall captured such an imagination 
while musing on the landscape of the Woomera Long-Range Missile Base to 
which Maralinga was attached: 
It was the country in which they gave a man nine hours to live if he ran 
out of water and couldn’t find shade. … It was the country in which the 
sky was immense and glaring. … It was silent country, and vast, and 
apparently empty, country in which only the gods could live in com-
fort. … To the eyes of the stranger it was a cruel country, and worthless, 
baking in a blistering shimmer, with heat so intense that a man could 
scarcely breathe. … It was dead country, or so it seemed. Its spirit had 
expired. Man had arrived too late. … [It was] sterile land. … It was a 
weird land, arid, alarming, blistered.454
Empty, cruel, worthless, dead, sterile, weird, masculine: Southall here 
 emphatically combines the ‘wasteland discourse’ with what Roslynn D Haynes 
calls ‘the wilderness image’, an imagery that ‘presents the desert as harsh, infer-
tile and punitive’.455 In Wasteland: A History, Vittoria di Palma contends that 
wasteland is a concept defined by absence and lack (of food, water and life) and 
writes that ‘although wasteland may be many things, what it does is provide a 
space that figures as the antithesis, the absolute Other, of civilisation’.456 Michael 
Marder, like di Palma, points out that in these dominant imaginings ‘desert’ 
is a doing word, it is ‘an invention, a creation of emptiness in the plenitude of 
existence, an introduction of barrenness into the fecundity of being’.457 In other 
words, the cultural imagination that arid landscapes are wild wastelands drives 
the active creation of actually uninhabitable spaces in this very image: mines, 
dumps, nuclear testing facilities, oil fields, toxic ecologies. ‘Here it was’, Southall 
writes again, indicatively of the instrumentalising logic of nuclear colonialism, 
‘one of the greatest stretches of uninhabited wasteland on earth, created by God 
 453 Anderson, ‘Colonialism and Cold’, 13.
 454 Ivan Southall, Woomera (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1962), 1–2.
 455 Kuletz, ‘Invisible Spaces’, 13; Roslynn D Haynes, Seeking the Centre: The 
Australian Desert in Literature, Art and Film (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1998), 26.
 456 Vittoria di Palma, Wasteland: A History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2014), 3–4.
 457 Michael Marder, ‘The Desert Is a State of Mind Cast over the Earth’, Cabinet: 
A Quarterly of Art and Culture 63 (2017): 51. Emphasis added.
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 specifically for rockets, a magnitude of emptiness’.458 The introduction of slowly 
blossoming dangers and toxicities into these Othered, disposable landscapes 
demonstrates the performative nature of the wasteland discourse and the 
nuclear colonial ontology. It constitutes an example of ‘perpetrator self-justi-
fication’ wherein ‘groups holding such ideological constructions may inculcate 
a self-fulfilling prophecy’.459 As Brown’s Maralinga evidences, the concept of 
wasteland was a discursive mirage, an ontological concession that allowed the 
British and Australian testing authorities to plunge the landscape of Maralinga 
into the multi-millennial rhythms of slow violence while maintaining claims 
of safety.
Against the mirage of the desert as wasteland
Maralinga by Stolen Generations artist Jonathan Kumintjara Brown is just 
under two metres tall and over a metre wide, and was the first sand-covered 
work in what became the ‘Maralinga Nullius’ series (1992–97). In this work the 
majority of a dot-style painting is covered over by a light caramel body of sand 
adhered to the surface, and in the near centre of the work is affixed the skeleton 
of a lizard.460 Forcibly removed from his birth parents while only weeks old, 
Brown returned in 1984 to the diasporic mission of Yalata where he was born, a 
mission 200 km south of Maralinga that began as a refugee camp in 1952 after 
the Ooldea Mission 40 km away from the future test site was closed.461 Hav-
ing been introduced into the community over a number of months and years, 
Brown was taken out to visit his ancestral land, his grandfather’s  Country: the 
region that the British had named Maralinga. For the sand covering in Maral-
inga, Brown used the potentially contaminated and ancestrally charged sand 
of this land as a material for the first time, bringing the material reality of 
 458 Southall, Woomera, 3.
 459 Anderson, ‘Colonialism and Cold’, 11; Ibid., 18.
 460 This gesture of obscuring the dotted painting is unlike the formal innova-
tion in some Aboriginal communities of painting over sacred designs, a 
solution devised for the problem of putting down and communicating, but 
also protecting, secret knowledge. As such, it is a unique visual technique 
within the idiom of Western Desert painting.
 461 Helen Chryssides, ‘Earthly Treasures: Paintings Has Brought Jonathan 
Kumintjara Brown Back to His People, His Culture and His Ancestral Land’, 
Bulletin, May 7, 1996, 74–75; Maggie Brady and Kingsley Palmer, ‘Depen-
dency and Assertiveness: Three Waves of Christianity Among Pitjantjatjara 
People at Ooldea and Yalata’, in Aboriginal Australians and Christian Mis-
sions: Ethnographic and Historical Studies, eds. Tony Swain and Deborah 
Bird Rose (Bedford Park: Australian Association for the Study of Religions, 
1988), 236–49.
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the ecological and spiritual ‘poison’ of slowly decaying radionuclides into his 
paintings. The skeleton of the lizard attached to the painting’s surface was also 
possibly collected on Aṉangu (Pitjantjatjara) Country and perhaps even from 
around Maralinga itself.462 
The coarsely textured surface of the painting conceals the majority of a dot-
ted landscape that depicts culturally and spiritually significant sites of water, 
food and paths of ancestral beings on Brown’s Country. The exposed concentric 
roundels that represent these sites and map the ‘geospiritual’ cartography of the 
region sit in a sea of sand in the middle of each perimeter, and in the corners 
and centre of the painting.463 The partial and implied presence of lines that con-
nect each of these roundels, as well as concentric patterns inside this grid, is 
suggested by an additional area of uncovered painting in the top right. Brown 
shows just enough of this painting beneath the sand to suggest that a vast 
majority of it has been obscured: to render visible the fact that something has 
been made invisible. By effacing the dotted painting as such, Brown produces 
a vision of environmental and cultural damage. He figures the abstract and 
non-spectacular violence of a radioactively contaminated space: something 
that is hard to experience even if standing at ground zero. The slow violence of 
radioactive contamination, it may be argued, is also presented in Maralinga in 
such a way that mirrors Brown’s personal distancing from this land and culture 
by the assimilationist policy of forcible child removal. What Brown’s covering 
technique achieves is the figuring of the shared experience of nuclear colonial-
ism’s diasporic virtual nation: the contamination of land, its inaccessibility, the 
invisibility of inhabitant populations, the increase in strange and unsure medi-
cal diagnoses and cultural denial (both the denial of culture and a bureaucratic 
culture of denial).
To reinforce the experience of a geospiritual catastrophe in the painting, 
Brown has attached the skeleton of a lizard to the lower right of the central 
roundel. The fragile skeleton, like the sand, operates as a material metaphor for 
the ecological violence of radioactive contamination, standing in for all animal 
life in this desert ecology that has been killed, maimed or genetically impacted. 
Lizards are a common sight in the region and in addition to providing a food 
source, the diversity of lizard species—from thorny devils and bicycle lizards to 
goannas and blue tongues—also feature as ancestral figures in major  tjukurpa 
 462 Possible lizards common to the area that fit this skeletal model are mem-
bers of the Ctenophorus genus, specifically the Bicycle Lizard (Ctenophorus 
Cristatus); however, the remains are inconclusive and appear closer to the 
Draco genus of flying lizards (hence the very long rib bones) endemic to 
South East Asia. Brown may have come across this skeleton while working 
in Melbourne.
 463 The term geospiritual wonderfully captures the way in which ecology, 
geology, culture and spirituality intertwine in indigenous cosmologies. See 
Masco, The Nuclear, 108.
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(stories, lore) for the south-eastern Pitjantjatjara. Examples include Miniri, 
the thorny devil (that Brown painted regularly as it relates to his grandfather’s 
Country and to male initiation), and Nintaka and Ninjuri, a perentie lizard and 
black goanna respectively, whom are central to a major tjukurpa significant to 
the majority of Western desert groups, not only southern Aṉangu.464 Maral-
inga’s skeleton, in chorus with the sand, renders the biological, ecological and 
cultural violence of nuclear contamination palpable, providing a haptic sense 
of the physical reality of the tests’ impacts on this region that overcomes the 
challenges of visibility facing this context of colonial violence. A reading of 
slow violence enters here since, on the one hand, the object-painting figures 
the physical contamination and danger of the area’s radioactive legacy and, on 
the other hand, Maralinga also figures the cultural poisoning of this land. In 
other words, this is violence wrought on both material and spiritual ecologies 
where the slow death of animal food sources hinders physical inhabitation of 
these spaces, and where these deaths likewise disturb the land’s cultural and 
spiritual health, aligning with the push of missionaries at Ooldea and then Yal-
ata to nix the ‘‘‘satanic” influences of Aboriginal religion’.465
If the lizard bones reference the region’s reptiles in general, then they may 
be understood as pointing to the important role the animals play in the diet 
of those humans and predatory animals living in such an ecology. The figured 
death of the lizard in Maralinga therefore underscores the slow violence of an 
interruption to food sources vital for Aboriginal people and other larger preda-
tors in the ecology, such as birds of prey or game marsupials. Thinking through 
this ecological violence also prompts a consideration of the multi- generational 
mutations and genetic damage that the reptiles and other animals of the con-
taminated landscape face. Most animals have faster generations than humans, 
speeding up the appearance of the mutagenic effects of radioactive exposure. 
Brown’s lizard skeleton is therefore not just death now or in the past, but signals 
a slower, mutagenic violence that plays out on the scales of the cell and the 
gene. It suggests the denial of a food source at the time of the tests, at the time 
of Brown’s painting and also into the future.
Spiritually as well as physically, Maralinga suggests that this land was also 
poisoned. As Maralinga tour guide Robin Matthews, the husband of an Aṉangu 
traditional owner, recounted to our tour group, Aṉangu avoid the site. Today’s 
Aṉangu know that the spirits of missing people, having not been laid to rest 
in the correct manner, wander the former Prohibited Area, a sighting of one 
of these spectres bringing terrible misfortune. Materially and spiritually haunted, 
this land has also been poisoned by decades of forced ritual neglect. In other 
words, having been relocated 200 kilometres south and being barred access to 
their land and important sites, Aṉangu were largely blocked from carrying out 
 464 Charles P Mountford, Nomads of the Australian Desert (Adelaide: Rigby 
Limited, 1976), 484–506, 269–309.
 465 Brady and Palmer, ‘Dependency and Assertiveness’, 238.
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maintenance or performing site-specific rituals.466 In this way, the disconnection 
of the roundels (sites) in Maralinga, as well as the obscuring of the tapestry of 
their networked inter-relation, communicates the poisoning and interruption 
of this geospiritual ecology. Like assimilationist policies, the poisoning of cer-
tain areas and the denial of access worked to slowly obscure some  connections 
to land. The presence of the roundels does, however, imply that regeneration 
and reconnection are possible (perhaps always-already  happening). Yet the 
focus of Maralinga is to highlight these forms of violence and make the impacts 
of nuclear colonialism both palpable and visible. In addition, Brown also brings 
to the surface the underlying ontology of nuclear colonialism that mirrors the 
doctrine of terra nullius used by the British to claim Australia: that deserts are 
wastelands and, as such, are barren, empty and useless.
Maralinga nullius
Brown’s Maralinga operates against the wasteland discourse that informs the 
Anglo-European ontology of desert landscapes. As philosopher Elizabeth A. 
Povinelli argues, ‘the Desert’, ontologically, ‘is the space where life was, is not 
now, but could be if knowledges, techniques, and resources were properly 
managed’.467 But rather than try to make the barren landscape productive, it was 
instrumentalised precisely for its ontological emptiness of life and being. Maral-
inga counters the discursive and figural trope of the ‘dead’ heart of  Australia—
fuelled by the imagination of deserts as lifeless, uninhabited and useless—while 
interrogating the implications that such discourse has for understandings 
of the people who do inhabit them. Brown’s compositional gestures insist that 
the desert was in fact alive and that it was spiritually and ecologically abun-
dant. What Brown’s effacing gesture performs then is the colonial opening of 
a void in ‘the fecundity of being’, made possible by the wasteland discourse 
and its ontological blindness to desert life.468 Emphatically underscoring how 
entrenched this logic was at the time is the fact that only one person, a native 
 466 Brady and Palmer, however, have respectively demonstrated that ritual and 
ceremony did not cease completely and that work-arounds for the spatial 
restraints were devised. These new practices were not developed for all cer-
emonies and rituals, some being site-specific. See Palmer, ‘Dealing with’, 
197–207; Maggie Brady, ‘The Politics of Space and Mobility: Controlling 
the Ooldea/Yalata Aborigines, 1952–1982’, Aboriginal History 23 (1999): 
1–14; Maggie Brady, ‘Leaving the Spinifex: The Impact of Rations, Missions, 
and the Atomic Tests on the Southern Pitjantjatjara’, Records of the South 
 Australian Museum 20 (1987): 35–45.
 467 Elizabeth A. Povinelli, Geontologies: A Requiem to Late Liberalism (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2016), 16.
 468 Marder, ‘The Desert’, 51.
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patrol officer named Walter MacDougall, was employed to patrol the hundreds 
of thousands of square kilometres around the base to locate, notify and deter 
(or relocate) Aboriginal groups.469 The task was impossible and the position a 
token one, illustrating an assumption that hardly any resources needed to be 
dedicated to it because the desert was empty (Figure 5). 
When MacDougall reported to testing authorities about the dangers to Abo-
riginal people in the area and the impossibility of his task, he was reprimanded 
for ‘apparently placing the affairs of a handful of natives above those of the Brit-
ish Commonwealth of Nations’.470 As oral histories (most recently captured by 
Lynette Wallworth and Nyarri Nyarri Morgan’s Collisions (2016)) and evidence 
given to the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in Australia (1984–
85) demonstrate, ‘throughout the time Maralinga was operational,  Aboriginal 
 469 For many other examples that confirm this same point, see Frank Walker, 
Maralinga: The Chilling Exposé of Our Secret Nuclear Shame and Betrayal of 
Our Troops and Country (Sydney: Hachette, 2014), 148–63.
 470 William Alan Stewart Butement quoted in JR McClelland, Jill Fitch, and 
William Jonas, The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests 
in Australia (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1985), 
1: 308–309, section 8.4.38.
Figure 5: Griffith Taylor’s 1946 depiction of ‘Empty Australia’. Drawn from 
Lesley Head, ‘Zones and Strata, or How Aborigines Became Living Fossils’, 
in Second Nature: The History and Implications of Australia as Aboriginal 
Landscape (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 47.
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 people still traversed the lands’.471 Brown’s Maralinga brings attention to the 
invisibility that Aboriginal people and their forms of life faced under this 
nuclear colonialism. The gesture of covering and the lizard skeleton highlights 
that the wasteland discourse operated to justify and secure the desert black hole 
within which nuclear experiments could be conducted with no consequence 
and, as Prime Minister Robert Menzies assured the public at the time, with ‘no 
conceivable injury to life, limb or property’.472
In Maralinga the slow ecological and cultural violence of nuclear colonialism 
at Maralinga is rendered through a process of obscuring, a material and pro-
cessual allegory of the invisibility of radioactive contamination and Aboriginal 
life within the desert site. The painting attests to the enduring presence of life 
at and around the nuclear outpost since even though the majority of the canvas 
is covered, not all is lost. Ecological, cultural and human life, the painting sug-
gests, continues to persevere, although in a damaged, injured form. Rather than 
Mad Max-esque post-apocalyptic representations of his damaged desert Coun-
try, Brown figures the material (and spiritual) reality of a landscape upon and 
within which the signs of slow violence have begun and will continue to appear.
From ground zero to downwind
In Yhonnie Scarce’s Thunder Raining Poison (2015) the slow and uncanny vio-
lence of radiation is explored through Maralinga’s legacy of loosely mitigated 
and largely unmonitored fallout. The large-scale installation is a five metre tall 
‘cloud’ composed of 2000 hand-blown glass bush yams that are suspended from 
the ceiling. It points to the scale and impacts of the fallout from the tests in 
South Australia (nine in total, including two at Emu Field in 1953), and explores 
the uncanny reality of living downwind, in the path of this fallout. I argue that 
Scarce employs ‘fallout’ as a vector of nuclear colonialism and the disregard 
testing authorities had for the safety of downwind, predominantly Aboriginal 
communities. The two thousand vitreous yams that make up Thunder Raining 
Poison are modelled off the long yam found in Scarce’s Kokatha Country, land 
only a few hundred kilometres downwind of Maralinga that was exposed to 
fallout on numerous occasions. The glass yams, and the overall installation they 
shape, have been used by Scarce to surmount the representational hurdles that 
the slow and uncanny violence of radioactive colonialism presents.
Lit from above, Thunder Raining Poison glistens and shines radiantly, the con-
tours and shapes of the glass tubers catching the light and throwing dramatic 
 471 Tynan, ‘Thunder on’, 27.
 472 Robert Menzies in Question Time, Hansard, House of Representatives, 
October 21, 1953.
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shadows on surrounding surfaces.473 In producing the multitude glass forms for 
the installation, Scarce worked with glass-blowing assistants from Adelaide’s 
Jam Factory. Each one of the 2,000 hand-blown glass yams is therefore unique, 
but all share a roughly conical shape based on the top-heavy organic forms 
that the root vegetable takes as it burrows through sandy and rocky soil. In 
the work, the thicker end of each yam faces the ceiling that it is suspended 
from by nylon thread, while the thinner, pointed tip faces the ground, giving 
the overall installation a sense of both rising and falling movement. Does it 
resemble an atomic dust cloud rising up and expanding into the atmosphere 
above? Or, as the downward facing tips of the yams sculpturally suggest, is it 
the start of a contaminated rain falling to the ground below? The work allows, 
if not welcomes, both readings, since the rising and falling of radioactive debris 
(ash, dust, rain, bomb fragments and particulate matter) into and out of the 
atmosphere as clouds and rain, were both atmospheric realities through which 
radioactive particles spread across Australia, ‘infecting’ yam systems, land and 
water downwind.
The overall form of Thunder Raining Poison, despite being five metres tall 
and comprising 2,000 suspended objects (and 2,000 lengths of unconcealed 
supportive nylon), is nonetheless punctuated by gaps and space that contribute 
to a sense of expansive volume. The atmospheric quality created by the illusive 
emptiness of the work is supported by the many clear glass yams throughout its 
height that allow sight to pass through to the other side. While there are some 
dense clusters of yams, suggestive of cancer clusters that appeared in downwind 
communities in the months and years following the nuclear testing, Thunder 
Raining Poison is nonetheless almost transparent and is deceptively wisp like. 
The illusion of empty expanse created by the installation serves to highlight 
both the massive extent of fallout from the South Australian tests (Emu Field 
and Maralinga both being in the path of a prevailing westerly that carried fall-
out thousands of kilometres away), and the simultaneous everywhere-nowhere, 
that is, the ‘nonlocalisable’ and ‘invisible’ reality of radiation.474 It too is unseen 
and expansive.
Thunder Raining Poison’s title came to Scarce while standing at ground zero 
of an explosion whose fallout was particularly widespread, the same ground 
zero described at the beginning of this essay. Breakaway was the fourth round 
of Operation Buffalo, a series of tests that alternately violated safe firing condi-
tions or exceeded radiation levels deemed to be safe even at the time, when safe 
levels were far higher than what they are today. The test (like the first round, 
One Tree) was a tower blast and was therefore ‘expected to have a higher level 
 473 The work was produced for the inaugural ‘Tarnanthi’ exhibition at the Art 
Gallery of South Australia in 2015, and has since appeared in ‘Defying 
Empire: 3rd National Indigenous Art Triennial’ at the National Gallery of 
Victoria in 2017.
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of fallout’ than the other two tests in the series.475 This prediction was indeed 
the case as the dispersed cloud eventually stretched all the way from Darwin, 
in the country’s north, to Newcastle, on the south-east coast, with radioac-
tive rain being recorded at Oodnadatta (Kokatha Country), and Brisbane, in 
Queensland, days after the detonation.476 The cloud’s path also overlapped with 
those of previous tests, contravening a ‘no overlap condition for firing’ aimed at 
limiting the region’s radioactive exposure.477 The thunderous nuclear tests were 
raining poison, literally, across Australia (Figure 6). 
Writing on how the British and Australian testing authorities approached 
fallout, Heather Goodall (who also played a role in the 1985 Royal Commis-
sion into British Nuclear Tests in Australia) has concluded that ‘the early tests 
[Montebello Islands and Emu Field] were marked by a refusal to investigate, 
survey and monitor, whether in relation to human health or the spread of toxic 
fallout and residues, and later [at Maralinga] monitoring was more for publicity 
purposes than for any real safety effect’.478 Goodall’s (and the Royal Commis-
sion’s) conclusion of negligence was not, however, the first time serious doubts 
about the safety of the test were raised. At the time of the tests an independent 
fallout monitoring programme conducted by The Commonwealth Scientific 
and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) scientist Hedley Marston, who 
collected sheep thyroids from farmers all over Australia to test for  radioactive 
isotopes of Iodine, and also collected air samples from Adelaide, reached 
 similar conclusions. Both of Marston’s studies produced results that dramati-
cally undermined the information the testing authorities were sharing with the 
Australian government, let alone providing to the media.479
In repeating the yam form to build the nuclear weather of Thunder Raining 
Poison, Scarce maps the uncertain and winding passage of radioactive toxic-
ity from ground zero (the yam), into the atmosphere (the cloud), back to the 
ground (through rain), into plants (the yam again), animals and water and, 
finally—we might deduce—into human bodies, blood streams and genetic 
code through ingestion. The multiple and ambiguous forms employed in Thun-
der Raining Poison (cloud, rain, yam) contribute to a gallery experience of the 
flow of irradiating materials between the fission weapons, the contaminated 
landscape, fallout atmospheres and the human body. In mapping these  material 
 475 McClelland, Fitch, and Jonas, The Report, 1: 294, section 8.3.21.
 476 Ibid., 1: 297, section 8.3.26, section 8.3.27.
 477 Ibid., 1: 297, section 8.3.25.
 478 Heather Goodall, ‘Colonialism and Catastrophe: Contested Memories 
of Nuclear Testing and Measles Epidemics at Ernabella’, in Memory and 
 History in Twentieth-Century Australia, eds. Kate Darian-Smith and Paula 
Hamilton (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1994), 59.
 479 For a full account of the Hedley Marston saga and his reports, see Roger 
Cross, Fallout: Hedley Marston and the British Bomb Tests in Australia (Kent 
Town: Wakefield Press, 2001).
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Figure 6: Direction of Fallout reproduced from Frank Walker, Maralinga: The 
Chilling Exposé of Our Secret Nuclear Shame and Betrayal of Our Troops and 
Country (Sydney, NSW: Hachette, 2014). © Frank Walker and Hachette.
flows, the suspended installation brings attention to the violent realities pro-
duced by the testing authorities’ lack of any sense of consequence, highlight-
ing the extent to which this colonised wasteland was exploited and remade as 
such. In doing so, it also charts the nuclear uncanny, since it renders tactile and 
visible the fact that ‘radiation traverses space in ways that can make the air, 
earth, and water seem suspect, even dangerous, though no sensory evidence is 
at hand’.480 This lack of sensory evidence recalls the challenges of visibility fac-
ing instances of slow violence: how can we know that eating a yam, for example, 
is dangerous or not if there is no sensory evidence, where instead, evidence may 
be cancer, still births, mutations or other non-instantaneous manifestations. 
The installation as a whole, and Scarce’s yams in particular, are representations 
of these slippery dangers and as such become forms of material evidence that 
experientially mark the impacts and danger of the violent nuclear weather 
from Maralinga on the land and people of South Australia, and Australia more 
broadly. Like Brown’s sand and lizard skeleton, the yam, the cloud and the rain 
are non-human witnesses of the slow and ambiguous spread of contaminating, 
mutating and potentially deadly radiation. By activating these forms and figur-
ing fallout as a harbinger of colonial, even genocidal, violence, the installation 
 480 Masco, The Nuclear, 32.
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succeeds in representing radioactive contamination and making the nuclear 
colonisation of South Australia palpable and apprehensible. Scarce, further, 
achieves this powerful figuring in another way.
The bush yam
In Thunder Raining Poison (as in Scarce’s practice more broadly), bush foods are 
used as vessels of meaning, referring to her Country and cultural heritage (the 
custodial knowledge of the bush yam belonging to her maternal grandfather) 
and at other times, standing in for Aboriginal bodies. They are important in a 
work such as Thunder Raining Poison because as a culturally significant plant 
and food source the yams not only suggest the slow and silent irradiation of the 
ecosystem and of human bodies that interacted with it, but also signal the colo-
nial violence towards Aboriginal practices and forms of life. Each of the few 
thousand yams is unique, individualised, and as such generates a soft anthro-
pomorphism wherein the yams became stand ins for individuals affected by 
the cell-altering dangers of radiation. Perhaps to the reading of the installation’s 
form as a cloud or rain could be added the argument that these are the rising 
ghosts of the deceased victims (Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal) of Maralin-
ga’s radiotoxicity. As Marston’s independent fallout data indicated, the nuclear 
tests were resulting in the large-scale introduction of irradiated debris into 
the atmosphere and environment (including crop growing and farming land). 
Especially on Kokatha Country, this unknown and uncertain irradiation of the 
ground would have compromised exposed food sources such as the yam and 
other bush foods like the bush banana or quandong. The vitreous surrogates of 
these quietly toxic yams in Thunder Raining Poison therefore serve as material 
and forensic evidence against the official mandates of the nuclear programme 
and its stubborn insistence that the tests were being conducted safely and with 
no prospect of harm. The slow, multigenerational and cumulative violence that 
produces nuclear harm is notoriously difficult to prove (as those ex-servicemen 
and downwinders who have attempted to gain compensation have discovered), 
so Scarce’s cultural-ecological narrative, told through glass yams and the wisp-
like mass they produce, serves as evidence against the culture of denial of ‘any 
harm whatsoever’ that still persists today. The installation of a cloud of these 
yams becomes an affective negation of the Safety Committee’s self-defined task 
‘to ensure that the activity which does reach the ground outside the specified 
danger areas shall be at a level so low that it will not harm people exposed to it, 
or have any economic effect on plant and animal life’.481 
Deepening our understanding of the use of the yam form in Thunder Raining 
Poison is an examination of the rhetoric and parameters of safety at the time of 
 481 McClelland, Fitch, and Jonas, The Report, 1: 281, section 8.3.3.
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the tests. One of the many criticisms levelled against the Atomic Weapons Tests 
Safety Committee (AWTSC), which was ‘responsible for monitoring the British 
testing programme to ensure that the safety of the Australian environment and 
population were not jeopardised’, was that they did not take into considera-
tion exposure to internal radiation and simply focussed on external radiation, 
which is orders of magnitudes less dangerous, as a measure of fallout.482 In their 
definitional blindness to Aboriginal agricultural practices the Safety Com-
mittee conveniently ignored the dangers of ‘living close to the earth, hunting 
local animals, eating plants growing wild and walking barefoot’.483 As Marston 
reported at the time: 
The grave danger of intensive internal irradiation resulting from the 
accumulation of long-lived isotope within certain tissues of the bodies 
of individuals subsisting on foodstuffs produced on the contaminated 
area cannot be dispelled. … The situation is not one that may be pushed 
aside by denials of ‘any danger whatsoever’.484 
The continuing on in the face of this knowledge constituted an act of deliber-
ately negligent and slow violence that would play out over decades and centu-
ries to come, not only for those ‘individuals subsisting on foodstuffs produced 
on the contaminated area’ such as Aboriginal communities, but the broader 
population of Australia as well.
To visually emphasise the dangers that fallout posed to downwind commu-
nities, a portion of Thunder Raining Poison’s glass yams have been coloured 
in combinations of a sickly green and an opaque black that in more diluted 
areas appears purple. Metaphorically, each colour activates associations of sick-
ness, contamination, burns, bruising and death. Materially, the colours refer-
ence Trinitite, the green (Maralinga) and black (Emu Field) atomic glass that 
is usually created at sandy nuclear test sites, as well as referencing the ‘black 
mist’, a fallout event that coated the small, predominantly Aboriginal commu-
nity of Wallatina with a black, metallic smelling and oily mixture of radioac-
tive debris.485 In their colouration, the yams of Thunder Raining Poison become 
silent records of nuclear damage wrought by fallout events. Their shapes still 
resemble unaffected tubers, however the differing inflections of green, black 
 482 PN Grabosky, Wayward Governance: Illegality and Its Control in the Public 
Sector (Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 1989), 242.
 483 Tynan, ‘Thunder on’, 24.
 484 Hedley Marston cited in Roger Cross, Fallout: Hedley Marston and the 
 British Bomb Tests in Australia (Kent Town: Wakefield Press, 2001), 103.
 485 The colour of Trinitite is determined by the mineral composition of the 
earth and sand at a given test site. Trinitite produced by the weapons at Emu 
Field is black because of a high iron content. It is, however, predominantly 
green.
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and occasionally purple tones communicate that downwind yams bear the 
mark of irradiation. While being shaped and blown, the almost-molten glass is 
dipped and rolled in glass pigments, which melt into the form. Their colouring 
in this way creates a non-uniform finish, often appearing as if the sickly tones 
are flowing inside or as if they are in the process of swallowing the glass yam. 
With this method the glass yams visually capture the slow process of radiotoxic 
becoming. Nuclear contamination, mutation and danger are figured as pro-
cesses of time and remain in process, happening now (still) at the genetic level 
of the colonially contaminated ecology.
‘The colonisation of the future’
In their formal and metaphorical activation of this narrative of contamina-
tion, Scarce’s glass yams visualise what Joseph Masco has called a ‘mutant 
ecology’.486 Mutation, as Masco defines it, describes changes, ‘whether through 
 improvement, injury or genetic noise’ at ‘biosocial, political, and ethno-
graphic’  levels.487 The biosocial, political and ethnographic mutations brought 
about by the nuclear colonisation of Maralinga (and, in fact, any site involved 
in the nuclear process), saw ‘the production of nuclear natures’.488 Masco argues 
that nuclear natures and mutant ecologies are not only environmental, but 
since ‘nuclear science has transformed human culture at the cellular level … 
 producing new kinds of ecologies, bodies, and social orders’, then they rep-
resent a locality, body or society that has, is, will or may undergo social, eco-
logical and physical mutation because of the presence of nuclear material.489 
Atomic diaspora, mysterious unseasonal clouds, the cancers and stillbirths that 
plagued Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal families alike, and the defamiliarisa-
tion of Country: these were the new uncanny facts of life in the mutant ecology 
borne out of atomic testing in South Australia. What Scarce’s yams tune into is 
the uncanny reality of South Australia’s nuclear nature, a colonised landscape 
wherein the ‘dangerous vulnerability of the human sensorium to an uncertain 
and uncertainly haunted universe’ is revealed.490 Scarce’s vitreous bush food 
forms demonstrate a subtle and serious notion of nuclear violence and dan-
ger. Simply collecting foodstuffs, a once normal part of life in these arid ecolo-
gies, becomes a potentially dangerous and risky practice haunted by the invis-
ible force of radiation. Scarce’s contaminated yams capture the subtlety of 
experiences of radioactively contaminated spaces as food and water sources 
silently and without warning became irradiated, with daily practice going on, 
 486 Masco, The Nuclear, 298.
 487 Ibid., 301, 326.
 488 Ibid., 293.
 489 Ibid., 301, 306.
 490 Ibid., 29.
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 unknowingly, as usual. The violence signalled by the yams of Thunder Rain-
ing Poison is slow, subtle and everyday. While the installation’s ambiguous 
cloud form does partially vibrate on the register of the spectacular because of 
an association with the image of the mushroom cloud, other, far slower and 
more widespread considerations of violence are also (perhaps more strongly) 
signalled. 
In Masco’s unpacking of the concept of mutation, he describes its temporal 
dimension: it ‘implies … a complex coding of time (both past and future); it 
assumes change, but it does not from the outset judge either the temporal scale 
or the type of change that will take place. It also marks a transformation that 
is reproduced generationally, making mutation a specific kind of break with 
the past that reinvents the future’.491 In Thunder Raining Poison, Scarce plots 
the coordinates of the new nuclear nature imposed upon those living within 
contaminated and slowly violent landscapes. The nuclear colonisation of 
Maralinga is therefore not simply an historical event, but an unfolding moment 
whose temporal scales reach into the billions of years. Masco has gracefully 
described this situation as a ‘multimillenial colonisation of the future’, the bio-
logical,  cultural and ecological ramifications of which are still playing out and will 
continue to do so.492 Radioactively contaminated ecologies, Masco urges, there-
fore require ‘a different temporal analytic’, and as I have made clear through the 
work of Brown and Scarce, these ecologies also prompt one to consider dif-
ferent registers of violence and to reconsider the manifestation of  colonialism 
and genocide in Australia.493 The nuclear colonisation of Maralinga and the 
subsequent contamination of land and people must therefore be recognised—
as this essay has done—through the ‘different temporal analytics’ of slow vio-
lence and cold genocide. Until these other, decelerated impacts of colonisation 
in Australia are more widely recognised and acknowledged, the violence will 
 continue, slowly and silently. 
Conclusion
Jonathan Kumintjara Brown’s Maralinga and Yhonnie Scarce’s Thunder Raining 
Poison both explore and make visible the slow and subtle violence of a colo-
nially delivered radioactive contamination, whether at ground zero or down-
wind. Both works emphasise ecological, cultural and biological damage, and in 
doing so invite further reflection on the spatiotemporal scales of nuclear vio-
lence in the arid lands of South Australia. They particularly figure the impacts 
that nuclear contamination and the irradiation of land have had on  Aboriginal 
 491 Masco, The Nuclear, 301.
 492 Ibid.
 493 Ibid.
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 people and their connection to these now toxic ecologies. Brown’s sand, as a 
material, brings the ancestrally and radioactively charged reality of the land-
scape into the gallery, with the effacing gesture supporting a vision of a poi-
soned geospiritual region. The skeleton was likewise examined as expanding 
our consideration to the broader cultural-ecological impacts of the tests. In 
harmony, the vitreous yam objects of Thunder Raining Poison were thoroughly 
argued to present material evidence against claims of safety and ‘no harm what-
soever’ arising from the tests. Both works of art demonstrate conceptual and 
formal innovations that ‘expand our affective and narrative capacities’ for appre-
hending and representing the ‘invisible’ and slow traumas that nuclear testing 
 delivers into bodies and landscapes.494 The racist blindness towards Aboriginal 
people in this ontologically uninhabited region were also explored, demon-
strating that in the mid-twentieth century Australia’s ‘empty’ arid areas were 
colonised anew under the guise of nuclear weapons development. The land and 
lives of Aboriginal people and the lives of servicemen and contracted civilians 
who worked at Maralinga, as well Australians more broadly, were  sacrificed 
to the slow rhythms of nuclear matter.495 The slow violence of  radioactive 
 contamination presents, in Masco’s words, a colonisation of the future, a 
colonisation whose genocidal violence Brown and Scarce have rendered visible 
through their work.
 494 Parikka, A Slow, 16.
 495 It must be noted that the Australian servicemen (no women were allowed at 
the site) who served at Maralinga have not had their time there recognised 
as military service by the Australian Government or Military. Many of these 
nuclear veterans died from unexplained cancers in their 20s, 30s and 40s 
as a result of the work they were ordered to do by controlling British regi-
ments. For more on Australian nuclear servicemen and their treatment at 
Maralinga see Frank Walker, Maralinga: The Chilling Exposé of Our Secret 
Nuclear Shame and Betrayal of Our Troops and Country (Sydney: Hachette, 
2014), 106–29; and Paul Brown, ‘Maralinga: Theatre from a Place of War’, 
in Unstable Ground: Performance and the Politics of Place, ed. Gay McAuley 
(Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2006), 205–26.

CHAPTER 8
The 2017 Myall Creek Massacre 
Commemoration Speech
Mark Tedeschi AM QC
The Myall Creek massacre on 10 June 1838, that resulted in the horrific 
murder of 28 men, women and children of the Weraerai tribe of the Kami-
laroi nation, has come to represent the multitude of massacres of Indigenous 
people that occurred all over Australia during a period of more than 120 years. 
This is because we know more today about the murders at Myall Creek than 
any of the hundreds of other massacres. We know so much today about this one 
largely because of the investigation and two trials of the perpetrators conducted 
in 1838.
The man who successfully prosecuted the two trials of those responsible for 
the massacre was the then Attorney-General of New South Wales, John Hubert 
Plunkett. It was, in my view, the greatest challenge of his long career and one 
of his greatest achievements. Unusually for the times, two trials arose from the 
massacre, and both provoked enormous controversy and hostility throughout 
the colony towards the prosecutor. The powerful forces of the landowning set-
tlers were pitted against Plunkett and caused him endless difficulties. Plunkett’s 
approach to these prosecutions was innovative and bold in equal measure. He 
faced massive difficulties in overcoming bigotry and vested interests. Despite 
the fact that there had been an eyewitness to the massacre—the Indigenous 
stationhand Yintayintin (known as Davy)—the law at that time prevented 
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any Aboriginal person from giving evidence in court. Plunkett spent the next 
20 years trying to remedy this deficiency—without success. New South Wales 
was, in fact, one of the last jurisdictions in Australia to allow Aboriginal people 
to give evidence in court.
It is instructive to look closely at the long-term effects of the 1838 Myall Creek 
murder trials. They marked one of the few times in the history of Aboriginal 
displacement that Europeans were punished for the murder of Aboriginal Aus-
tralians. Those trials stand as an early statement of principle that Australian 
courts had at least the capacity to operate without fear or favour and to treat all 
people, including those on the margins of white society, equally. That is not to 
say that the law always operated in this way, or even that it frequently did dur-
ing the colonial period; but on the occasion of the Myall Creek murder trials 
it certainly did. Plunkett’s advocacy and tactics at the second trial succeeded 
in persuading a jury of 12 white, free men to convict seven white defendants 
for the brutal slaying of an Aboriginal child, who represented the 28 members 
of that infant’s kinship group that had been murdered. That Plunkett was able to 
do this in the face of almost universal hostility to the prosecution was nothing 
short of miraculous. It would never happen again during the colonial period, 
or even after the federation of the Australian States in 1901.
Tribute should also be paid to others who did the right thing in 1838: George 
Anderson, the convict hut keeper on Myall Creek Station, who attempted to 
convince the perpetrators not to commit the atrocity, and who later bravely 
gave evidence against them. Yintayintin (Davy) was the Aboriginal station 
worker on Myall Creek Station who at great risk to himself followed the per-
petrators at a distance while hidden in the bush and personally witnessed the 
murders, so that he could report back to George Anderson. William Hobbs was 
the station manager on Myall Creek Station who was so repulsed by what had 
happened in his absence that he reported the atrocity in writing to the Gov-
ernor, and in retaliation was then sacked by his employer, landowner Henry 
Dangar. Police Magistrate Captain Edward Denny Day conducted an exem-
plary investigation of the incident and managed to arrest and charge 11 of the 
12 perpetrators, and then to bring them to Sydney for trial. The trial judge at 
the second trial, Justice William Westbrooke Burton, reinforced to the jury the 
sanctity of all life and set the tone for a fair hearing. And the 12 white jurors 
in the second trial who were brave enough to convict the seven defendants in 
the face of extreme public hostility; and especially juror William Knight, who 
spoke up to correct the initial, incorrect verdict of acquittal, so that convictions 
were eventually recorded.
There is no doubt that the trials failed to stop the attempts to annihilate 
Aboriginal people. The hanging of seven of the Myall Creek murderers merely 
served to drive future perpetrators underground, so that more surreptitious 
means, such as poisonings, were used instead of brutal, bloody slayings by 
sword or bullet, or herding over cliffs or into swamps. However, one cannot 
assess the significance of the Myall Creek murder trials merely by that measure, 
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just as one cannot assess the success of the Nuremberg trials in Europe after the 
Second World War by the number of genocides that have since taken place in 
various parts of the world.
In my view, the two trials in 1838 were more akin to modern-day war 
crimes trials than to domestic murder trials, even though the concept of 
war crimes lay more than 100 years in the future. There was undoubtedly an 
ongoing,  internal, frontier war at the time, albeit quite one sided, between the 
white settlers and the Indigenous inhabitants, whom the former were attempting 
to displace and disperse. The war against the Indigenous population involved 
a systemic policy, often approved or acquiesced in by the white authorities, of 
unlawfully exterminating those Aboriginal people who stood in the way of the 
expansion of English settlement, or who posed a threat to the white pastoralists 
and their farming activities. In my view, the perpetrators of the mass murders 
at Myall Creek Station on 10 June 1838 were motivated by genocidal intentions 
and their actions were an example of what today we call ‘ethnic cleansing’. The 
fact that almost the whole tribe was decimated—including old men, women 
and children—demonstrated clearly the genocidal intent of the perpetrators. 
The subsequent sexual abuse of one female Indigenous victim, who was spared 
her life on the day of the massacre, but only for what must have been a few 
excruciating days, illustrated the objectification of the victims. Recent history 
has shown that sexual violence often goes hand-in-hand with genocide, and 
that is why systemic sexual offences against enemy populations in war zones are 
now categorised as war crimes.
In addition, the actions of the perpetrators can be viewed as an example 
of what has become known as ‘collective punishment’—a form of retaliation 
whereby a suspected offender’s family, friends, acquaintances, neighbours or an 
entire ethnic group is targeted for punishment, and where the punished group 
may have no direct association with the act that is being punished. The vic-
tims in this case had been living peacefully on Myall Creek Station for several 
months and had done nothing to justify their victimisation. Collective pun-
ishment has been categorised as a war crime since the 1949 Fourth Geneva 
Convention and genocide has been categorised as an international crime by the 
Genocide Convention as adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 
1948, which came into force in 1951. 
By modern-day standards, the actions of the Myall Creek murderers were 
war crimes and part of a deliberate, state-sanctioned genocide of the Aboriginal 
people that today would be punishable by the rules of international criminal 
law. The fact that vast numbers of genocidal murders in colonial Australia 
went unpunished would today provide evidence of state sanction, justifying 
international intervention in the prosecution of the perpetrators and their 
national leaders. While such laws did not exist in 1838, the approach taken 
by John Hubert Plunkett towards the case was consistent with these legali-
ties, and demonstrated an enlightened and visionary attitude that was unpar-
alleled in his time, or for more than 100 years afterwards. John Plunkett did 
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not just  prosecute 11 men for murder. He prosecuted his entire society for its 
 connivance in the attempted annihilation of the Aboriginal people and their 
culture, and that is why it aroused such prevalent hostility. His contemporar-
ies vehemently resented him during the trial and for years afterwards. It was 
a testament to his perseverance and tactical skills that he convinced 12 jurors 
to convict seven of the perpetrators, because they were not only condemning 
those men to their deaths, but also stingingly rebuking their own society. So, 
while the 1838 trials and convictions did not prevent future massacres, they 
stand as a beacon of humanity and interracial justice that illuminated the way 
for Australia to develop as a civilised nation.
Australian schools, both primary and secondary, have always devoted much 
time to teaching students about the great, white explorers—people like John 
Oxley, Charles Sturt and Major Thomas Mitchell. Very few schools, however, 
teach what almost invariably happened within a few years of these explorers’ 
discoveries: the expansion of white pastoralists into areas that had for  millennia 
been occupied by Indigenous clans. What followed was the expropriation of 
their land, the destruction of their culture and society, and the massacres of tens 
of thousands of Indigenous peoples in hundreds of locations all over Australia.
In my opinion, the story of what happened to the Aboriginal inhabitants in 
colonial times should be taught in our schools as readily as we teach the exploits 
of the great, white explorers. The two accounts are inextricably intertwined. 
One almost inevitably followed the other. A real acceptance by mainstream 
Australia of the horrors perpetrated against our Indigenous communities in 
the colonial period will bring with it an understanding of the long-term trauma 
transferred through the generations. We readily recognise that the trauma of 
other genocides and crimes against humanity—such as those during the Nazi 
period in Europe, in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s, and in countries 
like Rwanda and Cambodia—can be deeply felt for many generations after the 
killings have ended. If we acknowledge that Aboriginal communities were sub-
jected to massacres in a multitude of locations all over Australia for more than 
a century, there may be more sympathy for the current generations striving for 
equanimity, understanding and acceptance.
Until we recognise that what occurred was a war of extirpation or  annihilation, 
until we acknowledge that what was perpetrated amounted to genocide and 
that today it would be categorised as a war crime, and until we teach this to all 
children throughout Australia, we will not reach our full maturity as a nation.
CHAPTER 9
Long Shadows—The Great War, Australia 
and the Middle East
From the Armenian to the Yazidi Genocide
Caroline Schneider and Hans-Lukas Kieser
This essay is based on the exhibition ‘Long Shadows—The Great War,  Australia 
and the Middle East’, displayed at the University Gallery of the University of 
Newcastle (Australia) from 5 September to 11 November 2018.496 The essay 
synthesises the exhibition’s main content and focus, and adds reflection. 
‘Long Shadows’ made a connection between Australia’s military operation on 
the  Gallipoli peninsula and what would come to be known as the  Armenian 
 Genocide, and presented detailed information on the persecution of the 
 496 A website has been established to make the exhibition online accessible. See 
‘Long Shadows –The Great War, Australia and the Middle East’, The Univer-
sity of Newcastle Art and Museum Collection, accessed February 7, 2019, 
https://gallery.newcastle.edu.au/pages/longshadows. We acknowledge the 
work of our colleagues Dr Kate Ariotti, Gillean Shaw and the whole team 
of the University Gallery. In the following, content will be drawn from the 
physical exhibition as well as its online attribution. For an exhibition review 
see Burcu Cevik-Compiegne, ‘Long Shadows: The Great War, Australia and 
the Middle East’, History Australia 16, no. 1 (2019): 210–11.
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 Armenian population. ‘Long Shadows’ implicitly suggested that a fair public 
memory of the night of 24 to 25 April 1915, must address both the Australians’ 
(Anzac) and the Armenians’ (Armenian Genocide) trauma. France—whose 
soldiers fought alongside Britain and Australia in 1915—has recently decided 
to do so: it named 24 April a national day of genocide commemoration.497 
The exhibition in Newcastle drew long historical lines from the 1910s to the 
2010s and provided an unusually broad context to the Armenian Genocide. 
It highlighted a genocide that targeted Armenians primarily, but also other 
Ottoman Christians and minorities, and the impact on all for generations to 
come. Also, it shed light on lesser-known traumatic experiences of Anzac sol-
diers at Gallipoli or during captivity. Furthermore, ‘Long Shadows’ joined dots 
not only between Gallipoli and genocide in Ottoman Turkey in 1915, but also 
between this genocide during the Great War and the recent genocide of Yazidis, 
and between patterns of violence in the Middle East then and now. Finally, it 
 connected stories of persecuted people and the efforts of Australian humani-
tarian organisations then and now. Although not all problems in today’s post- 
Ottoman region can be directly traced back to the decade of 1911–22, many 
major issues have important historical connections there, such as radical Islam-
ism, the Kurdish question and several instances of mass violence that have 
remained unrecognised. Ethno-religious stigmatisation, extreme violence and 
human trafficking were common during the decade of the Ottoman war; many 
of its patterns have since re-emerged in recent years in Syria and Northern Iraq 
(although the number of civilian victims was much higher a century ago). In 
short, the Great War casts long shadows of violence, trauma and unresolved 
conflicts over current times.
While the Great War was physically undertaken in one geographic region, 
its consequences and memory have affected and still affect international diplo-
macy and countless individuals belonging to migrant communities all over 
the world. In this essay, the focus will be on the shared war experience of two 
regions: Australia and the Middle East. As in the exhibition, the essay will 
weave from Australia to Gallipoli, to Asia Minor, Syria and Northern Iraq, from 
1915 through to 2018.
I
Every year on 25 April (since 1916), Australians and New Zealanders come 
together to commemorate their servicemen and women. While this day offers 
 497 ‘Macron fait du 24 avril la journée nationale de commémoration du géno-
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honour and respect to Australians and New Zealanders who served their coun-
try in any conflict or peacekeeping mission, it has its origins in the Gallipoli 
campaign of 1915. At the time, World War One was already underway, but 
somewhat in a deadlock. To contain the Central Powers (Germany and its main 
allies Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire), to lessen the pressure on 
certain fronts (for example, the Caucasus), and foremost to connect with Rus-
sia through the Bosphore, British strategists decided on a new front against 
the Ottoman capital. The Gallipoli peninsula seemed to be the ideal location. 
A successful attack would eventually ease the way for Allied forces to cap-
ture Ottoman’s capital Constantinople (today’s Istanbul), which would knock 
the Ottomans out of the war and allow for Allied control of the Dardanelles, 
a waterway linking the Black and Mediterranean seas. After a British/French 
naval attack failed on 18 March 1915, a joint offensive of British, French and 
Anzac soldiers launched a few weeks later. This campaign would come to play a 
fundamental role in Australia’s national memory and identity.
In the early morning hours of 25 April 1915, the first Anzac troops landed 
on the Gallipoli peninsula. From the very beginning, the troops faced enor-
mous challenges. The terrain, with its steep cliffs, deep gullies and thick scrub, 
proved difficult to conquer and the Ottomans were determined in their resist-
ance. Less than a month after the landing on the peninsula, and following a 
strong  counter-offensive by the Ottomans, the fighting stalled. The Australians 
and New Zealanders managed to occupy a little ground around the beach and 
on the ridges above, but life on the peninsula was hard. In extreme heat, the 
soldiers had to carry their own supplies from the beach to higher ground, 
the trenches were overcrowded, sanitation was limited, lice and fly plagues were 
present and sniping and bombing were incessant. The Anzac soldiers became 
more and more exhausted. In fact, more men suffered from sickness than 
were wounded. Anzac soldiers had to be evacuated en masse for medical rea-
sons. To counteract this harsh reality, in early August 1915 an ‘all or nothing’ 
offensive was launched. This led to high losses and only little ground gained. 
With no real prospect for improvement and the need for more troops in 
Europe, the decision was made to withdraw the Anzac soldiers from the Gal-
lipoli peninsula. Without a single casualty, all Anzacs were safely evacuated 
by 20 December 1915. Ironically, the safe removal of the troops was the most 
successful aspect of the campaign. All forces involved—Allies and Ottomans—
endured great losses. Australia suffered 26,000 casualties, including over 8,700 
dead. Furthermore, 67 Australians were taken prisoners of war by the Otto-
mans.498 Joined by light horsemen and members of the Australian Flying Corps 
captured in  Mesopotamia, the Sinai Desert and Palestine, these POWs were 
used for forced labour and many died in captivity. However, some also became 
 498 For further information on Australian Prisoners of First World War see 
Kate Ariotti, Captive Anzacs. Australian POW’s of the Ottomans during the 
First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
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witness to atrocities committed by the Ottomans against the Armenians and 
other ethnic minorities (Christian  Assyrians and Pontus Greeks) in the Empire. 
Writing about the Armenian Genocide while in captivity was risky, but there 
are several eyewitness accounts from captive Anzacs. John Wheat, a captured 
member of the Australian submarine AE2, would write the following in his 
diary: ‘At Afyonkarahissar … officers had houses to live in. The owner of these 
houses had been taken away “somewhere” … driven into the desert, and were 
numbered among the victims of the Armenian atrocities’.499 What John Wheat 
refers to as ‘the Armenian atrocities’ is today known as the Armenian Geno-
cide. The genocide started in the evening of 24 April 1915, in Constantinople, 
just a few hours before the Anzac landing on Gallipoli and in close proximity to 
the peninsula. Signs of an extermination policy could be observed earlier, but 
on that evening approximately 300 Armenian intellectuals, clergy and commu-
nity leaders were taken into custody. The systematically implemented genocide 
started by first depriving the Ottoman Armenian community of its leaders. 
II
The Ottoman Armenian population had achieved advanced self-organisa-
tion, welfare and educational institutions by the late nineteenth century, and 
was increasingly vocal in its claims for equality. The Armenian community was 
under the rule of Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876–1909) when it became the tar-
get of social envy and violence, including large-scale massacres carried out in 
1894–96. At the time, the Ottoman Empire faced domestic crises and began to 
crumble. Dissatisfaction with the ruling sultan led to the rise of a broad under-
ground opposition movement of the so-called Young Turks. The group’s strong-
est organisation was the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), which was 
formed by young army officers and comprised students and state functionaries. 
In the hope for a better, more democratic future, the main Armenian party, the 
Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), entered into an alliance with CUP 
in 1907. In July 1908, supported by ARF, the Young Turks initiated a constitu-
tional revolution to overthrow the despotic regime of Sultan Abdülhamid II. 
Constitutional rule was restored, the Ottoman parliament reopened and elec-
tions took place in the same year. The revolution ultimately led to an ‘Ottoman 
Spring’, a short phase in which a more democratic collective Ottoman identity 
was emphasised. This period, however, did not last long, and Armenian hopes 
for equal rights and the end of violence against minorities in the Empire were 
soon destroyed. The aims of the ARF and the CUP diverged with the Young 
Turks’ desire to restore imperial power and create a homogeneous Turkish 
 499 John Wheat, Diary, August 18, 1915, 3DRL/2965, AWM, in Vicken 
 Babkenian and Peter Stanley, Armenia, Australia and The Great War 
 (Sydney: NewSouth Publishing, 2016).
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identity. In 1909, the Armenians once again became victims of massacre, this 
time in Adana.
Adding fuel to anti-Christian sentiments and a warmongering attitude within 
the CUP were the Balkan Wars (1912–13). With the rise of ethnic national-
ism and the simultaneous increase in dissatisfaction among diverse population 
groups, non-Muslim as well as Muslim, the situation within the Empire became 
increasingly tense. The Balkan Wars emerged both from unresolved problems 
in Ottoman Macedonia and the irredentism of young post-Ottoman Balkan 
states. The Ottomans were defeated and lost almost all their territory west of 
Istanbul. The Balkan Wars resulted in several peace treaties, mainly the Treaty 
of Constantinople in September 1913. This was the first treaty in a long series of 
similar agreements in the twentieth century that foresaw population exchanges 
with the aim of an ‘ethno-religious un-mixing’ (in contrast with future treaties, 
however, this one was not compulsory).
The two Balkan Wars had severe consequences: approximately 500,000 sol-
diers plus an unknown number of civilians lost their lives, the Ottomans lost 
massive amounts of territory, and about 300,000 Muslims became refugees. 
During the turmoil of the First Balkan War, the CUP—which had temporarily 
lost power in July 1912—launched a successful coup d’état on 23 January 1913. 
It then established a dictatorial single party regime in the Ottoman Empire. 
Interior Minister Mehmed Talaat Bey, later the mastermind of the Armenian 
Genocide, evolved to become the strongest, most influential figure in the 
Empire.500 His aim was not only to restore by means of coercion and violence 
the sovereignty and territory of the Ottoman Empire, but also to build a cen-
tralised Turkish-Muslim state based in Asia Minor. The Balkan Wars were a 
catalyst for this policy, and thus for World War One in the Middle East and for 
the Armenian Genocide.
III
The main events of the Armenian Genocide lasted from April 1915 to Septem-
ber 1916 and killed more than a million Ottoman Christians. When Mehmed 
Talaat gave the order to arrest hundreds of members of the Armenian elite on 
that night of April 24 1915, and to question, torture and eventually murder 
most of them as well as those arrested in provincial towns, the first phase of 
the Armenian Genocide began. Provincial and military authorities, as well as 
party commissaries were sent to the provinces to spread propaganda about 
supposedly treacherous Armenian neighbours, accusing them of stabbing 
the Empire in the back by changing sides and helping the enemy. Some 
 500 For further information on Talaat Pasha, his rise to power and his role in the 
Armenian Genocide see Hans-Lukas Kieser, Talaat Pasha. Father of Modern 
Turkey, Architect of Genocide (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018).
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 Armenians had indeed turned to the Russians, yet the Armenian community in 
general had been one of the most loyal to the constitutional state. Nevertheless, 
the Armenians became a useful scapegoat for CUP’s broader problems. Attacks 
on Armenians and other Christians and minorities involved massacres, 
 deportations, death marches and concentration camps. The genocide was car-
ried out in gender-specific ways: men were often killed on the spot, while many 
women and children were abducted and enslaved, either trafficked or forcibly 
married and converted. Thousands were forced to march through the desert 
to squalid concentration camps in Northern Syria. They were either trans-
ported in railway cattle wagons or on foot. Many were massacred in their home 
 provinces or died en route to the camps. The ones who were able to escape fled 
to the Caucasus, Northern Iran, the Sinjar mountains of the Yazidis in North-
ern Iraq and into the Alevi-Kurdish province of Dersim in Eastern Anatolia. 
Based on CUP policies and correspondence, including a letter sent in May 
1915 from Mehmed Talaat to another CUP member, Grand Vizier Said Halim, 
it is clear that Talaat’s ultimate goal was the almost total elimination of the 
Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire. He argued that the Armenian 
‘trouble occupies an important place among the vital problems of the Sublime 
[Ottoman] state’ and that now ‘means were prepared and considered to remove 
this trouble in a radical, fundamental and comprehensive way’.501 Furthermore, 
Cavid Bey (Talaat’s party friend and unofficial finance minister) wrote in his 
diary in September 1915: ‘Ottoman history has never known before such mon-
strous murder and enormous brutality. … I am of the opinion that Talaat was 
involved in this [extermination] with full conviction’.502 Talaat ordered the relo-
cation of more than a million Armenians, of whom more than half a million 
arrived in Syria. Here, the survivors of the deportation faced the next phase 
of the genocide. The conditions in the camps led to hundreds of thousands of 
deaths from starvation, disease and exposure. In a final massacre between 
August and September 1916, tens of thousands were killed.503 On the intitiative 
of Syria governor Cemal Pasha, many more Armenians were forcibly converted 
to Islam and resettled further in the South, including in Palestine. Although 
 501 Talaat, from the interior Ministry’s Directorate for Resettlement of Tribes 
and Migrants, to the grand vizier, Ottoman State Archives: BOA BEO, 
4357-326758.
 502 Mehmed Cavid Bey, Meşrutiyet Rûznamesi (Ankara: TTK, 2015), 3:136–37.
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ton: Princeton University Press, 2012); Taner Akçam, Killing Orders: 
Talat Pasha’s Telegrams and the Armenian Genocide (Cham [Switzerland]: 
 Palgrave Macmillan, 2018); Kieser, Talaat Pasha; Khatchig Mouradian, 
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their individual lives were saved, the policy of forced assimilation effectively 
contributed to the destruction of the Ottoman Armenian Christian community. 
The plight of the Armenians was well known in wartime Australia. In addition 
to the POWs who witnessed atrocities against the Armenians, wounded and 
sick Australian servicemen, who were sent to Egypt for treatment and recov-
ery, also became aware of the Armenians’ desperate situation.504 In September 
1915 a large refugee camp was established in Port Said in Egypt. Around 4,000 
Armenians found refuge there, employed by the Allies to make, for example, 
army shirts and fishing nets. 
Humanitarian relief efforts were crucial for the survival of Armenian refugees. 
Underground networks, in which Western missionaries were also involved, had 
already helped rescue Armenians via Dersim in 1915. These and other net-
works were partly built on existing humanitarian groups that had been estab-
lished in Europe, the United States of America and Australia after the 1894–96 
massacres. Together with workers from neutral countries still resident in the 
Ottoman Empire, they formed the active nucleus of the Near East Relief that 
started in late 1915. Australia had its first fundraising campaign for the Arme-
nians in mid-late 1915. It was a success. Several organisations were involved in 
arranging collections, which grew over the years with heart-breaking reports 
from overseas. The fundraising efforts also helped to open an orphanage in 
Antelias in Lebanon, which took in about 1,700 genocide survivors. Australian 
aid to the Armenians lasted well into the 1940s, despite the official denial of 
the Armenian Genocide by the Turks and the push for healthy diplomatic rela-
tions with Turkey after the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. The aid provided to the 
Armenians is considered to be Australia’s first major international relief effort 
and set the path for Australia’s future worldwide humanitarian efforts. Despite 
this, the aid had limited impact on the overall suffering of the  Armenians. In 
hindsight, a successful Gallipoli campaign could have prevented or at least 
mitigated the Armenian Genocide.
The suffering of the Armenians did not end with the war; expropriation and 
cultural suppression continued. Many Armenians deal with transgenerational 
trauma even today. The first commemorations of the Armenian Genocide took 
place in the Ottoman capital on 24 April 1919, but ceased abruptly in 1923 
when the occupation of Istanbul by the Allies ended. It was not commemo-
rated again until 1965, its fiftieth anniversary, when protests in Yerevan and 
among the Armenian Diaspora revitalised this day of remembrance. Until 
1991 Armenians did not have a state of their own, which made it difficult to 
create a platform to advocate for justice.505 The struggle for recognition and 
 504 For further information on encounters between Australians and Armenians 
see: Babkenian and Stanley, Armenia, Australia.
 505 Harutyun Marutyan, ‘April 24: Formation, Development and Current State 
of the Armenian Genocide Victims Remembrance Day’, in: Remembering 
the Great War in the Middle East: From Turkey and Armenia to Australia 
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 commemoration of the Armenian Genocide continues to date in the face of 
Turkish Government denial. 
One critical aspect that created a long-lasting problematic political matrix 
was the Treaty of Lausanne. Initially, another peace treaty was concluded 
between the Allied forces and the Ottoman Empire, the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres. 
The Turkish nationalists (also named ‘Kemalists’ after their leader Mustafa 
Kemal, later Atatürk), who had founded a counter-government in Ankara, 
refused the stipulations in the treaty that foresaw the prosecution of war crimi-
nals and included financial and military restrictions. Also, the Sèvres Treaty 
planned to attribute parts of Asia Minor to Greeks, Armenians and Kurds. 
Ankara’s victory in the Greco-Turkish war led to the renegotiation of the treaty. 
The new Treaty of Lausanne—a compromise between the nationalist leaders in 
Ankara and imperialist Britain and France—came into force in 1923. 
From the very beginning, this treaty was highly criticised by international 
lawyers, scholars and humanitarians. It not only withdrew provisions for 
minorities, but also offered impunity for crimes against humanity—a term that 
was first used on 24 May 1915, in relation to the Ottoman authorities’ atrocities 
against the Armenians. Ultimately, this meant that members of the Ottoman 
Empire who were responsible and active actors in the genocide were not pros-
ecuted. Moreover, the treaty endorsed compulsory mass population exchanges. 
The treaty ended the conflict, but not without long-term consequences for 
 ethnic minorities living in the region, and for a political culture that allowed 
for impunity. Finally, the treaty defined the borders of Turkey and, as a result, in 
October 1923 the Republic of Turkey was internationally recognised. The Laus-
anne Treaty not only shaped the modern Middle East, but established a seminal 
international paradigm of conflict resolution that consisted in ‘un-mixing peo-
ples’ for the sake of unitary, authoritarian, ethnic nation states.506 
In the following years the Turkish government was confronted with Kurd-
ish insurrections. Initially the Kurdish had fought on the side of the Kemalists 
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during the wars for Asia Minor against non-Muslim competitors (1919–22), 
as they had alongside CUP in World War One. However, they soon realised that 
the Turkish government intended to implement a radical Turkish-nationalist 
agenda. There was no room for other languages or cultural autonomy, and all 
religious expression was subjected to strict state control. In the interwar period 
several rebellions took place, which led to massacres such as the one in Dersim 
in 1937–38. Overall, these resulted in the death and displacement of hundreds 
of thousands of Kurds. Since the mid-twentieth century, violence and conflict 
in the Middle East have led to much higher death tolls than in continental 
Europe. For several decades, the Israel-Palestine conflict has taken centre stage, 
while other domestic and interstate wars have occurred such as the Lebanese 
civil war, the Iran-Iraq war, the anti-Kurdish Anfal campaign, Kurdish guer-
rilla wars in Turkey, the Persian Gulf War, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the 
civil war in Syria and the war in Yemen. These conflicts claimed millions of 
lives and resulted in the displacement of many more people. New elements 
of warfare were combined with patterns of violence, genocide and human traf-
ficking present in World War One. Most recently, the shadows of the past have 
been cast over Syria and Northern Iraq by the so-called Islamic State (IS) and its 
treatment of minorities—Christians, Shi’a Muslims and especially the Yazidis.
IV
Almost 100 years after the Armenian Genocide began, the Yazidis were con-
fronted with genocide in their homeland around Mount Sinjar, where they had 
offered asylum to fleeing Armenians a century earlier. The Yazidis are an ethno-
religious minority with their own distinct religion. As heterodox non-Muslims, 
they have been regularly persecuted, and there are testimonies of Yazidi survi-
vors of attacks by Ottoman rulers during the Armenian Genocide. They were 
viewed by IS and other non-Yazidis as heathen infidels and, therefore, ‘fair prey 
for conquest’.507
The so-called Islamic State’s roots can be traced back to the US-led invasion 
of Iraq in 2003 and much earlier.508 After loosening its ties with the Islamist 
 507 IS produced several documents for propaganda purposes and for the dis-
tribution of instructions and guidelines for its supporters. For instance, 
it released an official propaganda magazine to promote the recruitment 
of new soldiers, its attempt to legitimate an IS Caliphate (‘Khilafah’), the 
 promotion of slavery and to encourage worldwide atrocities and individual 
terror attacks. 
 508 For further information on IS, its ideology and rise, see, for example 
Robert Manne, The Mind of the Islamic State (Carlton: Redback Quarterly, 
2016); Patrick Cockburn, The Rise of Islamic State. ISIS and the New Sunni 
 Revolution (London: Verso, 2015).
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terror organisation Al-Qaida, IS proclaimed itself a caliphate in June 2014 in 
Mosul and promised the worldwide establishment of an Islamic order. The 
implementation of the genocide launched in August 2014 against the Yazidis 
has many parallels with the Ottoman attacks against Armenians: displacement, 
dispossession and massacre, enslavement and sexual violence against women 
and girls, and the brainwashing of children. 
On 3 August 2014, IS launched its attack by invading the area from various 
locations: Mosul and Tal Afar in Iraq, and Al Shaddadi and Tel Hamis region 
in Syria. The Yazidis had little chance to escape. They were given no evacuation 
orders beforehand, nor could they display any significant resistance  themselves. 
Many Peshmerga soldiers, who were supposed to defend and protect the 
Yazidi population, reportedly left their posts when IS approached—without 
warning the Yazidis.509 Tens of thousands of Yazidis fled to Mount Sinjar Pla-
teau where they remained for several days surrounded by IS fighters, with no 
belongings, water, food or heat protection, and with no escape route. Within 
a matter of days after the initial IS attack, thousands of Yazidis were killed— 
murdered by IS fighters or perishing on their escape. Many more were taken 
captive by IS members and the whole community of the region was displaced. 
The atrocities committed by IS fighters against the Yazidis have been recognised 
as genocide by the United Nations and other authorities, including the Austral-
ian Parliament.510 It is a genocide that is still ongoing as the United Nations’ 
expert body in this matter argues: ‘Thousands of Yazidi men and boys remain 
missing and the terrorist group continues to subject some 3,000 women and 
girls in Syria to horrific violence including daily rapes and beatings’.511 
IS sought to destroy the Yazidis via multiple strategies. Their actions were 
planned, and the genocide systematically conducted by strict ‘rules’. The sys-
tematic nature can be seen in the categorisation of Yazidis into groups, which 
 509 ‘“They came to destroy”: ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis’, UN Independent 
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, June 
15, 2016, accessed March 20, 2019, 6–7, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents 
/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A_HRC_32_CRP.2_en.pdf.
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/debates/?id=2018-02-26.195; Susan Hutchinson, ‘The Pain of Hearing: 
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accessed March 20, 2019, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter 
/pain-hearing-australia-parliament-recognises-yazidi-genocide.
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tives is hard to establish as many might have been killed while in captivity 
by IS, allied airstrikes, etcetera.
Long Shadows—The Great War, Australia and the Middle East 169
occurred consistently across different locations, clearly indicating the planned 
nature of the attacks. These are the fates of the captives.512
Men and women were immediately separated. Men and boys who had 
reached puberty were often immediately massacred, shot into mass graves. 
Others were forced to convert to Islam and killed if they refused. In some 
cases, family members were forced to watch the executions or were taken later 
to see dead bodies lying on roadsides.513 The bodies of the Yazidi men and 
boys were often left in situ. Most killings were groups that consisted of two to 
20 captives, but there are several documented and yet to be documented sites 
of bigger mass killings. The Yazidi men and boys who converted to Islam were 
transferred to different sites in Syria and Northern Iraq, where they were put 
to forced labour such as construction projects, digging trenches, and cleaning 
streets. They were also forced to pray, to grow their beards and hair, and to fol-
low other religious ‘rules’. Attempted escape resulted in immediate execution. 
It has to be highlighted that even converted Yazidis were by no means equal to 
IS fighters, nor were they protected. Male Yazidis, even boys around the age of 
12, were often beaten and verbally abused, called ‘kuffar’ (infidel), and forced to 
commit heinous acts of violence against each other.
Yazidi women and girls aged nine and above suffered severe sexual abuse, 
frequent rape, enslavement, physical violence, human trafficking, starvation 
and verbal and mental abuse. Once separated from the men, the women and 
girls were themselves categorised into groups of married or unmarried, with 
children or without, with young, unmarried girls being the most ‘valuable’. 
After weeks or sometimes months of living in poor conditions, where basic 
human needs were barely met, the women and girls were sold, mainly to IS 
fighters. Some were sold in slave markets, which would later become acces-
sible online. Once sold, the fighter held the woman captive in his home, where 
she was raped, sometimes several times a day, and forced to do housework for 
the fighter’s family. Most of the Yazidi women and girls were sold and traf-
ficked several times. The younger children could stay with their mothers, and 
 512 For more detailed information on the treatment of the captive Yazidis 
and the Yazidi Genocide in general see inter alia: ‘“They came to destroy”: 
ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis’, UN Independent International Com-
mission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, June 15, 2016, accessed 
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were also treated poorly, including having to watch their mothers being raped. 
Any attempt to escape had severe consequences. The women and girls were the 
property of the buyer, which meant he could do to them whatever he wanted. 
Already pregnant women were sometimes subjected to forced abortion. Some 
Yazidis who were forcibly married to IS fighters were confronted with forced 
pregnancy, others with the use of forced contraception to facilitate ongoing 
trafficking. Some were gifted from one IS fighter to another. Ownership rights 
reflected in purchase contracts were yet another indication of the rigid system, 
hierarchy and official governance of the treatment of captive Yazidis. 
Furthermore, captive female Yazidis and children were not allowed to prac-
tise their own culture and religion. Boys under the age of puberty were con-
sidered to have a pliable identity, able to be converted to Islam and trained 
in IS ideology. Thousands of boys were brought into ‘schools’ and taught how 
to pray, fight and kill. The boys were registered, had to convert to Islam and 
were given Islamic names. From that moment on, the boys were treated as IS 
recruits. The boys had to attend daily indoctrination of IS ideology, Quran les-
sons and military training sessions. Furthermore, they were forced to watch 
propaganda videos of armed battles, beheadings and suicide missions. If the 
boys performed poorly in training sessions or could not remember Quranic 
verses, they were beaten. IS did everything to erase the boys’ past. Instead, a 
new identity was forcibly imposed on the boys, the identity of an IS fighter. 
They were taught to hate their own community. One boy said: ‘They told us 
we had to become good Muslims and fight for Islam. They showed us videos of 
beheadings, killing and battles. My instructor said “you have to kill kuffars even 
if they are your fathers and brothers”’.514 After weeks or months in the training 
camps, the boys were distributed according to IS’s needs: some became fighters 
on the battlefield; others had to perform duties including suicide attacks.
For the Yazidis who fled towards Mount Sinjar, limited international efforts 
were initially made, including humanitarian airdrops by the US government, 
which were announced by then President Obama while acknowledging the 
risk of an imminent genocide. Australia was one nation that launched an air-
drop with much needed supplies.515 For Australia, this was one of the most 
complex humanitarian operations in more than a decade. However, the overall 
 international intervention was extremely limited. Further action could have 
 514 ‘“They came to destroy”: ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis’, UN Independent 
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, June 
15, 2016, accessed February 7, 2019, 18, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents 
/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A_HRC_32_CRP.2_en.pdf.
 515 ‘Recent History of Air Force Humanitarian Assistance’, Royal Australian 
Air Force, accessed March 20, 2019, https://www.airforce.gov.au/operations 
/humanitarian-support/recent-history-air-force-humanitarian-assistance.
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prevented many more deaths and saved thousands of women and children 
from  abduction. Australia is continuing its assistance for the Yazidis to date.516
V
IS’s actions against the Yazidis, which include the crime of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and human rights abuses, have had dire short-
term as well as long-term consequences for the Yazidi community. Already 
faced with individual, collective and transgenerational trauma, the Yazidis have 
lost their homeland. There are approximately 350,000 Yazidis living in camps 
for internally displaced people in Northern Iraq. A small number of Yazidis 
have found refuge in Europe as well as in the United States of America, Canada 
and Australia, but several thousand are still missing or captive. So far it has 
almost been impossible for Yazidis to return to their homeland. Approximately 
80 to 85 per cent of cities in the region have been destroyed. IS has officially 
been defeated, but ongoing geopolitical conflict between the Kurdish and Iraqi 
authorities complicate any rebuilding of the area.517 Poor safety and infrastruc-
ture, including uncleared landmines, make resettling difficult. The lives of the 
Yazidis drastically changed on 3 August 2014 and they continue to suffer enor-
mous daily challenges.518
The suffering of the Armenian Genocide survivors did not end with the 
atrocities—some scholars even recognise the ongoing denial as the last stage 
of the genocide.519 The genocidal strategies of Ottoman forces such as mas-
sacres of local Armenian men, forcible transfer and brainwashing of children, 
enslavement, forced marriages and sexual violence against women and girls, 
trafficking, forced conversions and cultural, biological and social destruction, 
had severe long-term consequences for the Armenian community. The gen-
dered nature of the Armenian Genocide proved to be a central tactic of the 
 516 For example Nathan Morris, ‘Yazidi Refugees Fleeing Northern Iraq 
Arrive in Toowoomba to Write a New History in Australia’, ABC, accessed 
February 7, 2019, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-06-21/yazidis-write 
-a-new-history-in-toowomba/9889238.
 517 For further information on the on-going conflict between different groups 
in the region see ‘An Uncertain Future for Yazidis: A Report Marking Three 
Years of an Ongoing Genocide’, Yazda, accessed March 20, 2019, 32–42, 
https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/92f016_230c3d32aa44498db557326046ad
5ca7.pdf. 
 518 For more information on the Yazidis’ trauma, see for example several works 
from Jan Ilhan Kizilhan.
 519 For example Fatma Müge Göçek, Denial of Violence. Ottoman Past, Turkish 
Present, and Collective Violence against the Armenians, 1789–2009 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015), 11.
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genocide itself, and continued to have an impact in the aftermath.520 Rescued 
or escaped Armenian women and children who were sexually abused had to 
deal with long-lasting stigma; re-integration was often difficult. Turkification 
and Islamisation processes of orphaned children, and assimilation in general, 
could often not be reversed and had severe consequences for individuals and 
the whole community.521 The aim was not only to destroy the Armenian popu-
lation, but also its heritage: identity, history and culture. As a central policy, the 
Armenian Genocide displayed mainly a race-based social Darwinist character 
that is comparable to exterminatory patterns of the Holocaust. Yet, in many 
provinces, religion-based Islamist ideology prevailed.
Similar Islamist strategies are now being reinforced by IS in their treatment 
of the Yazidis. Knowing what the Armenians had to face after the genocide—
stigma, problems around re-integration, trauma and re-traumatisation, hidden 
or permanent loss of Armenian identity—reflects the situation of the Yazidis 
today. Many Yazidi boys who return from captivity have forgotten their iden-
tity and language, Kurmanji. They suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder. 
The women and girls have to live with the stigma from sexual violence, despite 
statements from Yazidi leadership that welcomed them back into community 
(although not their children born of rape). They are severely traumatised. Some 
male Yazidis have a hard time dealing with their perceived failure to protect 
women and children. Many Yazidis have lost their lives and the fate of many 
others remains unknown. Combined with all the existential challenges, this is 
an unbearable situation. All of this should awake the international community 
and call for more concrete action. 
However, despite everything known about the Yazidi Genocide, the first pros-
ecution of an IS member for crimes against Yazidis only began in April 2019, 
in Germany.522 The lack of accountability for perpetrators is seemingly repeat-
ing the history of the Armenian Genocide. This fact highlights the need for a 
joint international effort to bring IS fighters to justice. Future coexistence in the 
region is impossible without justice. The survivors of the Yazidi  Genocide bear 
 520 For detailed information on the gendered nature of the Armenian and 
Yazidi Genocide, especially on the enslavement of women and its long-
term consequences see Nikki Marczak, ‘A Century Apart: The Genocidal 
Enslavement of Armenian and Yazidi Women’, in A Gendered Lens for 
Genocide Prevention. Rethinking Political Violence, eds. M.M. Connellan 
and C. Fröhlich (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 133–62.
 521 For more information on the treatment of Armenian children in orphan-
ages see for example Selim Deringil, ‘“Your Religion is Worn and Outdated” 
Orphans, Orphanages and Halide Edib During the Armenian Genocide: 
The Case of Antoura’. Études arméniennes contemporaines 12 (2019): 
33–65.
 522 ‘German IS Member on Trial for War Crimes in Munich,’ Deutsche Welle, 
April 9, 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/german-is-member-on-trial-for-war 
-crimes-in-munich/a-48259664, accessed April 22, 2019.
Long Shadows—The Great War, Australia and the Middle East 173
witness to the atrocities of IS and are willing to fight for justice. Nadia Murad, 
Human Rights activist, United Nations Goodwill Ambassador and Nobel Peace 
Prize winner, stated: ‘It never gets easier to tell your story. Each time you speak 
it, you relive it … Still, I have become used to giving speeches, and large audi-
ences no longer intimidate me. My story, told honestly and matter-of-factly, 
is the best weapon I have against terrorism, and I plan on using it until those 
terrorists are put on trial’.523 Murad highlights the importance of  raising aware-
ness through the honest telling of peoples’ experiences, despite the challenges. 
Descendants of Armenian Genocide survivors still recount their stories today, 
and memoirs of descendants of Islamised Armenians are finally being pub-
lished.524 This aspect of the genocide—the secret Armenian grandmothers 
in Turkish or Kurdish families—was for generations a taboo topic in Turkey. 
 Turkey’s continued denial of the Armenian Genocide, and decades of passive or 
active support from Western partners for this position, are a major  stumbling 
block against any credible accountability for mass violence in the post- Ottoman 
Middle East. 
A principled international stand and, in the current case of the Yazidis, sig-
nificant action, would help in preventing repeated patterns of violence that 
burden the political cultures in the region. Sadly, patterns of demographic and 
economic engineering, enslavement and dispossession, common during the 
last Ottoman decade, have once again taken centre stage in the Middle East of 
the 2010s.
Conclusion
The Armenian Genocide casts to this day a particularly long and dark shadow, 
both in the region it occurred, and indeed globally. It is the unnamed black spot 
in the Lausanne Treaty and represents a continued, even reinforced  culture 
 523 Nadia Murad, The Last Girl. My Story of Captivity, and my Fight against 
the Islamic State (New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2017), 306; for fur-
ther accounts also see Farida Khalaf, The Girl Who Escaped ISIS. Farida’s 
Story (London: Vintage, 2016); Shirin with Alexandra Cavelius and Jan 
 Kizilhan, Ich bleibe eine Tochter des Lichts. Meine Flucht aus den Fängen der 
 IS- Terroristen (München: Knaur, 2017); Jinan mit Thierry Oberlé, Ich war 
Sklavin des IS. Wie ich von Dschihadisten entführt wurde und den Albtraum 
meiner Gefangenschaft überlebte (München: mvg Verlag, 2016).
 524 See for example Fethiye Çetin, My Grandmother: An Armenian-Turkish 
Memoir, trans. Maureen Freely (London: Verso Books, 2012); Ayşe Gül 
Altınay and Fethiye Çetin, The Grandchildren. The Hidden Legacy of ‘Lost’ 
Armenians and Turkey, trans. Maureen Freely (Somerset: Taylor and Francis, 
2014); Kemal Yalçın. Hayatta Kalanlar (Istanbul: Birzamanlar Yayıncılık, 
2006); İrfan Palalı, Tehcir Çocukları: Nenem Ermeniysmiş  (Istanbul: Su 
Yayınevi, 2005).
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of impunity for the most serious collective crimes of genocide during the 
twentieth century. As a consequence, the foundation for human rights in 
the juridical systems of the post-Ottoman states was weak from the start. The 
Lausanne Treaty had implicitly accepted the CUP’s demographic engineer-
ing, even completing it through the agreement on the so-called Greek-Turkish 
population exchange. Also, it endorsed the single-party rule of the Kemalists, 
the successors of the CUP single-party regime, and its unitary, ultra-nationalist 
rule over Asia Minor. 
The CUP’s legacy has marked Turkey and the Ba’ath regimes of Syria and Iraq. 
Most post-Ottoman countries followed, one way or another, in the footsteps 
of the warring Young Turk regime; its rule was a paradigm for post- Ottoman 
power struggles: for military coups; leader centrism; deep states (within states); 
partisanship instead of meritocracy; and use of religion and propaganda 
against scapegoats. All this was and is incompatible with constitutional rule 
and comprehensive social contracts. As a consequence, lasting social peace has 
remained elusive. 
Visitors to the Australian War Memorial who possess some knowledge of 
World War One in Ottoman Turkey, are struck by the omission from this 
large exhibition of the slightest allusion to the extermination of the Armeni-
ans, which constituted a major chapter of the Ottoman Great War and evolved 
simultaneously with the Anzac landing on Gallipoli. In fact, for the CUP rul-
ers, one was logically connected to the other in a total war that they directed 
against domestic groups declared enemies as well as official foreign enemies. 
Any comprehensive exhibition on World War Two without inclusion of the 
Holocaust would be seen as entirely unacceptable. After 1945, Europe could 
only be rebuilt based on the explicit rejection of the former criminality of the 
German single-party rulers and their allies in Europe. Analogous reasons are 
valid for World War One and the post-Ottoman world.
Both the Armenian Genocide and the Anzac experience had in common the 
deep trauma that they left among Armenians and Australians. In Australia, 
both traumas, however, are remembered entirely separately, although it was for 
different reasons that they were not addressed in Australian public history or 
collective memory for generations. On the one hand, the reason was diplomatic 
convenience and partly historical ignorance; on the other, it was based on the 
need for national heroism to make sense out of great loss. In Australia, the Gal-
lipoli campaign is held up as an event signalising the ‘birth’ of the nation and 
used by politicians to invoke a sense of patriotic pride and military virtue. But 
for many soldiers and their families it was, and remained, a profound trauma 
that they were largely left alone to deal with—as were Armenian survivors.
In contrast to this genre of memorial framing, the exhibition ‘Long Shadows’ 
exposes links between the Armenian Genocide and the Gallipoli campaign, 
as well as between past and current patterns in the Middle Eastern region— 
especially between the Armenian and Yazidi Genocides. With images, maps, texts, 
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artefacts and songs, the visitors of the exhibition are taken from 1915 Australia 
to Gallipoli, and with witness accounts of Anzac POWs they are introduced to 
the Armenian Genocide. After a section on the Armenian Genocide, ‘Long 
Shadows’ introduces the public to knowledge of Australian aid sent to Arme-
nians. Reflecting on the fatal consequences of the Lausanne Treaty and violent 
events in the Middle Eastern region since, it then leads visitors to the Yazidi 
Genocide, again highlighting Australian aid to the targeted group. The last wall 
of the exhibition shows a selective timeline on violent conflicts in the modern 
Middle East. Past events join contemporary events and have long-term con-
sequences for people around the globe. No longer looked at separately, they 
must be connected in authentic ways without national or diplomatic strings 
and constraints.
In 1985, an official memorial exchange between Turkey and Australia took 
place: the site of the Anzac landings was renamed ‘Anzac Cove’ by the Turks 
and a memorial to Atatürk was built close to the Australian War Memorial 
in Canberra. Furthermore, every year on Anzac Day thousands of Austral-
ians make a pilgrimage to Turkey to commemorate their ancestors.525 Turkey 
has threatened the cancellation of these events should Australia formally 
 recognise the Armenian Genocide. Understanding the linkages in this history, 
it becomes easier to explain the Australian humanitarian efforts on behalf of 
the Armenians and Australia’s simultaneous inability to face the reality of the 
Armenian Genocide. It touches on deep ambivalences and hypocrisies in poli-
tics and diplomacy. Because of Turkey’s political weight, several Western states 
still do not recognise the atrocities against the Armenians as genocide, prefer-
ring a diluted vocabulary like ‘tragedy’ or ‘catastrophe’. Australia is one of those 
states. It is certainly time to cast off the shadows. 
 525 See also Nikki Marczak, ‘Armenian Genocide Forgotten in ANZAC Com-






Genocide, Denial, Exile and Trauma 
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This essay explores the ways in which survivors of the Armenian Genocide 
and their descendants have responded to the ongoing trauma of the genocide 
in the last three decades. In 1986, Donald E Miller and Lorna Touryan Miller 
published a chapter identifying six responses to the genocide, drawing on their 
oral history work: repression, rationalisation, resignation, reconciliation, rage 
and revenge.526 In this essay I offer two extensions to this typology. First, I 
 suggest a seventh response that has emerged in recent years: engagement with 
the Turkish government, civil society and individuals. Second, building on the 
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findings of Miller and Miller527 and of Ani Kalayjian and Marian Weisberg,528 I 
explore how the continuing sense of exile, the unresolved trauma of the geno-
cide and denial by Turkish governments have fuelled the fear that the genocide 
‘is happening again’. This fear has shaped the response by Armenians to events 
in the last three decades: in Armenia (the 1988 earthquake, the 1991–94 war 
with Azerbaijan and the 2016 Four-Day War); in Azerbaijan (pogroms against 
Armenians in 1987–90); and in the Middle East (the Syrian civil war and the 
brief occupation of Kessab by the Syrian opposition in 2014).
Exile and trauma
Classic diasporas are characterised by ‘a collective trauma, a banishment, 
where one dreamed of home but lived in exile’.529 Exile and dispersion have 
been, in one form or another, part of the Armenian experience since the sixth 
century AD. Those who have remained in the homeland have lived with the 
constant threat of exile, domination or annihilation, with these experiences 
becoming ‘normalised’.
The genocide of the Armenians, launched by the Ottoman Turkish govern-
ment during World War One and completed by its successor Kemalist state, 
created conditions of exile and trauma on an unprecedented scale. Up to 1.5 
million Armenians were killed, and hundreds of thousands were forcibly 
converted to Islam or deported into the Syrian Desert.530 The millennia-old 
Armenian homeland was emptied of its indigenous inhabitants in what for-
mer Armenian Foreign Minister Raffi Hovannisian has referred to as the ‘Great 
National Dispossession’,531 with survivors eventually scattered across the world 
 527 Donald E Miller, ‘The Role of Historical Memory in Interpreting Events 
in the Republic of Armenia’, in Remembrance and Denial: The Case of the 
Armenian Genocide, ed. Richard G Hovannisian (Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press, 1998).
 528 Ani Kalayjian and Marian Weisberg, ‘Generational Impact of Mass Trauma: 
The Post-Ottoman Turkish Genocide of the Armenians’, in Jihad and Sacred 
Vengeance, eds. JS Piven, C Boyd, and HW Lawton (New York: Writers Club 
Press, 2002), 254–79.
 529 Robin Cohen, Global Diasporas: An Introduction (London: UCL Press, 
1997), ix.
 530 Greeks and Assyrians were also subjected to genocide, with an estimated 
1,000,000 killed.
 531 See, for example, Raffi Hovanissian, ‘Forward To The Past: Russia, Turkey, 
And Armenia’s Faith’, RadioFreeEurope, RadioLiberty, October 21, 2008, 
https://www.rferl.org/a/commentary_Russia_Turkey_Armenia/1331509.
html, accessed April 10, 2019.
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or making their way to the newly declared independent Republic of Armenia 
that lasted from 1918 to 1920.532 
Kalayjian and Weisberg’s 2002 study documented the transmission of the 
trauma of the genocide to the second and third generations.533 Eight partici-
pants aged 22 to 78, consisting of both survivors and their offspring, all reported 
feelings of grief, sadness, anger, pain and confusion over the genocide and its 
continued denial by the Turkish government, experiencing this denial as ‘an 
attack on their personhood, feeling like a non-person’.534 Both survivors and 
their offspring reported a distrust of outsiders and ‘deep and intense feelings of 
helplessness’, mostly in response to persistent Turkish denial.535 They found that 
‘anger that was not expressed internally was expressed horizontally: toward one 
another, to other Armenians, toward the facilitators in the workshop’.536 Off-
spring of survivors felt ‘like orphans: no roots, no relatives, no uncles and great 
aunts’. Importantly, they felt ‘burdened by having to carry emotional memo-
ries of previous generations’, for which ‘some second-generation respondents 
reported resentment’.537
In both the diaspora and Armenia, events throughout the twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries reinforced the sense of exile and made the healing of 
the post-genocide trauma more difficult. Among the diasporan communities, 
this trauma was compounded by the growing realisation that exile was now 
permanent. The creation of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1922 
confirmed Armenia’s re-absorption into the Russia sphere, and any chance of 
regaining independence and returning from exile now seemed lost. The second 
wave of emigration during and after World War Two from the long-established 
Middle Eastern and European communities to North and South America and 
Australia, pushed the epicentre of the diaspora further away from the homeland, 
making it more difficult to contemplate return if Armenia were to regain inde-
pendence. For those living in Soviet Armenia and in other parts of the Soviet 
Union, a series of events reinforced the sense of trauma: the Stalinist purges of 
the 1930s and the exile of thousands to Siberia were followed by heavy losses 
during World War Two, and more recently the earthquake in 1988, the pogroms 
in Azerbaijan, the war over Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh in Armenian) in the 
1990s, the Four-Day War in 2016 and the ongoing economic, political and 
 532 The independent Republic of Armenia was established, along with the 
Republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan, following the Bolshevik Revolution 
and collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917. It was reabsorbed into what was 
by then communist Russia in 1920, and became one of the 15 republics of 
the Soviet Union in 1922. 
 533 Kalayjian and Weisberg, ‘Generational Impact’.
 534 Ibid., 11.
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social challenges in post-Soviet Armenia leading to mass emigration from 
the homeland. 
These conditions created what poet Vahe Oshagan refers to as a sense of 
 ‘constant vigilance’—‘sleeping with one eye open’.538 The unresolved post- 
genocide trauma, along with the ongoing denial of the genocide by Turkey, 
is key to understanding the response of many Armenians to those events, 
 particularly in the last three decades.
Responses to the genocide and to Turkish denial
In 1986, Donald and Lorna Miller carried out in-depth interviews with 
92 Armenian Genocide survivors in California. They identified six responses to 
the experience of genocide: repression, rationalisation, resignation, reconcilia-
tion, rage and revenge.539 Miller and Miller argued that an individual’s experi-
ence of these six responses is often sequential, though there is overlap between 
stages and different people experience each stage differently. Their research 
showed how individual responses are shaped, among other things, by the extent 
and type of trauma, by pre- and post-genocide positive or negative interactions 
with Turkish people, and by the level of involvement in the  Armenian commu-
nity and its religious, political and cultural organisations.540
I suggest that Miller and Miller’s typology also describes the collective Arme-
nian response to both the genocide itself and to its denial by successive Turk-
ish governments. Furthermore, I suggest that, in the decades since Miller and 
Miller developed their typology, there has emerged a seventh response: engage-
ment with Turkish government, civil society and individuals. This seventh 
response is qualitatively different to the previous six responses, in that it has an 
outward, positive focus. I also explore how the ongoing trauma of the genocide 
and its denial have fuelled the fear that the genocide ‘is happening again’, shap-
ing the response by many Armenians to events in the homeland and the Middle 
East in the last three decades.
Repression, rationalisation, resignation  
and reconciliation (1918–1965)
Repression, rationalisation, resignation and reconciliation are inward-looking, 
essentially reactive responses to trauma. Repression involves ‘putting a lid on’ 
painful memories as a way of coping with past events that are ‘too  horrible to 
 538 Notes from lectures by Vahe Oshagan at Macquarie University, Sydney, in 
1992–93.
 539 Miller, ‘An Oral,’ 187–202.
 540 Ibid., 189–190.
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contemplate’.541 The sheer trauma of the genocide, along with ‘survivor guilt’,542 
left the Armenian exiles numb, with barely enough motivation to focus on per-
sonal survival and the preservation of their cultural heritage in the face of ‘white 
massacre’ (jermag chart or assimilation without bloodshed).543 Aside from the 
targeted assassination of members of the former Committee for Union and 
Progress (Young Turk) government in the 1920s, the desire for justice and rec-
ognition of the genocide by Turkey and the world did not translate into consist-
ent, organised political activism until 1965.
Rationalisation can take the form of political, pragmatic or religious expla-
nations for a traumatic experience. Miller and Miller found that, while many 
survivors were reluctant to allow repressed memories to resurface, they tried 
to give meaning to the genocide. Some viewed the genocide as a means of 
‘salvation’; that is, as an opportunity for personal and collective religious or 
political awakening, while others suggested that exile from the homeland pro-
vided better opportunities for long-term national flourishing.544 The Armenian 
Apostolic, Catholic and Protestant churches have drawn on sacred concepts of 
martyrdom, death-burial-resurrection, moral victory and redemption through 
suffering to make sense of the genocide and its aftermath.545 However, beyond 
these basic rationalisations, there has been little philosophical or theological 
reflection on the meaning and impact of the genocide, making it difficult for 
diasporan thinkers and leaders to achieve true ‘reconciliation’ with self and the 
Turkish nation due to the inability to derive meaning from the genocide.546
As memories become submerged beneath the realities of everyday life, and 
simplistic rationalisations seem increasingly inadequate, resignation expresses 
a sense of helplessness in the face of a past that cannot be changed and of a 
recognition that is increasingly elusive. The sense of resignation was fuelled 
by the international community’s abandonment of Armenia in the immediate 
post-war period, whose recognition of Kemalist Turkey and its borders in 1923, 
along with the sovietisation of the Armenian Republic, removed any hope for 
 541 Miller, ‘An Oral’, 192.
 542 Lorne Shirinian, ‘Survivor Memoirs of the Armenian Genocide as Cultural 
History’, in Remembrance and Denial, ed. Richard G Hovannisian (Detroit: 
Wayne State University Press), 171–72.
 543 Rouben Manuel Torossian, ‘The Contemporary Armenian Nationalist 
Movement’ (PhD diss., United States International University, 1980), 48.
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 545 For discussion of religious explanations for the Genocide, see for exam-
ple Leonardo Alishan, ‘Crucifixion Without “The Cross”: The Impact of 
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return or recognition. Meanwhile, the Turkification of Armenian place names 
in historical Armenian lands was completed by the 1930s. 
French-Armenian writer Shahan Shahnour expressed this sense of resigna-
tion in his novel, Nahanch Arants Yerki (Retreat without Song), published in 
1929, in which six Parisian survivors of the genocide angrily reflect on their 
powerlessness in the face of the pressures of assimilation: 
Parents, sons, uncles, and sons-in-law, retreat; 
customs, conceptions, morals, and love, retreat. 
The language retreats, the language retreats, the language retreats. 
And we are still retreating in words and in deed, 
willingly and unwillingly, knowingly and unknowingly: 
forgive them, forgive them, Ararat!547
Reconciliation is an acceptance of things as they are, but unlike resignation 
it involves a conscious decision. Reconciliation on an individual level might 
involve confronting one’s own anger, or concluding that disasters are ‘part of 
life’ and that one needs to ‘move on’, or beginning to recount stories of Turks 
who saved them. However, until the perpetrator acknowledges their crime, 
full reconciliation is impossible. Miller and Miller found that ‘Turkey’s current 
denial campaign simply fuels feelings of resentment and hostility’ among survi-
vors. Denial is the ‘salt’ that is rubbed into the open wound.548 Collectively, this 
means that it is difficult for the nation to ‘be at peace’ within itself.
Rage and revenge (1965–2001)
Fifty years of Turkish denial and continuing exile have made full reconciliation 
impossible, and have given birth to rage and, in some cases, revenge. While 
rage is generally an ‘internalised’ emotion, revenge is the acting out of these 
‘hostile feelings’ or giving approval to others who do so.549
Among some Armenians, rage was and continues to be expressed in the 
form of hatred towards the Turkish population and for anything Turkish: boy-
cotting Turkish goods; avoiding travel to Turkey; expressing anger at annual 
 commemorative events; or preventing their children from befriending Turks. 
However, 1965 marked the beginning of the politicisation of that rage; that 
is, its outward expression in non-violent form. Aside from ongoing Turkish 
denial, the emergence of activist rage was triggered by several factors: the 
 547 From Shahan Shahnour, Retreat Without Song, cited in Hagop Oshagan, 
Hai Kraganoutiun [Armenian Literature] (Jerusalem: St. James Patriarchate 
Press, 1942), 634–35.
 548 Miller, ‘An Oral’, 195–98.
 549 Ibid., 198–200.
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 environment of activism in the Western world of the 1960s; the symbolism of 
the 50-year anniversary; the tensions of the Cold War; and the emergence of a 
second generation of diasporans who carried the historical memory (‘trauma 
by proxy’)550 but who did not carry the burden of repressed memories.
On 24 April 1965, the government of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic 
held an official commemoration of the genocide. While delegates inside the 
theatre delivered solemn and cautious speeches, over 100,000 people gath-
ered outside calling for the return of Turkish occupied Armenian lands.551 On 
the same day, services commemorating the genocide were held in diasporan 
communities throughout the world. As a result of this awakening, Armenian 
National Committees were established throughout the world to pursue the 
‘Armenian Cause’, by lobbying world governments for official recognition of 
the genocide.
This recognition was slow to come. Rage turned into revenge for some 
 Armenians who saw violence as a means of expressing their frustration with 
ongoing Turkish denial and of expediting international recognition.552 In 1973, 
a lone gunman, genocide survivor Gourgen Yanikian, assassinated the Turkish 
Consul and Vice-Consul in Los Angeles. Over the next decade, a number of 
Armenian terrorist organisations were formed that targeted Turkish consular 
staff, businesses and citizens around the world.553 Cohen suggests that ‘it is easy 
to see that the 60-year silence about the genocide and the obstinate denials of the 
Turkish government were at some point going to provoke open rage rather than 
resignation and repressed anger’.554 While violence is never an inevitable (or jus-
tifiable) expression of trauma, terrorism was an act of desperation by those who 
lived with either the direct or inherited unresolved trauma of the genocide. 
Armenian response to the terror attacks was mixed. Most Armenians in the 
United States were opposed to terrorism,555 and the acts of terror were publicly 
 550 Amanda Wise, Exile and Return Among the East Timorese (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 11.
 551 Richard Hrair Dekmejian, ‘Soviet-Turkish Relations and Politics in the 
Armenian SSR’, Soviet Studies 19, no. 4 (1968): 513–15.
 552 Khachig Tololyan, ‘Cultural Narrative and the Motivation of the Terrorist’, 
Journal of Strategic Studies, Special Issue: Inside Terrorist Organizations 10, 
no. 4 (1987): 226.
 553 See Torossian, ‘Contemporary Armenian,’ 231–37, for a complete list of 
Armenian terrorist organisations and a breakdown of terrorist activities 
until 1980.
 554 Cohen, Global Diasporas, 54.
 555 Anny Bakalian states that 65 per cent of the American-Armenians she 
 inter viewed did not agree with terrorism as a means of furthering the 
 Armenian cause. The percentage was highest among American-born Arme-
nians. Anny Bakalian, Armenian-Americans: From Being to Feeling Armenian 
(New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1993), 53–54.
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condemned by most Armenian organisations. However, a number of Armenian 
writers and commentators expressed sympathy with the frustration that had 
given impetus to the killings, and some media outlets even praised the ‘brav-
ery’ of the terrorists.556 By appealing to ‘shared symbols’557 associated with the 
Armenian revolutionary movements in the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth 
century558—martyrdom, justice and revenge—terrorists were able to appeal to 
the popular imagination. In any case, the spate of terrorist attacks succeeded in 
placing the issue of the genocide and its ongoing denial on the global agenda.
In response to Armenian lobbying and terrorism, the Turkish government 
launched a propaganda counter-offensive. Beginning with the publication of 
booklets distributed to governments, embassies and libraries across the world, 
the denial campaign grew into a multi-million dollar industry, with a large pro-
portion of the funds spent paying public relations firms in Washington DC in 
an attempt to prevent the US President, Congress and Senate from publicly 
affirming the genocide. Turkish Studies Chairs were established in the United 
States, funded by the Turkish government and often run by known denialists 
of the Armenian Genocide. In Australia, in 1988, Turkish consular representa-
tives attempted to prevent the Centre for Comparative Genocide Studies at 
Macquarie University, Sydney—the forerunner of the Australian Institute for 
Holocaust and Genocide Studies—from teaching the Armenian Genocide. The 
ongoing denial of the genocide has had a profound psychological impact on 
the Armenian survivors and on subsequent generations:559 ‘The distortion 
of the truth impacts directly upon his own identity, and therefore the identity 
 556 For examples of overt or tacit support in the Armenia press, see Torossian, 
‘Contemporary Armenian’.
 557 Jenny Phillips, Symbol, Myth and Rhetoric: The Politics of Culture in an 
Armenian-American Population (New York: AMS Press, 1989), 142.
 558 A number of Armenian nationalist revolutionary groups and parties 
formed in the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth century. Of these, two 
continue to operate today: the Social Democrat Hunchak Party, founded 
in 1887 by a group of students in Geneva; and the Armenian Revolution-
ary Federation founded in 1890 in Tbilisi, Russia (now in Georgia). These 
 parties initially pursued the recognition of Armenian minority rights within 
the Ottoman Empire, but later sought independence for Armenians. They 
engaged in both terrorist and self-defensive acts in pursuit of their goals.
 559 Vigen Guroian, ‘Collective Responsibility and Official Excuse Making: The 
Case of the Turkish Genocide of the Armenians’, in The Armenian  Genocide 
in Perspective, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian (New Jersey: Transaction 
 Publishers, 1986), 135–36; and Leo Hamalian, ‘The Armenian Genocide 
and the Literary Imagination’, in The Armenian Genocide in Perspective, 
ed. Richard G Hovannisian (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1986), 
153–203, passim.
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of his children, because their identity formation is so closely tied to his own 
perceptions and feelings about himself, his past, and his worth’.560
Engagement (2001–present) 
As an alternative to rage and revenge, I suggest that some Armenians have more 
recently adopted a seventh response to the genocide and its denial: engage-
ment with Turkish government, civil groups and individuals. This has involved 
reflection on the current reality and a re-adjustment of goals and methods, and 
is qualitatively different to the previous six responses in that it has an outward, 
positive focus.
On the Armenian side, engagement has been prompted by the conditions of 
their host countries, in particular Europe, the United States of America, Canada 
and Australia, where Armenian intellectuals and community members alike 
have the opportunity to interact with their Turkish peers in a less restrictive 
environment. In addition, since a large number of countries have now formally 
recognised the Armenian Genocide, there has been a call by some Armenians 
to move from a strategy of seeking recognition to seeking reparations.561 
On the Turkish side, a growing number of journalists, scholars and other 
leaders have publicly acknowledged the Armenian Genocide, or have recog-
nised that Armenians died as a result of government-sponsored massacres 
rather than employing the previous euphemisms of ‘mutual massacres’ or ‘civil 
war’. This is despite Turkish laws prohibiting such acknowledgement.562 Early 
Turkish voices included prominent authors Elif Şafak and Orhan Pamuk, and 
historian Taner Akçam who has gained access to Ottoman records and written 
a number of important books outlining Turkish responsibility for the genocide. 
More recently, journalist Hasan Cemal, the grandson of Cemal Paşa who was 
one of the Young Turk triumvirate responsible for the Armenian Genocide, has 
acknowledged the reality of the genocide.
 560 Levon Boyajian and Haigaz Grigorian, ‘Psychosocial Sequelae of the Arme-
nian Genocide’, in The Armenian Genocide in Perspective, ed. Richard G. 
Hovannisian (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1986), 183.
 561 For example Harut Sassounian, ‘Genocide Recognition and a Quest for Jus-
tice’, Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 32, 
no. 115 (2010): 115–22. 
 562 The first part of Turkish Penal Code 301 reads: ‘A person who publicly den-
igrates the Turkish Nation, the State of the Turkish Republic or the Grand 
National Assembly of Turkey and the judicial institutions of the State 
shall be punishable by imprisonment from 6 months to 2 years’. The code 
has been used to charge authors, writers and activists who use the term 
 ‘Armenian Genocide’. 
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The Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC, 2001–04) was 
the first major attempt at organised dialogue between Armenians and Turks. 
TARC highlighted the challenges of such engagement: conflicting agendas; 
the involvement of known denialists on the Turkish side; and the involvement 
of third party governments. Nevertheless, TARC created a precedent for civil 
society engagement. The assassination of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant 
Dink in January 2007 gave further impetus to grassroots initiatives in Arme-
nian-Turkish relations. Gatherings to commemorate Dink’s death were held 
throughout the world, initiated by members of the Armenian, Turkish and 
Kurdish communities. Also, the ‘I Apologise’ campaign, launched in December 
2008 in Turkey by a group of academics, journalists and others, was endorsed 
by over 30,000 signatories. The apology stated: ‘My conscience does not 
accept the insensitivity showed [sic] to and the denial of the Great Catastrophe 
that the Ottoman Armenians were subjected to in 1915. I reject this injustice 
and for my share, I empathise with the feelings and pain of my Armenian broth-
ers. I apologise to them’.563 Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan refused 
to endorse the apology campaign, arguing that Turkey had done nothing for 
which to apologise.564 Instead, in a statement made on 23 April 2013, he called 
the ‘mass killings’ by Ottoman forces ‘inhumane’ and offered his ‘condolences’ 
to the grandchildren of those killed. However, he embedded his comments 
in the language of ‘shared pain’, arguing that all Ottoman citizens suffered and 
that it was ‘inadmissible’ for these events to be used as a way of stirring up hos-
tility against Turkey today.565 Erdoğan’s comments came against the backdrop 
of the failed Armenian-Turkish Protocols initiated by Turkey in 2009, aimed 
at  restoring diplomatic relations with Armenia and opening up discussion 
about the genocide. The impetus for this initiative came from Erdoğan’s initial 
push for entry into the European Union, and subsequently from his desire to 
raise Turkey’s profile in regional affairs. In the end, the Protocols were bur-
ied, in part due to Turkey’s insistence that Armenian forces withdraw from 
Nagorno-Karabakh as a pre-condition.566 
 563 Özür diliyorum (I Apologise), http://www.ozurdiliyoruz.com/. The site has 
since been shut down and the signatories punished under Article 301 of 
the Turkish Penal Code—see ‘“Özur diliyorum” yine takip altında’,  Radikal, 
March 3, 2009, www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/ozur-diliyorum-yine-takip 
-altinda-924313/, accessed October 10, 2018.
 564 İlgili Gündem Haberleri, ‘Turkish PM Says Apology Campaign to  Armenians 
Unacceptable’, Hurriyet Daily News, December 17, 2008, http://www 
.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/10587736.asp, accessed October 10, 2018.
 565 Constanze Letsch, ‘Turkish PM Offers Condolences Over 1915  Armenian 
Massacre,’ Guardian, April 24, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com 
/world/2014/apr/23/turkey-erdogan-condolences-armenian-massacre, 
accessed October 10, 2018.
 566 For the text of the Protocols and a discussion of the reasons for their 
 suspension, see David L Phillips, Michael Lemmon, and Thomas de Waal, 
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The response from Armenians to these initiatives is mixed. Some have viewed 
them as a ‘crack’ in the wall of denial, seeing the narrative of ‘shared pain’ as 
an improvement on the argument that ‘it never happened, but they deserved 
it anyway’. However, critics pointed out that the language and content of the ‘I 
Apologise’ campaign were problematic and that Armenians were not consulted 
in formulating the wording.567 They saw Erdoğan’s comments as an attempt to 
‘soften’ the Armenians in the lead-up to the 100th anniversary of the genocide 
in 2015. Overall, critics saw Turkish efforts as a way of strengthening Turkey 
(rather than bringing about justice for the Armenians), or of simply neutralis-
ing Armenian efforts at obtaining recognition and reparation while reinforcing 
the unequal power relations between Armenians and Turks.
The narrative of ‘it’s happening again’ has been a strong factor in shaping 
the response of some Armenians to these apologies. For many, it is difficult to 
trust any Turkish overtures. This distrust is shaped by previous experience. 
When the Young Turks came to power in 1908, Armenians were promised 
reforms that would give them equal rights within the Ottoman Empire. By 
1915, the Armenian dream of freedom and fraternity under the Young Turks 
had transformed into a genocidal nightmare.
Unresolved trauma, re-traumatisation and ‘history repeating’
So far, I have explored how the seven responses to the genocide and its denial 
have been experienced sequentially. Yet the unresolved nature of the trauma 
means that it is possible for Armenians to continue to experience a number of 
different responses at any given time. For example, a genocide survivor might 
relive rage or resignation, or even the very same emotions they experienced 
during the genocide itself, in the face of fresh trauma. 
On 8 December 1988, a magnitude 6.8 earthquake struck northern Armenia. 
The earthquake flattened several villages and a major town, Spitak, and caused 
severe damage to Armenia’s second largest city, Gyumri. The death toll was 
estimated at between 25,000 and 50,000, with 130,000 injured and up to half 
a million rendered homeless. In her work among earthquake survivors, Anie 
Kalayjian found that some elderly survivors who had lived through the  genocide 
Diplomatic History: The Turkish-Armenian Protocols (Harvard: Insti-
tute for the Study of Human Rights, 2012), https://carnegieendowment 
.org/2012/04/17/diplomatic-history-turkey-armenia-protocols-event 
-3630, accessed October 10, 2018. For background to the Nagorno-Karabakh 
issue, see the next section.
 567 Ayda Erbal, ‘Mea Culpas, Negotiations, Apologias: Revisiting the “Apology” 
of Turkish Intellectuals’, in Reconciliation, Civil Society, and the Politics of 
Memory: Transnational Initiatives in the 20th and 21st Century, ed. Birgit 
Schwelling (Blelefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2012), 53–54.
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were now experiencing nightmares of the horrors of 1915.568 The fresh trauma 
(the earthquake) gave opportunity for the repressed trauma of the genocide 
to surface, with the earthquake being seen through the lens of the ‘memory 
of trauma’.569
Survivors and eyewitnesses of the pogroms against Armenians in Azerbaijan 
between 1988 and 1990 also interpreted their experience through the lens of 
previous trauma. Armenians had lived in what is now Azerbaijan for hundreds 
of years. There had been massacres and inter-ethnic conflict in the early part of 
the twentieth century (the Armenian-Tatar massacres in 1905–07 and three 
massacres of Armenians between 1918 and 1920), followed by seven decades 
of relative stability under Soviet rule. However, in February 1988, Azerbaijani 
mobs killed dozens of Armenians and looted their homes in the city of Sum-
gait just north of the Azerbaijani capital, Baku, with police standing by. This 
was followed by similar pogroms in Kirovabad, north of Nagorno-Karabakh, 
in November 1988, and in the capital, Baku, in January 1990. 
The death toll from the pogroms ranged from the official figure of 120 to 
unofficial estimates of several hundred. Eerily, Harutyun Marutyan noted that 
‘the method of killing was the same as that used by the Turks during the geno-
cide’. Victims in both cases ‘were beaten, tortured, raped, and thrown out of 
windows, slain with metal rods and knives, chopped with axes, beheaded and 
burnt in fires … ’.570 This similarity was confirmed by interviews conducted by 
Donald E. Miller with the observers of the Sumgait massacres.571
Armenians around the world immediately linked the pogroms to the geno-
cide. Evan Pheiffer added that ‘Armenians seem incapable of separating the 
1988 pogroms from the 1915 Ottoman atrocities—mention of one immedi-
ately triggers talk of the other’.572 Mari Hovhannisyan noted that ‘the posters 
carried by the Armenians on April 24, 1988 were verifications of the fact that 
Armenians saw the Sumgait massacres as the continuation of the genocide. 
… The events in Sumgait are the sequence of 1915 Genocide. Reluctance to 
acknowledge the 1915 Genocide led to the Genocide of 1988’.573 As a result 
 568 Anie Kalayjian, Rania Lee Kanazi, Christopher L. Aberson, and Lena Feygin, 
‘A Cross-Cultural Study of the Psychosocial and Spiritual Impact of Natural 
Disaster’, International Journal of Group Tensions 31, no. 2 (2002): 178.
 569 Erica Resende and Dovile Budryte, Memory and Trauma in International 
Relations: Theories, Cases and Debates (London: Routledge, 2013), 65.
 570 Harutyun Marutyan, ‘Iconography of Armenian Identity: The Memory of 
Genocide and the Karabagh Movement’, Gitutyun (Yerevan: Publishing 
House of The National Academy of Sciences, Republic of Armenia, 2009).
 571 Miller, ‘The Role’, passim.
 572 Evan Pheiffer, ‘A Place to Live For’, Jacobin, June 1, 2016, https://www 
.jacobinmag.com/2016/06/nagorno-karabakh-armenia-azerbaijan-four 
-day-war/, accessed April 10, 2019.
 573 Mari Hovannisyan, The Collective Memory of the Armenian Genocide 
(Budapest: Central European University, 2010), 21–22.
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of the pogroms, 350,000 Armenians fled Azerbaijan to neighbouring Arme-
nia or Russia. As Miller and Miller point out, ‘The pogroms, while horrific, 
did not justify in themselves the mass exodus that occurred unless viewed as 
the precursor to an actual genocide’.574 The reason for this ‘overreaction’ lies 
in the memory of the Armenian Genocide a century earlier: the Azerbaijani 
‘other’ was reminiscent of the Turkish ‘other’ of that genocide. (Azerbaijanis are 
a Turkic people and speak a language similar to Turkish). The Armenians of 
Azerbaijan were re-traumatised, fearing that ‘it is happening again’. Their fears 
may have been well-founded: one wonders what the fate of these Armenians 
would have been if they had remained in Azerbaijan during the ensuing war 
over Nagorno-Karabakh.575 
The pogroms in Azerbaijan raised fears that Armenians in Nagorno- Karabakh 
could meet a similar fate. In 1921, in an effort to appease Kemalist Turkey 
and the more numerous Muslim inhabitants in the region, the newly formed 
Soviet Union had placed the Armenian-populated enclaves of Nagorno-Kara-
bakh and Nakhichevan under Azerbaijani control.576 Large-scale demonstra-
tions calling for greater autonomy for Nagorno-Karabakh, and eventually for 
re-unification with Armenia, began in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh 
in 1987, and gained impetus after the pogroms. Tensions escalated between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan,577 leading to a successful referendum for Nagorno-
Karabakh’s independence in 1991, followed by military conflict that erupted 
into full-scale war in 1992 and ended with a ceasefire in 1994. By that time, 
the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of Soviet times and its 
surrounding territories were under Armenian military and political control—
a total area of approximately 12,000 square kilometres. Since then, regular 
peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan have failed to make progress, and 
clashes have become a regular occurrence on the frontline. 
The Armenians were victorious in the war; however, the ceasefire is precarious 
and there remains a threat of renewed hostilities. Azerbaijan’s  military budget 
is greater than Armenia’s total state budget, and the rhetoric of  Azerbaijan’s 
leadership has become increasingly bellicose.578 The Four-day War in 2016 
 574 Miller, ‘The Role’, 187.
 575 Ibid., 188.
 576 Subsequently, while Nagorno-Karabakh had retained its Armenian major-
ity, Nakhichevan’s Armenian minority reduced from 40 per cent in 1917 to 
15 per cent in 1926 and 1.5 per cent in 1979, mainly through emigration 
to Armenia and Russia. 
 577 For discussion of this escalation, see Armen Gakavian, ‘Armenia: From 
Irredentism to Independence: The Dynamics of the Nagorno-Karabagh 
Crisis’ (Honours thesis, University of Sydney, 1991).
 578 For example Joshua Kucera, ‘Following Armenian Uprising, Azerbaijan’s 
Saber Rattling Grows Louder’, Eurasianet, July 3, 2018, https://eurasianet 
.org/following-armenian-uprising-azerbaijans-saber-rattling-grows 
-louder, accessed April 10, 2019.
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confirmed Armenia’s fear that war could erupt at any time. On 2 April 2016, 
fighting broke out between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces on the Nagorno-
Karabakh frontline. As a result, dozens of soldiers and civilians were killed on 
both sides, and Azerbaijan obtained approximately eight to 20 square kilome-
tres of land from Nagorno-Karabakh, marking the first time that the line of 
contact had shifted since 1994.579 There were reports of war crimes by Azer-
baijani troops, including ‘torture, execution, and mutilation’, and ‘beheadings, 
ears and hands cut off, and throats cut’,580 again reminiscent of methods used in 
the genocide. The most famous case was that of three elderly members of the 
Khalapyan family who were discovered by Armenian photojournalist Hakob 
Poghosyan in the village of Talish. The family appeared to have been tortured, 
mutilated and killed.581 A photo of the deceased family was widely circulated in 
the Armenian media,582 again feeding the sense of ‘it’s happening again’.
Armenians in the Middle East have similarly experienced this sense of history 
repeating. Genocide survivors and their descendants were ‘gripped with fear’ 
at the possibility of mass violence against Christian minorities during the 1956 
nationalist revolution in Egypt.583 More recently, the advance of Islamic fun-
damentalism in Iraq, Egypt and Syria following the ‘Arab Spring’ has  created a 
 579 For an analysis of the causes, course and outcome of the Four-Day War, 
see Masis Ingilizian, ‘Azerbaijan’s Incremental Increase On The Nagorno 
Karabagh Frontline’, Bellingcat, April 12, 2016, https://www.bellingcat 
.com/news/rest-of-world/2016/04/12/detailing-azerbaijans-incremental 
-increase-in-nagorno-karabaghs-frontline/, accessed April 10, 2019. Esti-
mates of the number of casualties vary. While both sides blamed the other 
for the hostilities, the evidence points to Azerbaijan as the instigator. Mikayel 
Zolyan argues that: ‘Arguably, apart from testing the defences on the line of 
contact, the operation pursued external and internal political goals: modi-
fying the status quo in the peace process and testing the international com-
munity’s reaction to military action in the region, as well as  consolidating 
Azerbaijani society around its ruling government’. See Mikayel Zolyan, 
‘The Karabakh Conflict After the “Four-Day War”: A Dynamic  Status Quo’, 
Turkish Policy Quarterly, March 14, 2017. 
 580 Artsakh Ombudsman’s ‘Second Interim Report on Atrocities Committed 
by Azerbaijan During the 2016 April War’, Karabakhfacts.com, December 9, 
2016, https://karabakhfacts.com/tag/4-day-war/, accessed April 10, 2019.
 581 See Maria Titizian, ‘War Crimes in Spring: The Four Day War One Year On’, 
EVN Report, April 1, 2017, https://www.evnreport.com/spotlight-karabakh 
/war-crimes-in-spring, accessed April 10, 2019.
 582 See, inter alia, ‘Azerbaijani Soldiers Execute Elderly Armenian Couple in 
Artsakh; Then Cut Off Their Ears’, HETQ, April 4, 2016, https://hetq.am/en 
/article/66976, accessed April 10, 2019.
 583 Based on my conversations with Egyptian-Armenian émigrés.
‘It’s Happening Again’ 191
new wave of refugees and nurtured a new narrative of exile, massacre and even 
genocide in describing these events.
The #SaveKessab campaign of the first half of 2014 epitomised this fear. On 
21 March 2014, the predominantly Armenian village of Kessab in northeastern 
Syria was captured by opposition forces. Most Armenian residents had been 
evacuated to safety in nearby towns before the capture, with only a handful of 
residents left behind. While the Kessab ‘genocide’ narrative circulated by some 
of the Armenian mainstream and social media did not hold up to analysis, the 
fact that the #SaveKessab campaign resonated so quickly and so widely, and 
the panic spread so easily, is telling. The sense of ‘it’s happening again’ was 
fuelled by several factors: Kessab had twice before experienced deportations 
(in 1909 and 1915); Kessab was one of the only two remaining Armenian vil-
lages along the Mediterranean coast (the other being Vakıflı, across the bor-
der in Turkey); Turkey’s involvement in allowing Islamic militant groups to 
cross the border into Syria aroused suspicions of Turkey’s intentions regard-
ing the Armenians; and the killing, rape, forced conversion and deportation of 
 Christian, Yazidi and Shia minorities in Syria and Iraq by ISIS were a haunting 
repetition of some of the methods used during the Armenian Genocide.584
Conclusion
The unresolved post-genocide trauma, continuing sense of exile, denial 
by successive Turkish governments and geopolitically driven reluctance 
of some countries to acknowledge the Armenian Genocide have had a pro-
found  psychological impact on the survivors of the genocide and subsequent 
 generations. The six responses identified by Miller and Miller—repression, 
rationalisation, resignation, reconciliation, rage and revenge—and the more 
recent response of engagement provide a helpful framework for documenting 
this impact and explaining the fear that ‘it’s happening again’. This fear is key 
to understanding the response to events in the past three decades in Armenia 
(such as the earthquake and the war with Azerbaijan), Azerbaijan (pogroms) 
and the  Middle East (the Syrian civil war and the brief occupation of Kessab). 
Until there is a resolution of the trauma there can be no collective healing or 
closure, and each subsequent traumatic experience will reinforce the fear that 
‘it’s happening again’.
 584 For an excellent discussion of the post-genocide dynamics around events 
in Kessab, see Elyse Semerdjian, ‘#SaveKessab, #Save Aleppo, and Kim 
 Kardashian: Syria’s Rashomon Effect’, Jadaliyya, April 24, 2014, http://www 
.jadaliyya.com/Details/30576#SaveKessab,-#Save-Aleppo,-and-Kim 
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